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SUMMARY 
 
 
      The object of this thesis is the examination of the concept of political representation in the 
corpus of Hobbes, Locke, Hegel and Marx. Through the method of textual reconstruction I 
foreground the concept’s salience in their writings. Political representation constitutes a unitary 
political society as the basis of representative government by entrusting to a separate part of the 
political community the exercise of the legislative and executive functions on behalf of the 
political society. 
       Hobbes’s author-actor model grounded the concept of political representation by 
introducing the act of the transfer of will to a representative by authorisation. Thereby he 
established the problematic relationship of permanently alienated, absolute, representative 
power acting in the name of the political community. Locke conceptualised political 
representation in a way that restored to political society the power to determine the legitimacy 
of its representative government in case the latter transgressed the norm of acting for the public 
good of society. Hegel, in turn, assigned to political representation the crucial function of 
integrating civil society into the power system of the state thus securing the identity of 
subjective and objective freedom in the rational state, though political representation bestows 
only formal freedom to civil society’s involvement in the affairs of the state.   
      For Marx, the relationship of political representation makes the representative polity appear 
as a democratically governed political society within which individual freedom and the public 
good are secured. This is vitiated by the rift between political society/state and civil society. 
Marx censures liberal and republican theory for ignoring the primacy of civil/bourgeois society 
over the representative political society. As a consequence, he argues, the representative polity 
is not a form of self-government but other-determined and neither freedom nor the public good 
are realised. Instead, under the regime of private property, money assumes the authorial 
function of organising social exchange and human relations, shaping the representative polity 
after its own image, and thus it renders democracy as popular sovereignty a lie.  
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                                                            Introduction  
         The concept of political representation has remained largely under-researched in recent 
political theory. There is certainly a wealth of book-length studies and collections of articles on 
democracy and representation, on representative government or on representative democracy1 
but there is dearth of research on the issue of political representation in connection with the 
modern political philosophers I discuss in the thesis. Though there is abundant literature for each 
of the four philosophers (Hobbes, Locke, Hegel, Marx) I engage with, hitherto there has not been 
any significant study addressing these four thinkers together, let alone in connection with the 
theme of political representation.   
        On a general level, a reason for the relative absence of an explicit focus on the concept of 
political representation may be the difficulty of constructing a concept of representation that can 
capture the wide gamut of forms of representation in existence in modernity. The ubiquity of the 
social and political relations of representation which organise the contours of modern life has 
made representation a kind of ‘second nature’ inscribed in mundane activities and so rendering it 
invisible to reflection. The ubiquitous presence of representation is surmised if we consider the 
fact that all persons and objects are involved in various kinds of representative relations 
throughout their lives. The parent-child relationship involves a relationship of trusteeship 
(according to Locke at least) where the parents are the child’s representatives not only in regard 
to the public authorities but also in regard to the child’s best interests rather than their own. All 
public officials are representatives of the state. All employees of private firms are taken to be 
either authorised or unauthorised representatives of their corporations during work. All 
enfranchised citizens are entitled to participate in the election of their governments and in the 
selection of political representatives responsible to voice the interests or concerns of their 
constituencies. Last but not least, property ownership involves a connection of representation 
between the owner and his property whilst the commodity world achieves its integral character 
due to the mediating function of money as the universal representative of any and all 
commodities. This diversity of forms of representation shows the open-ended character of the 
                                                            
1 See for example, A. Przeworski, S. C. Stokes, B. Manin, eds., Democracy, Accountability, and Represenation 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), Bernard Manin, The Principles of Representative Government 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), Paul Hirst, Representative Democracy and Its Limits (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1990). 
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concept of representation. Such diversity has been theorised recently to consist in three prevalent 
modes of representation designating representation as ‘authorization’, as ‘trusteeship’ and as 
‘identity’.2     
    Political theory has focused primarily on political representation as a set of techniques and 
procedures through which the ‘democratic game’ is conducted in contemporary political life. 
Such focus came as a consequence of general enfranchisement that ushered in the citizens en 
masse into political life. Because of the historical newness of the phenomenon of representative 
politics, political philosophy has deemed insignificant the presence of political representation in 
the thought of the modern political philosophers especially when they have not propounded an 
explicit political doctrine of representation. This gap in theoretical engagement with the question 
of representation and its significance in the work of Hobbes, Locke, Hegel and Marx, is the 
present thesis’s aim to address by demonstrating the constitutive role played by the concept of 
political representation in their work. Wherever it is necessary I also examine relevant forms of 
representation which subtend their understanding of the civil and political life in the modern 
state. In my conceptualisation political representation is a macroscopic concept which rests at the 
basis of the constitution of the state and grasps theoretically the tie which binds the political 
community to the sovereign power of the state.        
    In the first chapter, divided into two sections, I engage with H. Pitkin’s work on the concept of 
political representation that has become a classical reference for any attempt to theorise the 
function of representation in politics. The central concern of Pitkin’s philosophical endeavour is 
to distinguish between the notions of ‘symbolic representation’ and ‘political representation’ in 
order to grasp the specific essence of the concept of political representation. I argue that this is an 
impossible task to achieve by showing certain inconsistencies to which Pitkin is led by her 
analysis. Symbolic and political representation share the attribute of a ‘standing for’ relation 
between two entities that makes possible the essential feature of the concept of representation 
which is the rendering of the absent as present by re-presenting an entity in a locus where it is 
literally absent. The distinguishing features of ‘representing’ as against ‘symbolising’ are 
claimed by Pitkin to be the attributes of ‘substitution’ and ‘resemblance’ which specify also the 
character of political representation. Nevertheless, it is shown that the elements of ‘substitution’ 
                                                            
2 Monica Brito Vieira and David Runciman, Representation (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), p. 65. 
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and ‘resemblance’ are not really absent from the symbolisation process and so they cannot define 
rigorously the dimension of ‘representing’ as distinctive from ‘symbolising’. Consequently, on 
the formal level the notion of the ‘symbolic representative’ cannot be disambiguated from that of 
the ‘political representative’ as in the case of a king being a ‘symbolic representative’ of his 
nation. Political representation emerges as a subspecies of symbolic representation rather than as 
an independent category. Lastly, the general point is made that symbolic representation instead 
of condoning affective and irrational attitudes as Pitkin thinks, it provides the political 
community with the freedom to evaluate, judge and contest the representative character of 
political power while it opens up the domain of the political as a whole to a politics of 
representation.  
    In the second section I take up Hobbes’s conception of representation as ‘authorisation’. He is 
the first modern political philosopher who constructs a general theory of representation 
applicable also to the constitution of political society. It is shown that his conception of 
representation is grounded on the possibility of the modern self to double himself by someone 
else and/or as another ‘person’. The Hobbesian schema of representation is encapsulated as an 
‘author-actor’ relationship. The ‘author’ authorises an ‘actor’ as his representative to act ‘in his 
name’. The authorisation of someone to act as a representative involves a transfer of will or 
‘substitution’ of one’s will for the other’s with the attendant moral obligation to accept the acts 
of the representative as one’s own. The political application of the author-actor model as an 
account of the origination of political society or of the ‘civil state’ involves unlimited 
authorisation of the representative sovereign power. From this condition result two basic defects 
which mar the legitimacy of the instituted representative government. Firstly, the citizens as 
political subjects have alienated their will permanently and there is no possibility to retract their 
authorisation for they do not possess a political will of their own anymore. The representative 
‘actor’ has turned into the real ‘author’ of all permissible actions of the subjects bound to his 
will.3 Secondly, the representative power in Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty is revealed to be an 
absolute ‘arbitrary government’. The social contract binding the political community to the 
sovereign power is completely unilateral. The political subjects are absolutely bound to the 
Representative’s will whereas nothing binds him to the subjects. It is shown that all conditions 
                                                            
3 Throughout the thesis I use the masculine pronoun in a generic sense unless otherwise indicated by the context.  
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which could function as moral constraints obligating the sovereign will, namely, civil law, the 
precepts of natural law, God’s divine commandments, the political ends for which the 
commonwealth was instituted in the first place and reason, are methodically deconstructed by 
Hobbes so as to consolidate the absolute rule of the sovereign.                                
      Before I introduce the argument developed in the chapter on Locke, I seize the opportunity to 
clarify some methodological issues that have exercised the recent Locke literature, whose 
methodological import has general applicability and permits me to elucidate my methodological 
standing and the way I approached the thought of the philosophers analysed in the thesis. 
Ashcraft’s powerful interpretation of Lockean thought on the basis of an exhaustive historical 
reconstruction of the intellectual and political climate of the era and the unearthing of the 
subterranean political activity of a radical Locke has shaken traditional modes of text-based 
interpretations of the thinker’s intentions out of their theoretical ‘slumber’. Such kind of research 
highlights the importance of the historical and political contextualisation of an author’s thought. 
There are two significant dimensions in how the context influences the shape of the thought. 
Firstly, it illuminates the contemporary dominant ideas and their specific content in circulation as 
well as the political debates and the stakes involved and taken up by the political philosopher in 
view of the fact that his work, at least, addresses itself to the spirit of the age, and at most it may 
be construed as an active ‘intervention’ seeking to affect the existing state of affairs. In a sense 
all four political philosophers analysed here had a strong disposition, often explicitly declared 
(by Hobbes, Locke, Marx and tacitly by Hegel), to critically affect the extant political spirit of 
their epoch. The intellectual and political context provides therefore a better grasp and ensures a 
more complete interpretive framework of the examined thought. The second contextual 
dimension concerns the impact of the intellectual and political biography of the thinker on his 
thought. Surely, it cannot be supposed that the concrete life experienced by the thinker does not 
influence or leave its ‘traces’ in the content of his thought as if he were someone else who did 
the thinking which resulted in the specific thought product. Nevertheless there are three defects 
in prioritising context over text. Firstly, there is the tendency to reduce the text to the context. 
Instead of interpreting the text itself, the contextual prism may tend to ‘bend’ the understanding 
of the text in order to fit into the contextual contours and thus its specificity or potential 
‘originality’ may be lost. In my view this is the major methodological error committed by 
Macpherson who reads Locke through the prism of a developed capitalist society, a kind of 
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anachronistic reconstruction of the socio-economic context of the late sixteenth century English 
society and distorts Lockean thought to fit the categorial framework of a society premised on the 
logic of accumulation. Secondly, however useful the context may be in reconstructing the 
intentions of the author it cannot be claimed that a philosophical text is reducible to the 
intentions of the author. This reduction supposes that the thinker has total control over his 
thought and consequently no unintended conceptual consequences and effects are possible. It 
follows then that no contradictions could ever exist, or ‘grey areas’ left unexplained or 
significant issues silently by-passed. This is not the case as the history of philosophy and the 
critical thinking of philosophers themselves exercised on others has shown. Even if a 
contradiction is identified which reflects the existence of a general contradiction pervading the 
era still the context cannot provide the reasons of how it is inscribed in the text and it can only 
partly account as to why it is located in it. Thirdly, philosophical discourse stakes out the claim 
that it demonstrates a more or less systematic character. It presumes to have a conceptual 
articulation based on internal consistency and an underlying theoretical unity. Contextual 
thinking in the sense of the history of ideas which mobilises comparative frames of reading, 
though profusely illuminating as far as the history of concepts and philosophical themes are 
concerned, tends to slice up or ignore such systematic character and thus to denigrate the integral 
structuration of philosophical thought. A last reason that should make one reluctant to overstress 
contextual interpretation is the problematic character of the concept of context itself. The 
specificity of context quite often calls for its own contextualisation, the context of the context 
and this may lead to a devastating ‘infinite regress’. For example, in ‘new historicism’ the 
relevant context is primarily conceived as the ‘linguistic vocabulary’ of the era that captures its 
linguistic and cultural conventions.4 This leaves outside of the ‘context’ the social determinations 
exercised by the dominant social relations of power, hierarchy and exploitation of the society in 
question. It also shows that no ‘context’ is simply given historically but it involves the necessary 
mediation of a theoretical prism which contextualises the ‘context’ accordingly. Lastly, the 
question of the historical scope of the ‘context’ remains unresolved. For instance, the political 
debate around the time of writing the Two Treatises of Government is obviously contextually 
relevant. But this can be also claimed for the political debate and its terms during the civil war 
                                                            
4 Duncan Ivison, The Self at Liberty: Political Argument and the Arts of Government (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), pp. 12-19. 
6 
 
which took place few decades earlier and for the pro-monarchical theories of divine right 
originating few centuries before, let alone the adoption or contention with arguments originating 
in ancient Greek and Roman theories of the state. Lastly, the very emergence of modernity as a 
radical break with the past with its attendant processes of secularisation, state centralisation, 
universalisation of the idea of subjectivity, of private property, of right, of freedom, of equality 
invites the activation of a philosophy of history capable to account for a meaningful historical 
periodisation between eras and the appropriate context corresponding to each of these.  
     For these reasons, my methodological stress has been shed on a close reading of the texts of 
each thinker striving to elucidate the relative centrality of the concept of (political) representation 
and its ramifications in their thought. This does not mean that I disregarded the socio-historical 
and political context in my analytic focus. I have followed Marx’s methodological proviso that 
however abstract and deductively organised a mode of thinking may appear to be, the society 
within which it is produced must always be in the analyst’s mind. Such advice is always helpful 
in avoiding anachronisms as in the case, for example, of liberal defenders of Hegel claiming 
permanency of his representative assembly when in fact its convocation is dependent on the will 
of the sovereign power in Hegel’s account. Nonetheless, I have not emphasised the influence of 
the contextual aspects in my exegetical account but rather the logic of the text. If the context 
circumscribing the text can validly illuminate it then one could perhaps equally argue that the 
text can illuminate the context (as in W. Benjamin’s ‘micrological’ approach) though I have 
avoided doing so. Rather, I acknowledge the entrance of the context into the text as a subtext. In 
all four theorists, internal to the normative conceptual construction of the state lurks a conception 
of an empirical (contemporary) state in regard to which the rationally constructible state is an 
idealisation of it (as in the cases of Hobbes and Hegel) or an opposing, critical appraisal of it (as 
in the cases of Locke and Marx). 
 
The state of nature in Locke is both an actual social state of existence and a normative 
construction regulated by the universal law of nature that unites mankind into one ‘natural 
community’. The law of nature is the manifestation of the divine will of the world-maker. 
Locke’s ontology is a Christian onto-theology. At its basis rests a relationship of representation 
between God and humanity. Human beings are meant to be the actors executing the teleological 
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designs of the author of the cosmos. There is an apparent antinomy in the Lockean onto-
theological conception. On the one hand, mankind is the created product of divine Workmanship. 
In consistency with the Lockean labour theory of property use, human beings being the outcome 
of divine labour are ‘his property’.  They are construed as ‘servants’ of God. On the other hand, 
the Lockean natural individuals are seen to be free, self-governing agents. How can they be self-
governing agents when they are not proprietors of their own life but ‘servants’ duty-bound to the 
superior will of their creator? I argue that this antinomy can be resolved due to the mediation of 
human reason. Natural law is the declaration of the divine will. Natural law is not a positive law 
explicitly set down. It can be known through two distinctive sources, reason and revelation. 
Revelation entails a) intuitive access to divine instructions, b) miracles, c) the holy texts. All 
three knowledge procedures of revelation are subordinate to reason and do not possess 
independent validity as knowledge routes to divine will. Therefore reason is the exclusive guide 
to knowledge of the natural law and thereby of the unwritten divine will. A space of 
indeterminacy is opened between the tacit declarations of the divine will and human Reason’s 
solemn power to construe them. The divine will binds humanity ‘effectively’ as the formal cause 
of moral obligation but as what the contents of the superior will might be it is the prerogative of 
human reason to tell. All (adult) human beings are carriers of natural reason. They are ‘servants’ 
under the moral obligation to follow the decrees of divine will but they are free and the sole 
rational judges to interpret the imperatives of natural law. At the same time the Lockean God is a 
rational entity bound to ‘his’ will. Thus humanity through the exercise of natural reason can 
reconstruct God’s will. The political consequence of the rational nature of the divine will known 
exclusively by human reason is that it could never have endorsed any form of ‘absolute arbitrary’ 
political power on earth. Thus the justification of absolute monarchy that it represents the will of 
the creator falls to the ground. The way is opened for human communities to freely set up 
political societies establishing in common and by majority rule the set of political obligations in 
the form of civil laws which limit the functioning of legitimate governments and ‘enlarge’ the 
political freedom of the members of commonwealths.                                                     
      In the third section I argue for the foundational role representation has in Locke’s social and 
political theory. The political community is grounded on a relationship of political 
representation. The government established by the self-constituted ‘political body’ of society is 
legitimate only to the degree it respects the terms of its authorisation. Locke assigns the 
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governing function to the legislative. The legislative is the ‘supreme power’ in all forms of 
government. The forms of government available consist in the classical political typology of 
democracy, aristocracy, monarchy and any possible mixture of them. Whatever the form of 
government, each and any form of government has to abide to the conditions of political 
representation, to the trust bestowed upon it by the political society. The trust bestowed on 
government is not unconditionally given so as the government could rule at its discretion. There 
is an overarching principle circumscribing the conditions of exercise of the political power, its 
lawmaking activity. Every political regulation enacted by the government must cater to the 
promotion of the public good. The supreme good for any commonwealth is the ‘preservation of 
society’. The structure of the relation of political representation is teleological not 
instrumentalist. The author entrusts the governing actor to act for the public benefit of the whole 
society, rather than to execute the represented body’s temporary and contingent will. The 
relationship is triadic not dyadic. The representative government is commissioned to act in order 
to realise a permanent deontic good not to fulfill the instructions of the represented. This schema 
of political representation grounds the reciprocal obligations that the represented and the 
representative owe to each other. I focus on the obligations the representative government has 
assumed vis-a-vis the represented, the violation of which justifies the right of revolution and the 
legitimate overthrow of the standing government. Transgression of the trust restores political 
power to its original source, the people and allows the political community to either change the 
government or change the form of government or even dissolve the commonwealth and revert to 
the state of nature.  
    
     In chapter three I examine the place representation has in Hegel’s political thought. I discuss 
four different forms of representation that roughly correspond to the four sections into which the 
chapter is divided. These forms are a) the modern principle of political representation which ties 
the sovereign power of the state to the territorial community, b) the form of representation which 
Hegel sees to hold in the dispensation of ‘concrete justice’ and ties the ‘criminal’ with the ‘jury’ 
which judges him and both with the social estate to which they belong, c) the form of intra-
corporate representation through which civil society is organised in corporations and 
communities in tandem with the issue of who enjoys the right of suffrage in the Hegelian state 
9 
 
and d) the structure of political representation through which incorporated civil society 
participates in the ‘political organism of the state’. 
     Hegel is the real antipode to the social contract tradition in which political society constitutes 
itself and posits the representative power as a separate expression of itself. This is one of the 
reasons I chose his philosophy of state as a counterpart to Locke’s theory of political society. 
The other reason is that the examination of his political philosophy is the necessary 
presupposition for the understanding of Marx’s concept of democracy and his idea of 
representation built upon a critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. Nevertheless, Hegel’s 
philosophical stature is such that he cannot be reduced to a mere transitory link and hence I 
examine his political conception on its own. For Hegel the state-of-nature is a myth and the 
community has always existed historically in a form of state, at least to the degree the spirit was 
active in it (the exception concerns African tribes or communities living in ‘natural immediacy’ 
and whose spiritual life had not yet broken the immediate identity with nature).  
        Political representation plays a far more crucial role for the constitution of the Hegelian 
State than it has been traditionally believed. In his first major political essay on The German 
Constitution he queries whether the German Empire is a ‘real’ state or not and this leads him to 
identify the principles constitutive of the state which consists of two elements inexorably 
interconnected. The state is always a ‘mass of people’ under ‘political authority’. Each element is 
a mutual presupposition of the other. No ‘political authority’ exists without a ‘mass’, no 
community is a state without ‘political authority’ or a sovereign power. The interrelationship of 
these two elements constitutes the basis of his notion of political representation. It establishes the 
concept of state sovereignty. The community is the base of state sovereignty and the sovereign 
power represents the political power of the community (for example in regard to other states). 
Without a bond of representation to the community the sovereign power is just tyranny. This 
foundational tie of representation of the sovereign power to the community pre-exists logically 
and undergirds any and all forms of state. Consequently political representation is coterminous 
with the concept of the state and it pre-exists the emergence of the modern state. Hegel derives 
the modern principle of political representation from the historical transformation that the feudal 
state underwent. It resulted from an internal modification of the feudal state due to two factors. 
The emergence of a nascent bourgeoisie and primarily the divisiveness of the Christian religion 
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contributed to the generation of the modern notion of political representation. Two 
transformations prepared the ground for the establishment of modern representation. Firstly, the 
representative status of the prince was embodied in his very person. His person became divorced 
into his private personhood and his public function as ruler. Only under the latter capacity he was 
recognised as a representative of his state. Secondly, in the transformed historical situation 
rulership becomes definitively tied to the principle of territoriality. Formerly, the subjects under 
the rule of a prince (scattered in disparate territories) represented his rule. With the principle of 
territoriality the sovereign is recognised only if he is a representative of the territorial community 
over which he rules. Hence, the novel form of political representation in the modern world ties 
the Sovereign to territoriality and to the political community residing there. This relation 
establishes the ground of the state’s ‘inner sovereignty’. 
           In his Philosophy of Right Hegel articulates a philosophical conceptualisation of the state 
as the embodiment of the principle of universal freedom characteristic of the state of the modern 
world. Such state realises the identity of ‘subjective freedom’ of the members of civil society 
with ‘objective freedom’ inscribed in the institutions of the political state whose function is to 
promote the ‘universal end’ of the state as a whole. Only if this identity is secured is the state 
‘rational’. Rationality entails universality. One major form of universality reigning in civil 
society is the regulation of social life under the existence of ‘abstract right’. The implementation 
of ‘abstract right’ involves the ‘administration of justice’. The ‘administration of justice’ follows 
a certain set of formal procedures. These are handled by administrative experts who look after 
only the ‘formalities’ and not the content of the administered judicial cases and thus ‘injustice’ 
may result. To redress that civil society must have the right of ‘trial by jury’. Trial by jury is a 
public relationship based on a socio-ethical form of representation that respects the customary 
ethics characteristic of the various social estates in civil society. Thus the particularity of the 
ethical substance of civil members is maintained and their subjective freedom is guaranteed by 
the dispensation of ‘concrete justice’.             
        The role of political representation in Hegel’s account is to provide the mediating links that 
connect civil society to the political state. He argues that estate and corporate representation in 
the legislature establishes the political representation of civil society and this provides an organic 
bond between the politicised civil society and the state’s political authority such that civil society 
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is elevated above its particularity of interests and adopts the universal ends of the state 
community. Since Hegel’s rational state is premised on ensuring the freedom of the members of 
the state community an obvious difficulty which mars its universality is the restricted right of 
suffrage that Hegel acknowledges as a basic characteristic of the institutional articulation of the 
state. I argue that this difficulty is the product of a contradiction existing in Hegel’s philosophical 
construction of the state. On the one hand the rational state must encompass universality and on 
the other hand it must approximate the contours of the empirically existing state forms so that the 
modern state can be claimed to be the incarnation of the rational state as the apogee of the world 
spirit.  
       In the last section I expound Hegel’s conception of the political representative and the 
corporate representative system he envisages. The function of political representation in Hegel’s 
state is neither the representation of the particular interests of civil society in the legislature nor 
civil society’s participation in the legislative power of the political state but the ‘educative’ role 
it provides to public opinion about the ‘universal concerns’ of the state and the semblance it 
affords to civil society that ‘formal freedom’ is preserved by its token political representation in 
the system of political power of the state. The universality of subjective freedom of incorporated 
civil society remains politically ineffective and unincorporated into the ‘objective freedom’ of 
the ‘political organism’ and the identity of the ‘rational state’ is unachievable in actuality. Civil 
society and the sovereign political power do share the concept of subjectivity between 
themselves. It is a conceptual link uniting them. But what they share conceptually they do not 
share it as far as the political ‘determinate content’ of subjectivity is concerned. The real gap 
between civil society and sovereign power superseded formally by political representation is 
taken up by Marx’s critique of the Hegelian state.          
     In chapter four I discuss Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right and the idea of 
democracy Marx formulates in response to the democratic deficit of Hegel’s rational state. Marx 
follows an immanent type of critique based on the Hegelian conceptualisation of the 
differentiation of civil society from the political state and he traces the impossibility of an 
organic state to the fundamental problem of the modern world which is the divided essence of 
the communal being of society. This dividedness is expressed in the two-fold relationship of civil 
society to the political state and of the people to state sovereignty. In civil society the individuals 
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live a privatistic life while in the political state they are supposed to realise their universal 
political self. The disjunction between the particular private life and the universal political life of 
the state is reflected within the individual self as a schism between the self-interested 
individuality and the citizen. The political form of the division involves the separation of the 
people as a ‘demos’ from the form of state which rules over them. 
   Marx calls into question three basic conditions which Hegel deems sufficient to ground the 
unity of civil society with the political state. Neither an ethical duty toward the state exists that 
could motivate the individual to put the state’s universal interest over his self-interest, nor the 
abstract universality of law is an expression of communal integration but rather an abstract bond 
‘relating’ independent individuals. Lastly, corporate representation is not a self-expression of 
civil society administering its own affairs but a state controlled mechanism of representation 
harnessing civil interests to the political state’s own interests. 
     Marx’s conception of democracy rests on the idea that the foundation of any state sovereignty 
is the community of people. Consequently the realisation of the essence of democracy must be 
the political constitution of the people as ‘the life-expression of the people’ grounding popular 
sovereignty. In Marxian democracy no independent political power can exist apart from the 
communal being of the people and thus all must participate in the executive and legislative 
power of the political society in order to realise popular, democratic self-determination. The 
realisation of ‘true’ democracy presupposes the universalisation of enfranchisement and that 
makes the representative republic or political democracy a necessary stepping stone for the 
coming of societal democracy and the completion of human emancipation. The supersession of 
political democracy requires the annulment of the division between the political state and civil 
society and entails the abolition of the reign of private property that organises civil social life and 
overdetermines the abstract political state itself.  
    In chapter five I analyse Marx’s critique of political representation as it appears in the 
theoretical accounts of liberalism and of Hegel’s political state. The Hegelian account fails 
because his notion of political representation does not admit of equality of citizen representation 
in the affairs of the state and this belies the principle of universality of freedom that must be 
expressed by Hegel’s ‘rational state’. Instead of having one principle of representation 
universally applicable he propounds a dualism of principles of representation, ‘hierarchical’ 
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representation (representation by right of birth) and corporate representation (representation by 
election). Furthermore, Hegel’s dualistic conception of representation is pre-modern and 
inconsistent with the purpose it was designed to serve. Political representation is afforded to 
social groups which have already been constituted by the state as political entities whereas its 
purpose as a principle of the modern, post-feudal world is to provide the non-political private 
civil society with political participation in the state. The liberal account fails because though it 
acknowledges universality of political representation of the individuals, it assumes this 
universality to be an aggregate of wills which lacks the necessary unity that renders the political 
community an organic whole.  Neither of the two accounts is a viable solution that could mend 
the divide of civil society from the political state even though political democracy is more 
advanced than constitutional monarchy for it gives supremacy to the legislature and thus it 
allows for an alignment of the state with the popular will and consequently it permits the political 
constitution to progress in accordance with the historically developing needs of the community. 
     In juxtaposition to the liberal conception of abstract political individuality as the form of 
membership in the state Marx suggests his own idea of what membership in the ‘really rational 
state’ amounts to. I reconstruct this idea of the democratic state community suggesting that its 
basic contours are the germ of mature Marx’s understanding of communist society. In the last 
section I develop the implications of the notion of social representation which Marx presages and 
assumes it would exist among the state members in the hypothetical case of civil society having 
become the real political society. This notion of social representation underlies the essential 
structural relation constitutive of the human species-being.  
     In chapter six I argue that Marx builds his conception of human alienation that pervades civil 
society under the regime of private property on the omnipotent role money assumes as the 
mediator of commodity exchange. Against political economy’s concept of money as a mere 
‘medium of exchange’ Marx argues that in the society of private property money becomes the 
aim of exchange instead of a means. As a means of exchange, money functions as a 
representative of the value of the exchanged goods. By becoming the end of exchange its 
representative function turns into an omnipotent force which determines by itself the social 
worth of the man-made products. For if any human product cannot obtain value representation 
by money it cannot enter into social exchange and thus it becomes worthless and effectively 
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useless, as if it had not been produced at all. Since the produced goods are the self-expression of 
the human producers, the power of money to determine the social worth of products suggests that 
human producers have lost the power to control the exchange of their own social activities and 
they are alienated.  
       Marx claims that there is a structural analogy between money and Christ in their function as 
mediators in alienated society. Both are transformed from representatives of the represented 
entities (the commodity world and the religious community respectively) into controlling agents 
of the latter. In the first section I examine basic aspects of the relationship of transposition that 
takes place in the figure of Christ as a ‘representative mediator’ between God and alienated Man. 
In the second section I develop the conditions which associate money with alienation and allow 
money to obtain an authoritative power over the commodity world of the society of private 
property. In the last section I analyse the dual form of ‘surrogate’ or substitute representation that 
Marx argues it characterises the social exchange of private property owners and I draw some key 
structural analogies which seem to hold between the dual form of representation in private 
property exchange and the relationship of the representative to the represented in political 
representation.  
     In the seventh and final chapter I address two problems whose investigation elucidates Marx’s 
understanding of the connection between representative politics and class representation. The 
first problem concerns the manner of social class constitution through political representation. 
The second query grapples with the question of which form of the republic is most conducive to 
the prospect of human emancipation in Marx’s view. My analysis engages with the most explicit 
political texts of Marx, The Class Struggles in France and The Eighteenth Brumaire, in which he   
reconstructs the political struggles of classes in the French revolution of 1848 and its aftermath. 
Two significant ideas on political representation are derived from his discussion. Firstly, political 
representation is capable to transform the implicit class existence of a social multitude into class 
self-consciousness. Secondly, political representation provides for the public articulation of class 
interests. Such articulation creates conditions of transparency about the stakes of class struggle. 
Consequently the best form of the political republic is the one which most promotes the 
democratic features that secure such transparency.  
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     From Marx’s analysis of class politics I extract a cluster of social determinants which can 
establish a theory of social class constitution in his political thinking and I analyse the conditions 
which account for the paradoxical state of the French peasant class which could not achieve 
political representation by itself but only passive class representation by state power embodied in 
the representative figure of Bonaparte. In the second section I analyse the dialectical transition 
from (constitutional) monarchy to the political republic and the abstraction of political and class 
rule which accompany the passage to the political cum parliamentary republic. The political 
representation of abstract class rule encompasses the possibility of both an instrumentalist state 
power subject to narrow class interests and of a ‘relatively autonomous’ state power seemingly 
independent from any class interests. Abstract class rule is politically entrenched when whatever 
the parliamentary political representation is, the bourgeois order of the class-divided society is 
either defended as a whole or remains unquestioned.                               
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Chapter 1 
 
Symbolic Representation, Political Representation and Hobbes’s view of Representative 
Power 
 
1.a.  The Intertwinement of Symbolic and Political Representation 
       
       Pitkin in her seminal work on the concept of representation dedicates a whole chapter to 
symbolic representation trying to discern the attributes of this specific form of representation and 
the way it can be distinguished from proximate forms that seem to overlap with it.5 The 
conceptual specificity of symbolic representation raises considerable difficulties for the ambit of 
its relevance is so wide that this form of representing can be taken ‘as central and definitive, and 
all other kinds, including political representation, can then be interpreted in terms of it and 
approximated to it.’6  
    Symbolic representation anchored on the power of symbols to refer to entities other than 
themselves shares with other forms of representation based on ‘descriptive likeness’, the attribute 
of ‘standing for’. Pitkin starts her exposition by indirectly suggesting that a possible relation of 
substitution could be involved in symbolic representation by which the symbol standing for the 
symbolised referent assumes the latter’s place. Her analysis leads her to the conclusion that ‘a 
symbol is not a substitute for what it symbolizes’, adopting S. Langer’s contention that ‘symbols 
are not proxy for their objects, but are vehicles for the conception of ’what they symbolise.7  
    The symbol does not take the place of the referent. It does not make it disappear from the 
place it stands by standing in its place. It rather does the opposite. It entails the referent in its 
very constitution as a symbol. The symbol is the unity of itself as a material item and the mental 
existence of the referent to which it pinpoints. The symbol exists and becomes meaningful as an 
                                                            
5 Hanna Fenichel Pitkin, The Concept of Representation (Berkeley, Los Angeles: University of California Press, 
1967), pp. 92-111. 
6 ‘Ibid. p. 92.’ 
7 ‘Ibid. p. 97.’ 
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entity that exceeds itself, by being beyond itself in its conjunction with the referent. This relation 
of the symbol to a something outside itself from within itself establishes the character of 
symbolic representation. By this connection with an other than itself, the symbol captures the 
essence of representation whereby ‘Repraesentare means to make present something that is not 
in fact present.’ 8 The referential object is made present in the symbol as a representation of its 
existence located elsewhere. The object symbolised by the symbol exists in it as an absence or 
better as a present absence indicative of the object’s external presence somewhere else. 
    The symbolic function of representation is embodied in either inanimate or animate entities 
and certainly human beings can be constituted by the symbolisation process as ‘living symbols’. 
In the history of political theory the king has been assumed to be the prototypical symbol 
representing the political community he ruled over if not the very symbolic embodiment of the 
unity of the community subjected to him. 
    Pitkin in order to identify ‘the differences between representing and symbolizing’ proceeds to 
discuss the distinction of symbolic art from representational art as an exemplary case that may 
reveal their substantive difference. Symbolic art does not aim at representation and ‘the things 
that are represented are not the ones that are symbolized.’9 The uniqueness of the symbol is that 
it is not meant to be a ‘representation’ or an iconic copy ‘of what it symbolizes’, that is, ‘[u]nlike 
representations, symbols are not likenesses of their referents, and do not resemble them’.10 Pitkin 
is stressing the lack of inner connection between the symbol and its referent, an arbitrary 
connection that is only conventionally established. The arbitrary connection between symbol and 
referent as the product of pure conventionality appears to be the distinguishing criterion of 
‘symbolising’ from ‘representing’ where the latter is grounded on a relation of resemblance.11 
This distinguishing criterion cannot be taken as absolute for as Pitkin acknowledges, for some 
analysts, including no less than F. Saussure, whereas the sign is taken as ‘arbitrary’ in the symbol 
we may plausibly claim that there is ‘the rudiment of a natural bond between the signifier and the 
signified. The symbol of justice, a pair of scales, could not be replaced by just any other symbol, 
                                                            
8 Carl J. Friedrich cited in Pitkin, ‘ibid. p. 92.’ 
9 ‘Ibid. p. 94.’ 
10 ‘Ibid.’ 
11 Pitkin’s claim that ‘representing’ can be validly used only if there is ‘resemblance’ is contested by no other than 
Hegel himself. ‘A cockade, for example, signifies citizenship within a state, although the colour has no connection 
with the nation and represents not itself but the nation’  (PR § 58A, p. 88). Nonetheless in the text I follow a 
different (immanent) argumentative tack. 
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such as a chariot.’12  The idea of a ‘rudiment of natural bond’ between symbol and referent hints 
at the existence of a submerged association that mitigates the apparent arbitrariness of their 
surface conjunction. Likewise the appearance of a lack of any connectedness of a flag’s country 
to the country symbolised becomes questionable in many cases where the number of stars 
signifies the number of states, as in the US’s or the European Union’s flags. Pitkin’s 
distinguishing criterion cannot stand the test of experience if we consider the most universal 
symbol in daily social life, the symbolic form of national coins and banknotes where imprinted 
real historical personalities represent their country of origin or stand as symbolic representatives 
of it. Pitkin’s methodological error in denying any realistic connection between symbol and 
referent rests on the adoption of a naïve realist perspective where any abstract connection of 
resemblance inscribed in the symbol is deemed to be ‘arbitrary’ if it escapes the perceptiveness 
of ordinary consciousness. In this regard, Marx’s designation of Schelling as the symbolic 
representative of the Prussian state’s policies (not a representative in any official capacity) is 
quite apt in capturing the presumable abstract resemblance between the late Schelling’s 
philosophy and the given state’s policy agenda.13 Symbolic representation necessitates the 
presence of a third element, most often an idea shared by symbol and referent as their connecting 
link. In the symbolic association between a pair of scales and the concept of justice it is not any 
implicit ‘natural bond’ that secures the association other than the long historical concretion of the 
particular symbolism that has become a kind of ‘second nature’ in the European cultural 
experience.14 It is a socially constituted association premised on the idea of equal weighing 
shared by justice and a weighing scale. That justice entails a procedure of weighing is the 
outcome of an ancient institutionalisation reflected in Aristotle’s conception of justice as 
‘rectificatory’ where proportionate compensation was sought for the gravity of an injury 
committed, or the equalisation of the loss suffered ‘by means of the penalty’.15      
                                                            
12 F. Saussure, Course in General Linguistics cited in Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 95. 
13 Marx, ‘Letter to Ludwig Feuerbach, October 3, 1843’, MECW v.3, pp. 349-351 (p. 350).  
14 The same applies to another powerful symbolic figure of justice as ‘blind justice’ which represents the conceptual 
aspect or value of impartiality associated with the concept of justice. Symbols and symbolic figures are not vehicles 
of isolated meanings. On the contrary, they are enmeshed in crystallised semantic constellations which undergo 
historical transformation through class struggle in meaning imposition and refracted appropriation. On class struggle 
as the ‘social multiaccentuality of the ideological sign’ see: V. N. Vološinov, Marxism and the Philosophy of 
Language trans. by L. Matejka and I. R. Titunik (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1986), pp. 
23-4.    
15 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, trans. with introduction by D. Ross and rev. by J. L. Ackrill and J. O. Urmson 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980), p. 115 [1132a2].  
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    To make the case that symbolising is distinct from representing, Pitkin examines a class of 
‘symbols’ that do not symbolise at all but merely represent like purely conventional signs such as 
those used in algebra.16 A fallacy of equivocation is committed here. To grasp the pure function 
of representation in symbols, she considers ‘symbols’ devoid of any symbolisation. In what 
sense then do ‘symbols’ without any symbolic reference still submit to the definition of the 
symbol other than the fact that they are inappropriately named ‘symbols’ in common parlance 
rather than designated as mere signs with which they are identical in resting on an ‘arbitrary’ 
connection? The point Pitkin is driving at is that symbolising and representing are two functions 
enacted by symbols that they should not be confused with each other.  
 
A particular symbol in a particular situation may both represent and symbolize; but that 
does not mean that we are saying the same thing about it if we say the one or the other. 
To say that a symbol represents is to suggest a precise correspondence, a simple reference 
or substitution […] To say that a symbol symbolizes is to suggest the vagueness or 
diffuseness of what it stands for, the impossibility of exchanging the one for the other, 
expression rather than reference.17  
 
    This description of the difference between ‘symbolising’ and ‘representing’ suggests that their 
difference is one of a kind rather than of degree. They are meant to be discrete functions rather 
than continuous. As soon as the distinction is posited it calls for its annulment. Previously the 
symbolic connection was ‘not a matter of resemblance at all’18 Now, a resemblance is 
acknowledged to exist in the symbol’s standing for the referent albeit a vague or diffuse one. In 
contradistinction, the symbol in its representing function (actually reducing the symbol to a sign) 
evokes a ‘precise correspondence’. But is the difference between ‘precision’ and ‘vagueness’ a 
precise or a vague one?19 Do they admit of a variation in degree of precision as in the method of 
                                                            
16 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 97. 
17 ‘Ibid. p. 98.’ 
18 ‘Ibid. p. 94.’ 
19 The demand of ‘semantic inflexibility’ for symbols is utopian and this impossibility concerns also ‘words’ 
themselves, hence ‘representing’ and even ‘numbers’ in the form of numerical scales. On ‘words’ see: Woll, S. B., 
D. G. Weeks, C. L. Fraps, J. Pendergrass, and M. A. Vanderplas, ‘Role of Sentence Context in the Encoding of Trait 
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trial and error where the precise character of a correlation is gradually approximated starting 
from an initial condition of ascertainable vagueness? When a cartoonist uses a ‘pair of scales’ to 
signify ‘justice’ is that a precise or diffuse reference to it? Actually both functions are activated 
at once. The ‘pair of scales’ represents justice by substitution and symbolises a diffuse 
conception of it. By Pitkin’s own admission, ‘[o]f course, a symbol’s representing is often 
causally related to its capacity to symbolize.’20 Hence, rather than be two independent functions 
under the same name, the representing function is accorded a causally dependent status under the 
primacy of the symbolising function. Symbolising emerges as a condition of possibility for 
representing but the inverse does not hold true. 
    Pitkin’s intent is to disambiguate representing from symbolising in order to distinguish 
‘descriptive representation’ as a major form of political representation from symbolic 
representation. Both ‘descriptive’ and ‘symbolic’ representation share the attribute of ‘standing 
for’ and this amplifies the presumed perplexity of their connection. The representing function of 
the symbol permits substitution of the referent by the symbol whereas the symbol in symbolising 
expresses the referent but it cannot substitute for it. A clear-cut case of ‘descriptive’ 
representation exists when the representative shares a substantial attribute with the group he 
represents, for instance a working-class member standing for the working class in parliament. As 
a representative in his representing function, according to Pitkin’s distinction he is meant to be a 
‘substitute’ for the working-class. But is he really so? Can the said person really be a substitute 
for the class whose real existence is not affected at all and surely remains unsubstitutable in its 
place of existence. For the working-class parliamentary representative to be a real substitute for 
the class we must have supposed that the whole class should have had a place in the parliament. 
The only sense of ‘substitution’ that can be acknowledged to hold is a metaphorical one, that is, a 
symbolic one. Conversely it fits with common sense to say that the working-class representative 
expresses the working-class rather than substituting for it. But the idea of expression evoked by a 
symbol is tied by Pitkin with the symbolising function and not the representing function of the 
symbol. It is the mark of distinctiveness of symbolising vis-à-vis representing. The consequence 
of this brief examination of the cluster of the three criteria which according to Pitkin suffice to 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Descriptors.’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 39 (1980), pp. 59-68 (p. 60). On ‘numerical scales’ see: 
N. Schwarz, B. Knäuper, H. Hippler, E. Noelle-Neumann and L. Clark, ‘Rating Scales: Numeric Values may 
Change the Meaning of Scale Labels’,  Public Opinion Quarterly, 55.4 (1991), pp. 570-582 (pp. 574-577). 
20 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 98. 
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distinguish representing from symbolising adequately shows rather the inadequacy of drawing a 
rigorous distinction impermeable to a spilling over of phenomena from one domain to the other. 
The criteria of ‘precision’, ‘substitution’ and ‘simple reference’ depending on the circumstance 
examined can designate either of the two functions of symbolising and representing 
encompassed by symbolic representation. Any Christian believer would accept that the cross 
‘symbolises’ Christian religion rather than representing it even though it is a ‘simple reference’ 
to it. A banknote as a ‘piece of paper’ does not have any ‘outward resemblance’, i.e., ‘precise 
correspondence’ to the currency it represents. As a national symbol it is inscribed with an array 
of insignia whose extent of representativity ranges from specificity to extreme vagueness. Surely 
banknotes cannot be ‘substitutes’ for the country of issuance they represent nor even ‘stand for’ 
money without state power standing behind them to guarantee their nominal value. 
    Pitkin’s conceptual effort to differentiate representing from symbolising within the mode of 
symbolic representation rests on her concern to address the adverse (anti-democratic) 
consequences that follow if ‘political representation’ as a kind of representation is subordinated 
under ‘symbolic representation’ as a variation rather than a distinct kind, a view propounded by a 
coterie of symbolisation theorists. The perspective she has adopted lacks a thematisation of the 
holistic framework within which symbols are necessarily implicated. This is the symbolic order 
that permeates all aspects of social life and rests on the primacy of language as the constitutive 
structure organising signification and as a consequence the process of understanding and 
communication of meaning. In particular, symbols are a subcategory of signs. After Sausserian 
linguistics it has become almost universally accepted that the connection between sign and 
referent is an ‘arbitrary’ one. The relationship of the signifier, the material substance of the sign 
as sound or visible inscription (the alphabet) to the signified (the mental image of the object) 
does not entail any inner bond such that would permit a necessary and univocal tie between the 
sign and its referent, perhaps with the exception of few cases of onomatopoieia where the sound 
of the word mimes the audible character of a phenomenon. Even in these cases the association of 
the word to the phenomenon rather than being a ‘natural connection’ is actually mediated by a 
particular human community that posits the association in its language rather than discovering it 
as pre-existent in the world ‘out there’. Such positing is necessarily shaped by the received 
cultural understanding of the particular community as to the possible ‘natural’ resemblance that 
may exist between the specific sign and its referent. But the relation of language to the being of 
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the world is dialectical. It is not the case that any language taken as a whole is a pure 
classificatory imposition on an amorphous being of the world in spite of the peculiarity of the 
‘world’ that it constructs as the essence of the world. The under-determination of language by the 
being of the world is shown by the fact that if language provides a possible symbolic 
‘organisation’ of the world, the world itself must be amenable to such organisation, that is, that it 
possesses the inherent possibility of being organised thus, conformable to a certain degree to the 
classificatory grid bestowed on it. The world conditioned by the manner of referral of a 
language, conditions in its turn the mode of referral of the particular language.  Otherwise if a 
language was completely self-referential, a ‘self-creation’ of the world of its reference then the 
connections in the thinghood of the world would be both meaningless and non-existent for it, a 
mere projection of a fantasy land that would lead the speech community of the said language to 
quick extinction. (For instance, by classifying food as non-food and non-food as food). Even the 
capacity of singular words to be polysemous does involve a circumscribed ‘semantic grid’ where 
the cluster of connotations cannot be infinite but delimited to significations that evince a form of 
connection however imperceptible that may be.21     
    That symbols as signs do not exhaust their significance in significatory arbitrariness but reveal 
a ‘vague’ connection to what they symbolise is not a weakness as presented by Pitkin’s account 
but on the contrary a cultural asset that enriches the spiritual content of the process of 
development of the human civilisation. The symbolisation process, the multiform production of 
symbolic forms is a major aspect of human freedom, the expression of the human species’ 
capacity to be creative and posit meaningfulness by use of symbols rather than be a passive 
recipient, an inflexible reflector of a meaning system inscribed in the order of nature per se. The 
power of the species to symbolise (which is an historically developing competence) is a central 
component of the permanent ongoing historical process of social metabolism in the relationship 
of society to nature that constitutes the ontological first principle in Marx’s conceptualisation. 
The very fact that Marx’s conception of labour has a necessary teleological structure, that is, it is 
purpose-orientated and purposes are set and shaped within the public domain of sedimented 
                                                            
21 ‘The semantic grid that is placed upon the perceived world varies enormously from one language to another; but 
one will never encounter a language which classes together, under the same world, yesterday morning’s roses and 
tomorrow evening’s stars.” Cornelius Castoriadis, ‘The Sayable and the Unsayable: Homage to Maurice Merleau-
Ponty’ in C. Castoriadis, Crossroads in the Labyrinth, trans. by K. Soper and M. H. Ryle (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1984), pp. 119-144 (p. 125). 
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structures of meaning demonstrates the import of the social constitution of meaning as an 
enabling condition for both the physical and social reproduction of the human species.  
    This domain of communal freedom opened up by the symbolisation process and expressed as 
the symbol-making capacity is considered by Pitkin to lead to irrational consequences. In 
contrast to (descriptive) representation which rests on an objective, self-evident connection 
between what is represented and its representation (a ‘copy’ conception of image representation), 
‘[a] symbol is considered to have meaning beyond itself, not because of its actual resemblance to 
the referent, not because of any real connection, but just because it is so considered.’22 Hence the 
referential association of the symbol is deemed to be subjective, a mere matter of contingent 
belief and thus exposed to a constitutive ambiguity, expressing ‘primarily a frame of mind’. The 
consequence of this for ‘symbolic representation’ is neatly drawn. Since the connection between 
symbol and referent seems arbitrary and exists only where it is believed in, symbolic 
representation seems to rest on emotional, affective, irrational psychological responses rather 
than on rationally justifiable criteria. There can be no logical justification, no reason for 
believing in a connection that is purely conventional or arbitrary.23  
    What this argument ignores in its effort to ground an objectivist truth-value conditionality for 
representing at large and thus denying any truth value to symbolic representation is that even if 
the premise that symbolic representation is grounded on the condition of believability is 
accepted, still this condition does not vitiate a double truthfulness that permeates the conjunction 
of the symbol to its referent. The first truth condition concerns the cultural fact that such 
symbolic conjunction exists for the believing community which has posited the specific 
association for itself and recognises and/or identifies itself through the particular products of 
symbolic representation (as in the case of national symbols). The second truth condition amounts 
to the fact that the given symbolic connection established by the community of believers exists 
objectively as such for an outside observer who in no way needs to share in the social belief 
about the ‘truth’ of the symbolic association acknowledged by the community. Both truth 
conditions of symbolic representation submit to rational reconstruction and logical justification. 
As far as the first truth condition of symbolic representation is concerned, the well-studied 
                                                            
22 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, p. 100. 
23 ‘Ibid.’ 
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phenomenon of totemism characteristic of primitive aboriginal communities provides ample 
proof of this. The use of animal totems to symbolically represent the community of reference 
reveals that the structural relations between the totemic symbols reflect the organisation of the 
social relations of the communal clans at the level of their own self-understanding of the 
relations thereby symbolised.  
     Political representation (as acting ‘in the name of’) rather than being the contrary of symbolic 
representation or of the power of signs to represent their referents can be taken as a subspecies of 
representation as such. Such subsumption is not an invention of ours but proclaimed by Hobbes 
himself whose theory of representation Pitkin appropriates in order to comprehend its modern 
day applicability. Hobbes analyses the meaning of the term Image in order to determine the cases 
in which the Christian believers’ worship of images amounts to idolatry rather than worship of 
God. He employs a representational theory of perception in which the strict signification of the 
image ‘is the Resemblance of some thing visible’ (Lev. XLV, p. 447). As he argues the ‘word 
Image’ has a ‘larger use’ which properly defined is not restricted solely to visible objects but it 
encompasses ‘any Representation of one thing by another. So an earthly Soveraign may be called 
the Image of God: And an inferiour Magistrate the Image of an earthly Soveraign’ (Lev. XLV, p. 
448). The civil sovereign has been authorised by God (and instituted by the commonwealth) as 
his political representative just as the magistrate has been appointed by the sovereign to act in his 
name. They are thus representatives of the (tacit or explicit) will of their superiors. They bear the 
respective images because they enjoy a (political) connection of representation. Political 
representation is the ground of their capacity to bear the image of the represented not any iconic 
resemblance to the represented that grounds their representative status. Therefore it is the 
symbolic content (and its interpretation) of the words, texts and signs that ‘authorise’ their 
standing under the authority of a superior which confers on them their political status not any 
material element shared by the two parties. It follows that political representation cannot be 
disengaged from symbolic representation and posited as distinctive from it as it can be gathered 
from the requirement that the validity of any kind of consent or authorisation given must 
necessarily be mediated symbolically by words or actions signifying its expression. The 
community anchors the symbolic content of any referential system also for Hobbes since it is its 
customary practices that ‘give words their force’ (Lev. XLVI, p. 464).                 
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      Pitkin’s classification schema of the concept of representation divides the concept into the 
‘formal’ and the ‘substantive’ dimensions of representation. Formal representation is 
distinguished into the aspects of‘authorization’ and ‘accountability’ whereas substantive 
representation is subdivided into the modes of ‘acting for’ and ‘standing for’ which is further 
differentiated into ‘symbolizing’ and ‘mirroring’. Both formal and substantive categories are 
involved in political representation. The formal conceptions address the relation between 
representative and represented. The authorisation aspect concerns the represented who authorise 
a representative to act for them, whereas accountability involves representatives who are 
accountable to those they are to represent. In regard to the substantive categories, ‘standing for’ 
refers either to representatives who are considered ‘symbols’ of their constituency (like a king of 
his country) or to representative bodies as descriptive microcosms or ‘miniatures of the people at 
large’.24 ‘Acting for’ focuses on what representatives do rather than who they are. This emphasis 
on doing or saying does not abolish the predicate of similarity underpinning the relation of 
representation. But it may displace it from an apparent, exoteric element taken as the basis of 
similarity to the ideational realm where the similarity involves a conceptual alignment between 
representative and represented as in the case of social class representation where the political or 
literary class representative may not share the same class position with the represented but his 
discourse represents the class interest of the class represented. Pitkin considers ‘acting for’ as 
most suitable to thinking about political representation. To construe ‘acting for’ as the proper 
sense of political representation brings forward the controversy over the leeway the 
representative has to represent, the so-called ‘mandate-independence’ controversy. How tightly 
is the delegate bound to follow the instructions received on the one hand, and how independent 
can the representative be in functioning as a trustee of the represented pursuing their own 
discretionary belief of what is best to be done. Pitkin proposes a median position limiting the two 
extremes. She vouches for the representative to be free in exercising discretion but under the 
obligation to cater for his constituents’ interests and if he strays too far to justify this to the 
constituents. She has been criticised for this synthetic attempt in that she leaves the question of 
the limits of political representation undecidable especially over ‘what is a matter of theoretical 
debate within the limits of proper representation and what is a debate over these limits’.25  
                                                            
24 Pitkin, The Concept of Representation,  p. 60.  
25 Frank Cunningham, Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 94. 
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    To conclude there is no neat way through which political representation can be separated from 
symbolic representation. A major reason of the impossibility of performing such task rests with 
the concept of representation which as such it does not correspond to a single essence or to ‘a 
minimum and shared semantic kernel’ on the basis of which it can be defined in a univalent 
way.26 All the conceptual elements associated with the notion of representation and meticulously 
brought up by Pitkin have a place in the articulation of political phenomena and relations, not 
only in the area pertaining to the formal procedures of electing representatives and governments 
but also in the overall domain of the political as such, expressed in the form of the politics of 
representation. All these elements, the making of the absent present, the substitution of one entity 
for another and a relationship of similarity broadly construed to hold between the represented 
and the representative, contribute to the understanding of the representative relationship that ties 
a political community to the governing system of political power. The fact that even the simplest 
expression of authorisation between a principal and an agent is necessarily mediated by symbolic 
elements and requires interpretation implies that the terms and conditions of political 
representation are always exposed to contestation. This consequence rather than having any 
deleterious political effects constitutes a central pivot of the community’s political freedom to 
interpret, judge and contest the doing and saying of any representative government.                     
        
                                           
1.b. Political Representation and Arbitrary Government in Hobbes 
 
         Hobbes’ author-actor model is the ground of political representation. It provides for 
contractual transfer of will from person to person in the sense that one will substitutes for the 
other. It establishes the relationship of the representative acting ‘in the name’ of the represented. 
The theory of representation plays a most important role in Hobbes’s political philosophy. It 
secures the absolute obedience of the commonwealth members to the representative sovereign 
power for the latter’s will is construed to be a unitary will which binds all the members’ own 
wills. 
                                                            
26 Jacques Derrida, ‘Sending: On Representation’, Social Research , 49.2 (1982), pp. 294-326 (p. 298). 
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       In this section I will present some general features of Hobbes’s authorisation view of 
representation. I present the main structure of political representation which undergirds the 
construction of representative government in Leviathan. This is the relationship between the 
commonwealth and its sovereign power. We may call it a dyadic structure because it involves 
two parties in the representative connection. There exists also a subsidiary structure that 
establishes the constitution of a state between God and a ‘particular people’ and involves the 
interposition of a mediator who represents God and holds the sovereign power in God’s name. 
We can designate this structure as triadic. This structural form of political representation is a 
variation of the dyadic structure conditioned by the impossibility of any community directly 
covenanting with God (Lev. XIV, p. 97). Its construction is a necessary facet of Hobbes’s theory 
of sovereignty for it plays the strategic role of conferring ecclesiastical power (derived from 
God) to the civil sovereign and thus it undercuts any claims of dual power within the Christian 
commonwealth torn between civil obedience to the earthly ruler and religious obedience owed to 
the ‘spiritual power’ held by Papacy and interpreted as superior over the civil sovereign. I will 
not pursue the intricacies of this structure of representation here.     
     The relationship of political representation grounds the legitimacy of representative 
government. Legitimacy invokes the question of justifiable political obligation. A main tendency 
of political theory has been to examine how and to what degree individuals are politically 
obliged either on prudential or on moral grounds.27 I will adopt a different viewpoint, displacing 
the analytic stress from the subjects to the government and ask the question to what degree the 
representative sovereign power in Hobbes’s Leviathan is obligated (if at all) to the 
commonwealth. 
     I will claim that Hobbes’s account is vitiated by certain deficiencies whose overall 
consequence is to question the legitimacy of the representative government. The first deficiency 
concerns the permanence of the sovereign representative. The initial authorisation of the 
contractors cannot be retracted no matter what even if the sovereign power violates its mandate. 
It follows that no political freedom exists to modify, to change or even to call into account the 
representative power. Another deficiency concerns the arbitrariness of the will of the sovereign 
representative. He is above the law and defines the laws and the public good at will. Thus he is 
                                                            
27 Thomas Nagel, ‘Hobbes’s Concept of Obligation’, The Philosophical Review, 68.1 (1959), pp. 68-83.  
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unaccountable to the represented for all his actions and he can potentially breach any conceivable 
representative connection. Though, he ought to act for them in fulfilling the ends of ‘common 
Peace and Security’ (Lev. XXIV, p. 172) he was set up for, he ends up being an absolute ruler, a 
Hobbesian ‘tyrant’ who acts solely for himself. 
      Hobbes introduces the concept of representation in chapter XVI of his magnum opus 
Leviathan. He provides the conceptual definition of the two poles, author and actor, which 
constitute the essential components of the relation of representation in his view. The relation of 
representation is premised on a fundamental distinction that is said to exist in the categorisation 
of who is a person. Specifically, the person can either be: 
 
A PERSON, is he, whose words or actions are considered, either as his own, or as 
representing the words or actions of an other man, or of any other thing to whom they 
are attributed, whether Truly or by Fiction. 
When they are considered as his owne, then is he called a Naturall Person: And when 
they are considered as representing the words and actions of an other, then is he a 
Feigned or Artificiall person. (Lev. XVI, p. 111).  
 
Hereby persons are distinguished into natural and artificial ones, the distinguishing feature 
between them consisting in a relationship of ownership or original attribution in regard to one’s 
words and actions. The ‘natural person’ by speaking or acting emerges as the holder of his own 
discourse and action while the ‘artificial person’ enjoys a derivative status beholden to the 
primacy of the originator of words and actions. In spite of its plainness this initial definition hints 
at a more complex connection between the artificial and the natural person, two aspects of which 
are of significance. The first aspect concerns the possibility of the representative person to stand 
in a representative relation not only to the words or actions of another person but also to 
represent ‘any other thing’ to which words or actions can be attributed to. By this aspect of the 
definition the notion of ‘symbolic representative’ is suggested in that an object (for example, a 
text) can be represented by an ‘artificial person’ even when an authorisation by the former is 
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impossible. The lack of personhood by an object does not deny the possibility of its 
impersonation, a condition that accommodates a social necessity in bourgeois society where any 
material and immaterial entity tends to stand under the sign of property. By this condition 
property can achieve its juridical representation.  
The second aspect concerns the truth condition in the Hobbesian relationship of 
representation. The representative connection holds truly even if the ground on which the 
relationship is established is untrue or fictive. The ‘artificial person’ can be said to represent 
another even if the attribution of words or actions to the represented consists in a fictional 
attribution (for ex., via the interpretation of ‘holy texts’).  This condition ushers the possibility of 
grounding the legitimacy of a relation of political representation in the absence of an expressly 
declared will by the represented.  
Hobbes locates the origin of representation in the theatrical metaphor. The Latin term 
persona intimating an ‘outward appearance’ or ‘disguise’ by which someone impersonates 
another or even himself under an apparently different façade. This capacity to duplicate oneself 
on the stage became common currency in the early modern period, ‘[s]o that a Person, is the 
same that an Actor is, both on the Stage and in common Conversation; and to Personate, is to 
Act, or Represent himselfe, or an other; and he that acteth another, is said to beare his Person, or 
act in his name;’ (Lev. XVI, p. 112). Hobbes in this description of the social competence to 
double one’s self or re-present it under another guise by acting out one’s own self or the 
character of another captures a bourgeois sensibility that was to become a dominant motif in the 
17th and the 18th century European civil society. This is the widespread idea of the distinctiveness 
between a private and a public self who is acted out for the public mind as spectator.28 This 
divorce between intimate and public self, dominant in Hobbes too in the form of a distinction of 
inner ‘conscience’ from one’s  external actions compliant to the laws of the sovereign power,29 
requires reason’s capacity for self-reflection premised on the positing of the external world and 
                                                            
28 Marvin B. Becker, The Emergence of Civil Society in the Eighteenth Century (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1994), pp. 25-31. 
29 ‘A private man has alwaies the liberty, (because thought is free,) to beleeve, or not beleeve in his heart, those acts 
[miracles] […] [b]ut when it comes to confession of that faith, the Private Reason must submit to the Publique’ (Lev. 
XXXVII, p. 306).      
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one’s own self as distinctive internal objects. One’s own experience of the sensible world 
becomes internalised as personal memory and it then furnishes the basis of self-reflection.30   
The duplicity of self underpinning representation as the capacity to have myself represented 
by another and/or myself as another person could be traced to the religious schisms and civil 
wars rupturing contemporary society. Hobbes explicitly associated the political struggle between 
‘spiritual’ and ‘temporal’ powers rending ‘Christian common-wealths’ with an internalised 
schism ‘in every Christian mans own brest, between the Christian, and the Man’ (Lev. XXXIX, 
p. 320). ‘Man’ here signifies the political subject and the inner rift concerns allegiance to two 
opposed representatives (state and church), each claiming supremacy over the subject’s 
obedience to their representative wills.           
Political representation by authorisation or consent giving is construed as the basis of 
justifiable obedience. This is made possible by the condition that the relationship of the 
represented to the representative involves a making-other of the self. This other self to which the 
represented submits is not an independent natural person but an ‘artificial person’ encompassing 
the represented natural persons. The ‘artificial person’ embodied in ‘one or an assembly’ entails 
the incorporation of the natural person of the ‘authors’ into its public persona. The public person 
(as the commonwealth) does not stand externally to the ‘authors’ who have instituted it but it 
consists in the doubling of their natural selves into another unitary self whose sovereign will is 
the law.     
 In the debate between Hobbes and Bramhall on the question whether ‘free will’ is 
determined or undetermined, Bramhall contends that if the will is seen as determined then law’s 
prohibitions appear as unjust since necessitated willed actions take place inescapably and law 
then punishes violations that could not be averted by any free exercise of the will. Hobbes’s 
response to this argument is to deny the unjust character of the law claiming in his major 
counter-contention that ‘no law can possibly be unjust, inasmuch as every man makes, by his 
consent, the law he is bound to keep, and which consequently must be just, unless a man can be 
                                                            
30 Hobbes, [1645], ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’ in Hobbes and Bramhall on Liberty and Necessity, ed. by Vere 
Chappell (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), § 33, p. 39. 
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unjust to himself’’(emphasis mine).31 Consenting to law establishes a relation of representation 
that carries with it an ethical obligation to abide by it as a vicarious form of self-legislation. 
How is it possible to claim that ‘a man can be unjust to himself’ whenever he transgresses a 
law he has consented to or conversely remaining ‘just to himself’ when following the law, other 
than that the law is the political alter ego of the consenting individual? To transgress the law 
amounts to acting against one’s self as an incorporated member of the public person and this is 
possible only because representation permits the transposition of one’s will into another’s who is 
taken to be a duplicate of one’s own self.  
Hobbes’s political community can exist only if its prospective members obtain representation 
by one person who constitutes by his person the unity of the community itself.  
 
A Multitude of men, are made One Person, when they are by one man, or one Person, 
Represented; so that it be done with the consent of every one of that Multitude in 
particular. For it is the Unity of the Representer, not the Unity of the Represented, that 
maketh the Person One. And it is the Representer that beareth the Person, and but one 
Person: And Unity, cannot otherwise be understood in Multitude. (Lev. XVI, p. 114).   
 
   The covenanters agree individually with each other and all of them to constitute themselves as 
an artificial person. The mere agreement among themselves does not suffice to turn their 
aggregate into a unity. To obtain a unity they have to agree in their original covenant to set up a 
Representative whose unity of person confers upon them a unity. The multitude does not have a 
unity prior to instituting the representative power. Nor do we have two covenants, one between 
the covenanters establishing a commonwealth and then a second covenant consenting to the 
erection of a representative and entrusting him with the community’s power. There is only one 
covenant between themselves about the person (who can be either a man or an assembly) who 
will necessarily embody the legal personality of the community and transform by his very 
existence the multitude into a political body. The necessity of instituting the representative as the 
                                                            
31 Hobbes, ‘Of Liberty and Necessity’, § 14, p. 24.     
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ground that confers to them political unity has the following significance. That each and all of 
them are bound individually to the Representative. If they had a prior unity as a multitude then 
the setting up of the representative power would have been most probably a majority decision 
than a unanimous one and as a majority decision the dissenters would not have been obliged to 
obey the representative. It would have permitted also the possibility to dissolve the 
commonwealth by a majority decision. By not having a unity prior to the one conferred by the 
representative they are ‘but many Authors, of every thing their Representative saith, or doth in 
their name; Every man giving their common Representer, Authority from himselfe in particular; 
and owning all the actions the Representer doth, in case they give him Authority without stint’ 
(Lev. XVI, p. 114).            
      Hobbes’s conception of an original social contract as the source of representative power has 
been criticised as a self-contradiction due to two incompatible demands put on it. He sees it as 
‘the foundation of all shared standards and rules’ and at the same time as a contract but ‘for it to 
be a contract, there must already exist shared and common standards of the kind which he 
specifies cannot exist prior to the contract’.32  Actually, the presumable self-contradiction is not 
between two incompatible demands for it is perfectly compatible to posit a social contract and 
consider it as the foundation of all subsequent standards and rules. If there is a tension it can only 
be the logical inconsistency of presupposing a lack of shared standards in the state of nature such 
that no agreement is possible while assuming the origination of the contract as a mutual 
agreement within the state of nature.33 This criticism of Hobbes does not stand for it supposes 
not the impossibility of coming into agreement by words or promises but that these declared 
‘intentions’ do not have a binding force.34 But for Hobbes they do not need to have and they do 
not have any binding force till the sovereign power is set up whose power imposes obedience 
upon the covenanters. Precisely here is Hobbes’s originality. The constitution of the political 
community does not take place prior to the setting up of the Representative so that the 
covenanters meanwhile could withdraw their non-binding consent. For any covenant made in the 
state of nature which has to be fulfilled in the future is nonbinding (Lev. XIV, p. 96). It is the 
                                                            
32 Alasdair MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics (London: Routledge, 1989[1967]), p. 137. 
33 J. Habermas suggests a variant of this tension when he mentions that Hobbes’s grounding of social order rests 
problematically on ‘the fortuitous confluence of rational choices made by independent actors’. ‘Postscript to 
Between Facts and Norms’ in Habermas, Modernity and Law, ed. by Mathieu Deflem (London: Sage Pub., 1996), 
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concurrent covenant for the constitution of the Representative as the Person of the 
commonwealth which transforms the community into a ‘union’ or a political body and thus it 
necessarily binds its members under his power. The constitution of the commonwealth is not a 
two-step process whereby a multitude of men firstly becomes a political body and then it erects 
the sovereign representative but it is one act by which it authorises a representative power to 
protect and rule over it consolidating its unity. From the moment the Representative has been set 
up their will has also been alienated permanently and they cannot change it or renege their 
original consent. ‘For a Contract lawfully made, cannot lawfully be broken’ (Lev. ‘Rev. & 
Conc.’, p. 485) and according to the third law of nature ‘men [must] performe their Covenants 
made’ (Lev. XV, p. 100). Once one becomes a subject of a commonwealth he is forever 
subjected to its sovereign power for ‘[t]he Obligation of Subjects to the Soveraign, is understood 
to last as long, and no longer, than the power lasteth’ (Lev. XXI, p. 153) unless the 
commonwealth itself undergoes dissolution but this is impossible to occur on a consensual basis 
(except if the sovereign consents to it himself).35   
           So Hobbes is quite consistent in his origination of the social contract with its concurrent 
binding force. That the presence of a representative is the necessary condition for the constitution 
of a commonwealth is explicitly brought up in Hobbes’s critique of Bellarmine’s argument that 
the Spiritual power (of the Pope) holds supremacy over the Temporal power of the sovereigns. 
Against Bellarmine’s claim that there is a universal church of Christian believers Hobbes 
pinpoints that there is a plurality of commonwealths with several sovereigns representing them 
having an organic character like ‘a naturall man; which no Generall or Universall Church is, till 
it have a Representant’ (Lev. XLII, p. 397). Without the existence of a ‘representant’ no 
multitude can ever obtain an ‘artificial person’ embodying its constitution as a unitary political 
body.  
    There are two modes of origination of the commonwealth in Hobbes’s theory of sovereignty. 
Apart from the type of commonwealth constituted by design or ‘institution’, commonwealths are 
formed also by ‘acquisition’ or ‘conquest’ as by-products of successful wars. Consent is also the 
basis of this type of commonwealth. The vanquished declare their submission to the victor in 
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exchange for having their life spared. For Hobbes voluntary enslavement ‘to avoyd the present 
stroke of death’ is a matter of free choice (hence a consensual act) since the subject can always 
choose death or escape over enslavement. Nonetheless, mere ‘yeelding to discretion’ at the hands 
of the victor for expedient reasons is not a sign of consensual submission. The vanquished must 
expressly commit his life and liberty to the victor in order for the submission to be consensual 
and a ground of obligation. (Lev. XX, p. 141). Having given their consent the subjects are totally 
bound to ‘own’ the actions of the absolute will of the ruler just as it happens in the 
commonwealth by design. In both types of commonwealth the mode of subjection of the civil 
members to the sovereign representative is ‘virtually indistinguishable from the Greek or Roman 
slave master, that is, the despot or the private dominus.’36        
       Hobbes assigns to the sovereign power the exclusive right to legislate for the commonwealth 
while at the same time being above the law. ‘The Legislator in all Common-wealths, is only the 
Soveraign […] [and] be it an Assembly, or one Man, is not Subject to the Civill Lawes’ (Lev. 
XXVI, p. 184). The sovereign is the only agency competent to abrogate the laws. By having the 
power to make and repeal laws:  
 
he may when he pleaseth, free himselfe from that subjection, by repealing those Lawes 
that trouble him, and making of new; and consequently he was free before. For he is free, 
that can be free when he will: Nor is it possible for any person to be bound to himselfe; 
because he that can bind, can release; and therefore he that is bound to himselfe onely, is 
not bound (Lev. XXVI, p. 184).                                                                                             
       
    There exist some logical deficiencies in Hobbes’s argument through which he attempts to 
warrant the unlimited power of the sovereign. The conclusion Hobbes wants to derive is that the 
sovereign is above the law because he can make, modify or cancel the content of the law at will. 
Nevertheless, the sovereign cannot abolish the Law tout court. I mean by this that there is always 
a standing law to be obeyed by the subjects and provisionally by the sovereign power. 
Consequently, the sovereign is not released from the obligation to abide by the standing law 
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whatever the content of the law may have been at any given moment. At any moment the Law is 
going to have a particular content prescribing and proscribing certain actions. If the sovereign 
power violates the settled law then it comes in direct opposition to its own posited will. Thereby 
it endangers the legitimacy of its rule consonant with the general obedience to legality. From the 
condition that the law can be changed the consequence cannot be derived that as long as the law 
is standing the legislator is not bound by the content of his will. If anyone wills something this is 
what he has willed and he is rationally bound to the determinate effect of his will. That the 
person is a free agent and he can will something else at some other point in time does not annul 
the particular action he had willed the moment he had willed it. Certainly it cannot be supposed 
that he willed one thing and its opposite at the same time. So at any time the person is bound to 
his momentary will. The same condition applies to law. At no time is the sovereign’s legislative 
will outside the framework of law. The legislator is free to change the law, not free from the law 
as Hobbes asserts. 
     The argument on freedom offered to substantiate the sovereign’s unrestrained freedom over 
law is quite problematic. Hobbes’s proposition is ‘For he is free, that can be free when he will’. 
A person is free not when he wills to be free for he may be a slave and whatever he may will it 
does not affect his enslavement. Freedom is the precondition of a free will not a ‘free will’ the 
generator of freedom. One has to be free to will freely. To will to be free does not make you free. 
If the proposition is read otherwise, that one can be free when he wills it, therefore he is free, it is 
then a mere tautology not a proof, for it assumes the identity of possibility with actuality. If ‘I 
can be free’ is construed as meaning ‘I am free’ then the conclusion ‘for he is free’ is a 
reiteration of the premise.      
       The second point on the idea that persons cannot bind themselves is questionable too. 
Persons can be bound to themselves as it has been argued conclusively by Kant and as the 
existential testimony of ‘moral conscience’ in human history has shown. Actually a real free will 
is the one that binds the person who wills as a moral agent. Even from a pragmatic vantage point 
if one is not bound by what he has willed then he will be treated as an hypocrite, be considered 
irrational and most probably he will be socially censured if for example he does not keep any of 
the promises he makes. Apart from these logical and practical errors Hobbes is also caught in 
self-contradiction. He raises the issue of the obligation owed to ‘divine positive lawes’ declared 
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by the authorised representatives of God (Lev. XXVI, p. 197). His conclusion is that ‘if the Law 
declared, be not against the Law of Nature (which is undoubtedly Gods Law) and he undertake 
to obey it, he is bound by his own act;’ (Lev. XXVI, p. 198). So, if anyone wills to obey a law he 
is self-bound by his very own act of doing so. It follows that the sovereign power in willing 
freely the law it ought to be bound to its own act. Not doing so amounts to a Scholastic 
‘absurdity’, the lack of rational consistency, which in Hobbes’s own terms is ‘Injustice, and 
Injury, voluntarily to undo that, which from the beginning he had voluntarily done’ (Lev. XIV, p. 
93). The only solution out of this quagmire Hobbes has put himself in, it would be to assert that 
the sovereign will does not will to obey the acts of its own will, a sedition enhancing doctrine to 
espouse at the sovereign power’s own peril which Hobbes does not uphold.   
    We saw that in Hobbes’s account the Representative’s will is not constrained by the civil law 
for it is taken to be above the law by setting the law according to its own discretion. Another 
possible form of constraint that could and ought to bind his will is the promotion of the ends of 
the commonwealth since the safeguarding of the ends was the foundational reason he was 
instituted in the first place to act for. The third possible candidate of restraint is the normative 
force of the law of nature. If the sovereign power performs its entrusted duties and abides by the 
natural law all is well. But what does it happen if it transgresses its mandate and/or violates 
natural law? 
 
It is true, that a Soveraign Monarch, or the greater part of a Soveraign Assembly, may 
ordain the doing of many things in pursuit of their Passions, contrary to their own 
consciences, which is a breach of trust, and of the Law of Nature; but this is not enough 
to authorise any subject, either to make warre upon, or so much as to accuse of Injustice, 
or any way to speak evill of their Soveraign; because they have authorised all his actions, 
and in bestowing the Soveraign Power, made them their own (Lev. XXIV, p. 172). 
          
In a nutshell, we have all the conditions which ground the arbitrariness of representative 
government. Justice is distinguished from equity in Hobbes’s thought. Justice and the definition 
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of right and wrong is only what the sovereign will, declared as civil law, commands.37 Hence no 
sovereign act can ever be unjust. Given the distinction of justice from equity, a sovereign act 
may be just but inequitable by appeal to natural law in the sense of natural law being an 
independent standard of ethical conduct. Stricto sensu, natural laws ‘are not properly Lawes, but 
qualities that dispose men to peace, and to obedience’ (Lev. XXVI, p. 185). Only when they 
become ‘commands’ in the commonwealth, then they emerge as civil laws with binding force. 
So appeal to natural law is conditional upon its legalisation. Such appeal is thereby neutralised 
for natural law qua civil law does not bind the sovereign power which ‘is not Subject to the 
Civill Lawes’ (Lev. XXVI, p. 184). Even if we assume the independence of natural law as a set 
of ethical precepts by which the sovereign actions could be judged, still the possibility of ethical 
disagreement is duly eliminated and quite consistently so by the argument that since the 
representative’s action is the subject’s own action and, as we have seen above, no one can be 
unjust to himself, no one can accuse the sovereign of any injustice. So natural law cannot 
function as a critical counterweight to call the sovereign power into account. Hobbes’s 
systematic thinking is so powerful that it leaves nothing to chance. Since natural law is unwritten 
law its knowledge requires interpretation. The monopoly of interpretation of any and all laws, 
past and present, is held by the sovereign power whose ‘Judgement of what is reasonable, and of 
what is to be abolished’ counts only. (Lev. XXVI, pp. 184-5).38 So no independent interpretation 
of natural law can be raised to oppose the understanding of natural law by the sovereign. 
Consequently, the sovereign is safeguarded not only from ‘accusation’ but he cannot even be 
criticised of ‘evill’ or unethical conduct. What applies to natural law applies pari passu to the 
definition of the commonwealth’s public ends. Therefore neither can function as a limitation or 
as an ‘external impediment’ restraining the freedom of the sovereign.39 The Representative 
power can violate both the ‘trust’ and natural law at will for it is up to its own ‘conscience’ and 
understanding to judge what they mean. The whole edifice of unlimited representative power is 
erected on the ground of the initial authorisation act. The ‘authors’ have given him ‘authority’ 
                                                            
37 ‘Power irresistible justifies all actions, really and properly, in whomsoever it be found’. Hobbes, Liberty and 
Necessity, § 12, p. 22. 
38 Also, ‘all lawes, written and unwritten, have their Authority […] from the Will of the Representative’ (Lev. 
XXVI, p. 186) and on the monopoly of interpretation by the reason of the ‘artificial man’ (Lev. XXVI, pp. 187, 190). 
The reduction of reason to the sovereign’s reason eliminates the last remaining independent source of evaluation of 
the ethical conduct of the sovereign power.  
39 ‘Liberty’ in Hobbes is ‘the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and 
intrinsical quality of the agent’. Liberty and Necessity, § 29, p. 38.    
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and authority entails ‘a Right of doing any act’ (Lev. XVI, p. 112). They have authorised the 
Representative ‘without stint’, i.e. unconditionally. It has to be remarked, for it is often 
misunderstood, that in Hobbes’ schema of authorisation underwriting the social contract there 
does not take place any transfer of rights but a ‘transfer’ or substitution of wills. A transfer of 
rights presupposes that these are given or granted or entrusted to the representative government 
to uphold and protect. This raises the possibility that a ‘multitude’ of free wills may demand to 
have their rights back if these are not being respected. By contrast in the exchange of one’s will 
with that of the representative, the ‘author’ ceases to have a will of his own and only ‘owns’ the 
will of his representative, the will of his own public self. Therefore he does not have an 
independent will on the basis of which he could revoke his authorisation for whatever reason and 
he is fated to be permanently alienated from his will. Hobbes is explicit that no transfer of rights 
ever took place in the instituting of the commonwealth. The natural ‘right to everything’ and its 
most important derivative, the right to punish which makes any law enforceable, ‘is not grounded 
on any concession, or gift of the Subjects […] but onely in laying down theirs’ (Lev. XXVIII, p. 
214). What is ‘given’ may under certain conditions be reclaimed. What is ‘laid down’ can only 
be raised up. But if it is raised up this converts one into an ‘enemy of the state’ instantaneously 
and moreover sets one in unjustifiable opposition to his own will, that is, the representative’s 
will. Hobbesian political representation justifies total subservience to the sovereign’s master will. 
The obedience is so total that the subjection of the citizen’s private will verges on extinction 
under the sovereign’s will so that he is absolved from any responsibility of actions done under 
the authority’s command. He is in effect turned into a marionette of the sovereign will. A ‘Civill 
Soveraign […] may oblige men to certain actions, and sometimes to such as they would not 
otherwise do […] and yet when they are commanded, they are Laws; and the externall actions 
done in obedience to them, without the inward approbation, are the actions of the Soveraign, and 
not of the Subject, which is in that case but as an instrument, without any motion of his owne at 
all’ (emphasis mine, Lev. XLII, p. 389).    
    Political representation by committing the subjects ‘to uphold whatsoever power is given to 
the Soveraign’ is the ‘Fundamentall Law in every Common-wealth’ without which no 
commonwealth can be preserved (Lev. XXVI, p. 200). And this applies to all forms of 
government, be it monarchy, democracy or aristocracy. There are no other forms of government 
but just misnomers of these expressing an evaluative negative stance toward either one of these 
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(Lev. XLVI, pp. 470-1). Hobbes clearly favours monarchy though formally most of the time, he 
refers to monarch and assembly conjointly. Sovereign power as assembly covers both democracy 
‘in which any citizen has the right to vote’ and aristocracy in which ‘only a certain part have a 
vote’.40 His pro-monarchical preference for the sake of which sovereign power is constructed as 
absolute rule,41 is suggestively revealed in his discussion of the dysfunction of the counseling 
assembly.                                                        
The arguments used against the assembly format (tendency to demagogy, factionalism, 
intimidation to speak against the prevailing doxa etc.) are used in order to infer that the assembly 
structure as such does not permit rational decision-making but only ‘when the finall Resolution is 
in one man’ (Lev. XXV, p. 182). As a consequence the constitution of the sovereign power as an 
assembly, i.e. ‘popular government’ is dysfunctional and ‘therefore no great Popular Common-
wealth was ever kept up’ (Lev. XXV, p. 182). The alternative of monarchy or assembly as the 
three possible governmental forms of the Representative was a rhetorical ploy for the two 
alternatives to monarchy were in Hobbes’s view a recipe of political disaster and consequently to 
be discarded as forms of government.   
       The systematic intent of Hobbes’s political philosophy leads to a deification of the total 
power possessed by the sovereign. ‘Tyranny’ is the ‘name of Soveraignty’ under all forms of 
government (Lev. ‘Rev. & Conc’, p. 486).  In a sense the sovereign power is in a state of nature 
with the members of the commonwealth.42 One reason is that in the commonwealths by 
‘acquisition’ the subjects make a personal agreement with the sovereign so the latter should be 
bound by his agreement equally with his subject. When Hobbes raises the issue of whether the 
sovereign is bound by a covenant made with his subjects his response is that covenants are mere 
words and do not oblige, constrain or protect anyone ‘but what it has from the publique Sword’ 
(Lev. XVIII, p. 123).  So the covenant is considered as if it had been made in the state of nature 
                                                            
40 Hobbes, On the Citizen, pp. 91-2. 
41 Benjamin Constant argues that the notion of absolute rule is a ‘sophism’ of Hobbes introduced to serve his ‘aim’ 
and necessarily leads him to false conclusions and the disastrous consequence that in unlimited sovereignty ‘there is 
no means of sheltering individuals from governments’. ‘Principles of Politics Applicable to All Representative 
Governments’ in Constant: Political Writings , ed. by Biancamaria Fontana (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1988), pp. 175-305 (p. 179).    
42 H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, pp. 30-1.  
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in the absence of a protecting sovereign power.43 Hobbes is led to the impasse of denying the 
validity of civil covenants made with a sovereign of an established commonwealth because in 
this case the protection of the commonwealth’s subject by the sovereign power should have 
come from the very same sovereign power that has committed the violation of the covenant. The 
sovereign would have been obliged to punish himself for his own contractual transgression, 
something unimaginable for Hobbes. From another point of view the Hobbesian conception that 
covenants do not bind unless someone has the power to back them up leads to disastrous 
consequences in regard to his strategic intent to safeguard monarchical power. For if only 
possession of power matters then any and all subjects exposed to its arbitrary use would be 
strongly motivated to attempt to dispossess the holder of sovereign power from his power, thus 
intensifying tumult and civil strife than the consolidation of ‘common peace’ so much desired 
but lacking in the state of nature. An analogous problem pertains to the commonwealth by 
‘institution’. Of course, the constitution of this type does not involve any covenant with the 
Representative. Hobbes, nevertheless, raises the hypothetical case of one making ‘so many 
severall Covenants as there be men’ and thus instituting the commonwealth. The consequence is 
that ‘those Covenants after he hath the Soveraignty are voyd’ (Lev. XVIII, p. 123). The 
covenants of all severally are good and valid till the covenantee grabs the sovereignty. Thereafter 
they are invalid. The reason of invalidation is grounded on political representation. He is the 
representative person who by their authorisation has got their collective power in his hands while 
all of them have ‘laid down’ or ‘given away’ almost all their rights (except the right of resisting 
deliberate death) and to whom they have permanently alienated their private wills by obliging 
themselves to have his public will substitute for their own. So no ‘breach’ of any covenant can be 
claimed for whatever act is committed by their artificial person since any act of his is ‘the act of 
himselfe [the subject], and of all the rest, because done in the Person, and by the Right of every 
one of them in particular’ (Lev. XVIII, p. 123). How does this civil state differ from the state of 
nature? In the state of nature each feared everybody else. In the civil state each fears only the 
Leviathan. But there exists another significant difference. In the state of nature men enjoyed 
natural equality and there existed a kind of parity of fear in the sense of equivalent strength 
between enemies. In the state of the Leviathan each subject is confronted by a power capable to 
                                                            
43 Ross Harrison, Hobbes, Locke, and Confusion’s Masterpiece: An Examination of Seventeenth-Century Political 
Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), p. 111. 
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annihilate him. For this reason, the right of resistance to imminent death is a sham right vis-à-vis 
the Leviathan. In effect, there are not any rights held by the subjects against Leviathan, and the 
latter is not a constitutional state that could, through the rule of law, protect the individual from 
the absolute will of the sovereign power.                        
        The most basic element of living in the state of nature is that everyone has ‘a right to all 
things’ (Lev. XIV, p. 92). This right is laid down by the members of the commonwealth but it is 
afforded to the Hobbesian sovereign since no member of the commonwealth can reserve any 
right from being encroached legally by the sovereign power. For instance, the most important 
condition for the maintenance of the commonwealth and of its citizens is the institution of 
property and the distribution of the material resources of society. There is no natural right to any 
form of property. (Lev. XXIX, p. 224). ‘[T]he Introduction of Propriety is an effect of Common-
wealth; which can do nothing but by the Person that Represents it, it is the act onely of the 
Soveraign’ (Lev. XXIV, p. 171). The distribution of all material resources, the allocation of land, 
what any subject may own rightfully is the exclusive prerogative of the sovereign to decide. 
Access to the ‘means of preservation’ which was a right by nature for every individual in the pre-
civil condition is now exclusively left to the discretion of the sovereign. The standard of 
distribution of the means of subsistence is ‘Equity and the Common Good’. Alas, what equity 
and the common good mean is not the business of ‘any Subject, or any number of them’ to judge, 
but only he can judge it. (Lev. XXIV, p. 171). So, even if the great majority of citizens deems the 
commonwealth’s existing distribution of wealth and resources unfair and inequitable, this is of 
no effect, let alone that such opinion is severely punishable since it opposes the absolute will of 
the sovereign. This is an extremely asymmetrical political condition.44 Everyone is obliged to 
obey the commands of the civil power primarily out of fear of punishment as ‘the terrour of his 
laws’ (Lev. XLV, p. 449) coerces compliance and secondarily by the weak appeal of the ‘dictates 
of reason’ or the maxims of ‘natural law’ which counsel the performance of covenants. 
Consequently, all members of the political community are compelled to ‘own’, willingly or not, 
the actions promulgated by the sovereign power. By unquestionably obeying the commands of 
the ‘Arbitrary government’ of the Representative (Lev. XLVI, p. 471), the embodiment of the 
unitary will of the commonwealth, the represented authors have been reduced to a political 
                                                            
44 Laconically put by Hobbes himself. ‘Outside the commonwealth anyone may be killed and robbed by anyone; 
within a commonwealth by only one person’. On the Citizen , p. 116. 
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mirage of the sovereign will. As private men they do enjoy the leeway to oppose the laws (thus 
the sovereign will) but this turns them ipso facto into enemies of the state (Lev. XXVIII, p. 216). 
There is no room left at all to exist as political participants in the public life of the 
commonwealth. All public activity is strictly pre-determined by the sovereign power and the 
thought control it exercises. Even the pursuance of true philosophical doctrines is prohibited if 
they have not been condoned by the sovereign (Lev. XLVI, p. 474). Political representation in 
Hobbes is revealed to be the opposite of its initial constitution. The representative sovereign 
power has exclusive authority to appoint all officialdom of the executive, of the judiciary and of 
any other state agencies (as in local administration, in universities, in the Church).  All public 
servants are representatives of the sovereign power and all their actions are valid only on 
condition that they are authorised by the sovereign will. Thus the representative power is the 
actual ‘author’ of any and all public activity.    
       At the constituent moment of the commonwealth the representative originated as the actor 
embodying the universal will of the ‘many authors’ endorsing their political union. With the full 
development of the conditions underwriting the sovereign power’s absolute will the Hobbesian 
representative is shown to be the real author of all legitimately permissible acts (of public and 
private men) and the initial authors have been demoted to plain actors, ‘as instruments without 
any motion of their own’ acting out his arbitrary will and acting for the preservation of the 
sovereign’s supremacy.  
       In the next chapter we will see the logic of political representation being deployed 
completely otherwise. Unlimited representative government is duly transformed into responsibly 
limited government. In place of political representation taking place ‘in the name’ of the people 
to the detriment of the people, political representation takes place ‘on behalf’ of the people for 
the sake of society’s public good.                     
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Chapter 2 
 
 Natural Law and the Constitution of Representative Political Society  
 
      In this section I discuss some aspects of John Locke’s political philosophy which have 
remained undertheorised in recent scholarship. In particular, I focus on the social dimensions of 
his thought, a kind of ‘socio-logical philosophy’ that underpins his political theory proper. The 
paradigmatic text of Locke’s political philosophy is his magnum opus Two Treatises of 
Government published in 1690.  
    I argue that in his work we see the emergence of political society out of the state-of-nature 
which itself is a natural society, through a process of representation that renders the new society 
its sui generis political character. Individuals in the state of nature exist as multitudes and their 
consensual institution of a political society converts the multitude into a unitary political ‘body’. 
The instituted political power erected to direct the functioning of ‘political society’ involves 
representation both as a condition of its genesis (it represents the concerted will of the partners in 
the compact drawn while living in a pre-political condition), and as the form of deployment of 
the connection between the constituted political community and the legitimate government that 
regulates the community’s affairs.  
 
2.a.  The Social State-of-Nature and the Genesis of Political Society 
 
    The theoretical universe of Locke is articulated within the dominant politico-religious order of 
his era which is suffused by forms of representation especially representation based on notions of 
authorisation, entrustment, commission, trusteeship and stewardship designating relational 
activities performed by agents under obligation and on behalf of someone else or some other 
entity. His critique of the monarchical right to legitimate governance rests on an immanent 
critique (pace Filmer) of the ‘divine right’ conception of absolute monarchical power which 
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itself is based on an idea of representation of God’s will by monarchy. In this section I will 
explore the lineaments of such critique and I will argue that Locke infuses his conception of 
representation with freedom expounding it as a rationally guided, law-based, moral entanglement 
of the represented with the representative(s).      
    The precondition for the emergence of political society is social living in the so-called state of 
nature which is acknowledged by Locke to be an actual natural state rather than a mere 
hypothetical case or a ‘thought-experiment’ as some commentators take it to be.45 This does not 
mean that Locke focuses on a descriptive account of the empirical conditions of contemporary 
and/or bygone natural societies (though he refers at times to particular historical examples)46 but 
he aims to reconstruct the normative standing of the state of nature,47 how people must have led 
their lives given the absence of an overbearing human power over them and in accordance with 
certain presuppositions built into natural law that was assumed to be the regulatory basis of 
human interaction in that original state of consociation. Thus Locke falls neatly within the 
‘political antinaturalism’ camp, one of the two opposing camps in which political philosophy can 
be divided. ‘Political antinaturalism is the view that the natural condition of humankind is 
nonpolitical.’48 It follows that the constitution of ‘political society’ is a post-natural condition, an 
artificial invention designed by human creation. 
    None the less, the formation of political society is based on social resources, capacities and 
socio-ethical relations drawn from the state of nature and its law and carried over into political 
society prescribing the limiting conditions that circumscribe the legitimate functioning of 
political power. The Lockean state of nature reflects Locke’s conception of ‘human nature’ 
which in his account is constitutively social, ‘naturally sociable’.49 This assumption of an 
                                                            
45 For instance, Nicholas Jolley, Locke: his philosophical thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 196. 
For Locke’s simultaneous development of three different conceptions of social contract as ‘a historical event’, ‘an 
ongoing silent event of consent giving’ and a ‘hypothetical choice that rules out political arrangements rational 
agents wouldn’t agree to’, see: Don Herzog, Happy Slaves: A Critique of Consent Theory (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1989), pp. 34-5.    
46 The ‘beginning of Rome and Venice’, ‘parts of America’, ‘Peru’ are taken as historical instances of the past and  a 
‘Florida’ tribe, some in ‘Bresil’ and others are cited as contemporary ones. (TG II § 102, p. 335).   
47In any case any historical ‘Argument from what has been, to what should of right be, has no great force’ (TG II § 
103, p. 336).  
48 A. John Simmons, ‘Theories of the state’ in The Cambridge Companion to Early Modern Philosophy, ed. by 
Donald Rutherford (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), pp. 250-273 (p. 253).  
49 The individual is ‘urged to enter into society by a certain propensity of nature, and to be prepared for the 
maintenance of society by the gift of speech and through the intercourse of language’. (ELN, IV, p. 106). See also, 
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originary sociability characteristic of human nature in the state of nature implies that there is a 
connate disposition to socialise with fellow creatures and a certain set of social qua 
moral/rational bonds conferring an integral character to natural society. Hence, natural society 
does not consist of isolated individuals whose very isolation and unconnectedness with each 
other breeds fear of the unknown others and thus compels the individual to seek protection by 
instituting a commonwealth as in Hobbes. Though there are certain ‘inconveniences’ in the state 
of nature which make living within it far from idyllic50, still the state of nature is also far from a 
hellish state of war that would make it completely inhospitable for its inhabitants. Especially 
since in that state ‘man’ enjoys so much freedom being ‘absolute Lord of his own Person and 
Possessions, equal to the greatest, and subject to no Body’ (TG II § 123, p. 350) and at the same 
time he enjoys the two unique powers of looking after ‘the preservation of himself and others’ 
within the universal ‘community of Mankind’ established by the law of nature as ‘one Society 
distinct from all other creatures’ and being in possession of the moral power to punish the crimes 
committed against natural law (TG § 128, p. 352).  Does then ‘man’ trade freedom for security 
by entering into the political community? In a certain sense his natural freedom is restricted since 
it is ‘confined’ by the ‘Laws of the Society’ (TG II § 129, p. 353). The Lockean individual is in a 
state of ambivalence. He enjoys ample freedom and self-government but he is also faced with 
situations that breed ‘uneasiness’. These situations motivate but they do not compel the 
individual to exit the state of nature. In the absence of corrupt, vicious and ‘degenerate Men’ 
there would exist ‘no necessity that Men should separate from this great and natural Community, 
and by positive agreements combine into smaller and divided associations’ (my emphasis, TG II 
§ 128, p. 352). Hence, there is ‘no necessity’ but contingent social disincentives that make the 
individual ‘willing to joyn in Society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite 
for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties and Estates, which I call by the general 
name, Property.’ (TG II § 123, p. 350). But this is not all. It is not merely the existence of certain 
inconveniencies that weigh in the rational deliberation of the individual to leave the state of 
nature. There are also positive incentives to enter political society for in the ‘new state’ he will 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
A. John Simmons, The Lockean Theory of Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 16 note 4 and  A. 
John Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy: Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1993), chaps. 2 &3.      
50 Locke, TG II §§ 90, 91 on the lack of a ‘common Judge to Appeal to’, p. 326; TG II § 123, p. 350 on the exposure 
to the ‘invading’ of one’s property which creates a situation ‘full of fears and continual dangers’; TG II § 124, p. 351 
on the transgression of the law of nature due to ‘being biassed by their Interest, as well as ignorant for want of study 
of it’.       
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countenance collectively instituted political institutions ‘wanting’ in the state of nature, like a 
‘known Law’ which ‘by common consent’ stands as ‘the Standard of Right and Wrong’ (TG II § 
124, p. 351), ‘a known and indifferent Judge’ who adjudicates impartially any controversies (TG 
II § 125, p. 351) and a collective executive power to implement judicial decisions and thus to 
redress by equalising the unequal physical power impotent individuals have in the state of nature 
to make good the injustices suffered. (TG II § 125, p. 351).  
    From this perspective, the Lockean individual partakes in political society because it 
constitutes a higher form of organised sociopolitical existence. In this sense human beings are 
not pushed out of the state-of-nature due to the unbearable conditions that pervade it but they are 
rather pulled by the political society due to the civilised benefits the latter offers or they are 
enticed by the idealised form of political association it can provide them with. We can derive a 
two-fold consequence as a result of the standing of political society vis-avis the state of nature. 
Firstly, if individuals willingly enter political society in order to enjoy the institutional 
advantages offered by legally organised political life then if the consensually agreed upon 
conditions or even the ‘law of nature’51 are violated or abused by the holders of political power it 
is expectable that individuals would have every reason to withdraw their consent from the 
government and change the government or even change ‘the form of government’ according to 
the original constitutional arrangements set down by the instituted commonwealth (TG II § 132, 
p. 354). Secondly, in case the first solutions are not possible due to the permanent entrustment of 
the ‘Supream’ legislative power to its incumbent, the political subjects can justifiably strive to 
overthrow the governing power and even to dissolve the commonwealth itself and revert again 
into the ‘one community of mankind’ of the state of nature. This drastic solution is viable 
precisely because the condition of the state of nature is not worse than the political regime that 
abuses its representative authority and thus confronts its political subjects with an ‘absolute 
arbitrary power’ or an ‘unlimited Will’. If the consenters, supposedly, had intended to live under 
the rule of arbitrary power they ‘were to put themselves into a worse condition than the state of 
Nature’. (TG II § 137, p. 359).52 So, the consequence we infer is that living in the state of nature 
                                                            
51 ‘The Obligations of the Law of Nature, cease not in Society, […] [t]hus the Law of Nature stands as an Eternal 
Rule to all Men, Legislators as well others.’ (TG II § 135, pp. 357-8.).  
52 Expressed in a positive way; ‘Much better it is in the State of Nature wherein Men are not bound to submit to the 
unjust will of another’ (TG II § 13, p. 276). Also, Richard Ashcraft, ‘The Politics of Locke’s Two Treatises of 
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appears as a feasible choice, a sensible alternative to take up in the face of a governmental power 
turned tyrannical.53  The possibility of reversion to the state of nature primarily concerns the 
upholding of the moral relations prescribed by the law of nature, the liberation of the community 
from the set of political obligations that subjected it to the authority of political power. Thus the 
freedom to institute once again a new social compact representing politically the community in a 
novel way is restored. The state of nature stands to authoritarian government as an exit clause 
that allows the free and rational individuals to experiment with a new origination of the 
commonwealth. In regard to the actual social state of nature Locke seems to pinpoint to two 
distinct phases of the historical dynamic of the state of nature. A first primordial one akin to a 
kind of ‘golden age’ where communal cohabitation existed with common forms of property and 
when in tandem with primitive forms of private property the latter did not generate any 
significant differentials in life’s conveniences that could demoralise the community ethos. The 
second stage involves the entrenchment of private property, the consolidation of the money 
institution and the strengthening of the sense of self-interest which was the cause of the increase 
in the ‘contentions’ marring the relative peacefulness of the state of nature and reinforced the 
demand for a political, by common, regulation of the right to property.54   
 
2.b. The Law of Nature and Mankind’s Representation of the Divine Will by Reason 
 
    How does Locke envisage the universal state of nature out of which political society 
originates?  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Government’ in John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government: New Interpretations, ed. by E. J. Harpham (Lawrence 
KS: University Press of Nebraska, 1992), pp. 14-49 (p. 17).  
53 It is ‘as far distant, as a State of Peace, Good Will, Mutual Assistance, and Preservation [is from] a State of 
Enmity’ (TG II § 19, p. 280).   
54 On money breeding contention and quarrel driving men to civil society, Onur Ulas Ince, ‘Enclosing in God’s 
Name, Accumulating for Mankind: Money, Morality, and Accumulation in John Locke’s Theory of Property’, The 
Review of Politics, 73 (2011), pp. 29-54 (p. 37). For a different ‘story’ of the historical development of the Lockean 
state of nature, seen to be quasi-political from the start, originating from ‘paternal authority’ and through 
incremental changes evolving into legitimate political regime, see: Jeremy Waldron, ‘John Locke: Social Contract 
versus Political Anthropology’, The Review of Politics , 51.1 (1989), pp. 3-28.    
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we must consider what State all Men are naturally in, and that is, a State of perfect 
Freedom to order their Actions, and dispose of their Possessions, and Persons as they 
think fit, within the bounds of the Law of Nature […] A State also of Equality, wherein 
all the Power and Jurisdiction is reciprocal, no one having more than another: there 
being nothing more evident, than that Creatures of the same species and rank 
promiscuously born to all the same advantages of Nature, and the use of the same 
faculties, should also be equal one amongst another without Subordination or Subjection 
(TG II, § 4, p. 269; emphasis mine).   
 
     Possession of ‘perfect freedom’ to order one’s actions is of greater provenance than political 
freedom which is delimitated by conventionally agreed upon positive laws. Perfect freedom 
nevertheless is not unconditional or unlimited, ‘not a state of license’ (TG II § 6, p. 270) but 
conditioned or bounded by the strictures of the law of nature. And the ‘Law of Nature’ that 
governs the state-of-nature is ‘Reason’ (TG II, § 6, p. 271). Furthermore, the state-of-nature 
encompasses the universality of human beings who are ‘creatures of the same species’ having the 
same natural advantages and the same faculties to use. Human beings who belong ‘in the races of 
Mankind and Families of the World’ (TG II § 1, p. 267) are not mere aggregates of diverse 
individuals but partake of the same species being, the ‘one Community of Nature’ (TG II, § 7, p. 
271) without any intrinsic ‘rank’ dividing them amongst themselves. 
The totality of human beings compose one universal community and since as corporeal beings 
are scattered as groupings throughout the surface of the earth without any empirical basis to 
suggest an overall connection into one community, the pertinent question to raise is which 
element provides for this natural community’s unity? I claim that this unity is furnished by the 
Lockean God not only because he is construed as the maker of humanity but also because the 
individual human beings are seen to be representatives and executors of the divine will via the 
property of reason which all share as natural selves. The theological and moral connection 
between God and humanity at its foundation rests on a relationship of representation of limited 
authorisation and delegated power whose boundaries are reason’s duty to clarify. In Locke’s 
schema of representation God is the principal and all human beings are his serving agents. They 
are ‘All the Servants of one Sovereign Master, sent into the World by his order and about his 
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business, they are his Property, whose Workmanship they are’ (TG II § 6, p. 271). God’s labour 
in making man establishes his right of property over his creation, a relation of justifiable 
proprietorship exactly analogous to Locke’s labour theory of property use.55 Since all the 
‘servants’ are equally subordinated to their Master then by logic of transitivity they are also 
equal among themselves and thus they do not have the authority, which only a relation of 
superiority can authorise, either to destroy each other or treat each other ‘as if we were made for 
one anothers uses’ (TG II § 6, p. 271). It follows that no morally valid human interaction can be 
self-interested by prioritising one’s pleasures for that would constitute a violation of the terms of 
the commission under which the service ought to be performed. On the contrary ‘all the servants’ 
have the positive duty to ‘preserve’ themselves and ‘the rest of Mankind’. Thus a condition of 
reciprocity is set down which is further warranted by the norm of equality characterising their 
connatural situation. In being created all by God, the individuals have an identical nature sharing 
the ‘same advantages of Nature’ and the use of the ‘same faculties’ like the ability to reason, to 
labour, to judge, to punish. It seems that we are confronted with a paradoxical situation that calls 
for the resolution of an apparent contradiction. If human beings are conceived as executors of the 
ordinances of divine will then how can they be free and self-governing in the conduct of their 
life? As ‘servants’ they would have to abide by their ‘master’s will acting for his ‘pleasure’, in 
effect making his will their own will and becoming deprived of their own free will. The solution 
to this antinomic condition is furnished by the faculty of reason which shows thus the strategic 
importance of reason in Locke’s argumentation. Reason mediates the representative connection 
that binds mankind to the divine will and opens a realm of freedom (under law) which permits 
human beings to exercise their rational faculty (which all have having come of age, TG II § 61, 
p. 308) and thus form a volition of their own. This is made possible because the contents of the 
divine will as the natural law are unwritten (ELN, I, p. 86, TG II § 136, p. 358), there does not 
exist ‘any manifest Declaration of his Will’ as Locke presumes on the crucial political issue for 
humanity, the ‘appointment’ of a sovereign to represent God’s power on earth (TG II § 4, p. 
269).56  
                                                            
55 Keith Tribe, Land, Labour and Economic Discourse (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 47. 
56 The major ideological stake of the political struggle over sovereignty that led to the English civil war was the 
question who was the authentic representative of God, empowered to act for him or speak as his voice. ‘The king 
was God’s lieutenant, but the Commons claimed to speak for his people whose voice ‘‘in the things of their 
knowledge, is said to be as the voice of God.’’’ (my emphasis). Kenyon, Stuart Constitution, p. 35 cited by Joyce 
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    A possible objection that may be raised to my interpretation is that the undeclared will of the 
creator might concern only the particular question of his political appointee and does not 
embrace the totality of human conduct. If that is so this qualification would not affect the 
relationship of representation as such but it would change its form making it a kind of express 
will that it is immediately known by the human agents and thus disqualify the necessity of 
reason’s mediation in order to make it known and thus annul the space of freedom accompanying 
the exercise of human reason. 
      The divine will is promulgated (but not made manifest) in two distinctive ways, proximally 
and ‘indirectly’. In the ‘indirect’ mode the divine will is made known and binding through his 
representatives, the ones to whom ‘by delegated power the will of any other superior is binding, 
be it that of a king or a parent’ (ELN, VI, p. 119). Here we see the double aspect of the ‘divine 
right’ conception Locke will contest in the Two Treatises. On the one hand, the patriarchal 
conflation of fatherly with regal authority unified by the common attribute of superiority to 
which subjects owe obedience and on the other hand the justification of obedience to ‘imposed 
obligations’ because of the representative status of the superiors as enunciators of God’s will. 
Locke will dedicate considerable effort to distinguish the two forms of authority, firstly by 
depoliticising ‘paternal power’ showing it to be distinct from political power (TG II § 2, p. 268) 
in being of a ‘temporary’ duration (and without jurisdiction over ‘life and property’) till the child 
comes to attain reason and consequently freedom (TG II §§ 65, 63, pp. 310-1, 309). A full-blown 
representative relationship in the form of trusteeship pervades the parent-child bond. The parent 
as trustee or ‘guardian’ substitutes his/her will for the child’s absent will for ‘he that understands 
for him, must will for him too’ (TG II § 58, p. 306). ‘This trust’ grounded on the lack of reason’s 
use by the child ‘puts the Authority into the Parents’ and this authority is to be applied only ‘to 
the Childrens good’ (TG II § 63, p. 309). The trusteeship relationship by which the 
representative’s understanding and will stands for the will of the represented acting for the sake 
of the latter’s good, applies generally to all persons lacking reason for whatever reason (TG II § 
60, p. 308). 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Lee Malcolm, ed. and intro., The Struggle for Sovereignty: Seventeenth-Century English Political Tracts, Volume 1 
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1999), p. xlviii. Note the two-tiered representative linkage in the sequence God-people-
Commons.          
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    Furthermore, if paternal power was really political power then in ‘societies where fathers are 
subjects’ and all political power is held by ‘a Prince’ no father would ever have any paternal 
power over his offspring. (TG II § 71, p. 314). Secondly, Locke will strike at the representative 
nexus of the king having any ‘delegated power’ from God. 
    The second but primary mode by which divine will is promulgated is in the form of natural 
law. At the basis of both modes there exists a crucial distinction between the will and its content. 
The ‘will of a superior’ binds ‘effectively’ being ‘the prime cause of all obligation’. This is a 
‘formal cause’ since it does not specify as to what object anyone who is subject to the ‘superior 
will’ is obligated to. The pure will of the superior must be declared in order to bind 
‘terminatively’, that is, in terms of ‘the manner and measure of an obligation’. The declaration of 
the will is ‘the law’. So even though human beings are obliged unconditionally to the superior 
will, they are not obliged to any unlimited will but only to a will that has become ‘delimited’ to 
‘what a lawmaker in some way has made known and proclaimed as his will’ (ELN, VI, p. 118). 
Two consequences follow for the Lockean conception of the representation of will. Firstly, since 
only the declared will obligates by setting down the law then the (superior) will attains its 
substantial form, its actuality, only by obtaining a determinate form which in turn obliges the 
will itself to commitment to its own determinate content or to be logically bound by it since this 
is its substantive mode of existence. Of course, a will may change but if changed it must have 
necessarily adopted another declared content for it to be and so it cannot escape its own 
delimiting. But as far as the superior will is concerned it cannot change. The natural law as the 
declared divine will is universal and immutable because it not only ‘obtains everywhere’ (ELN, I, 
p. 83) but it also ‘does not depend on an unstable and changeable will, but on the eternal order of 
things’ (ELN, VII, p. 125). For if God were to change his will by making the world anew that 
would have meant that the first attempt was imperfect and unreasonable.  
     The second consequence is that a distance is opened between the divine will and its 
declaration since God’s will is not declared in person but via natural law and thus subject to 
human interpretation. This is the second mode of the manifested will inscribed in human nature 
and thus it binds ‘by its intrinsic force’ and it can be known only ‘by the light of nature’ which is 
human reason and by revelation (ELN, VI, p. 119).  
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     Natural law is not a positive law expressly set down. It can be known through two distinctive 
sources, reason and revelation. Revelation entails a) intuitive access to divine instructions, b) 
miracles, c) the holy texts. All three knowledge procedures of revelation are subordinate to 
reason and do not possess independent validity as knowledge routes to divine will. Intuitive 
access is mere ‘Enthusiasm’ which confuses, at its best, the truth of a proposition with a 
proposition coming from God.57 Miracles are not self-evident truths but the meaning of their 
‘marks’ can be judged only by reason as to their origin and truth.58 Holy texts are only human 
testimonies whose veracity pertains to the jurisdiction of reason to investigate.59 Thus none of 
the revelatory routes to knowledge of the divine will stands by itself and all are subsumable 
under reason’s provenance. Therefore reason is the exclusive guide to knowledge of the natural 
law and thereby of the unwritten divine will. A space of indeterminacy is opened between the 
tacit declarations of the divine will and human Reason’s solemn power to construe them. The 
divine will binds humanity ‘effectively’ as the formal cause of moral obligation. But as to what 
the contents of the superior will might be, it is the prerogative of human reason to tell. All (adult) 
human beings are users of natural reason.60 They are ‘servants’ under the moral obligation to 
follow the decrees of divine will but they are free and the sole rational judges to interpret the 
imperatives of natural law. The meeting ground of divine will and human reason is the law of 
nature.   
                                                            
57 J. Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, abridged with introduction and notes by P. Phemister 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), Bk IV, ch. XIX, § 10, pp. 452-3.   
58 ‘That no mission can be looked on to be divine […] or inconsistent with natural religion and the rules of morality: 
because God having discovered to men […] the truths of natural religion and morality by the light of reason, he 
cannot be supposed to back the contrary by revelation; for that would be to destroy the evidence and the use of 
reason’ (my emphasis).  J. Locke, ‘A Discourse of Miracles’, in The Reasonableness of Christianity with A 
Discourse of Miracles and part of A Third Letter Concerning Toleration, ed. by I. T. Ramsey (Stanford CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1958), pp. 79-87 ( p. 84).  
59 ‘Reason must be our last Judge and Guide in every Thing.’ Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, 
Bk IV, ch. XIX, § 14, p. 454. 
60 Locke distinguishes between possession of natural reason and its use. All human beings possess the faculty of 
reason but its proper exercise comes with age and as a consequence of critically minded education that emancipates 
individual judgment from ‘authoritative opinion’. Just as with equality in ‘natural freedom’ so it is for natural 
reason. Human beings are not ‘born in this full state [...] though they are born to it.’ (TG II § 55, p. 304). The 
distinction between possession and use of reason (and natural freedom) reflects the distinction between the abstract 
‘divine’ will and its ‘declared’ intention. The superior entity possesses the ‘will’ but it is actual only when 
‘declared’. The same distinction pertains to the Lockean ‘right of property’. This shows the error in Jolley (Locke, p. 
204) who thinks that ‘the natural right to property is not inalienable’ because it ‘can by transferred by gift or contract 
of sale’. It is not the possession of the right that is transferred in the exchange but the product of its exercise. That is 
why the good obtained rightfully belongs to the exchanger which would be absurd if he had transferred the right 
itself. What is alienated with the commodity exchange is the ‘self of the owner’, as we shall see (with Marx) in 
chapter six.       
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    If the law of nature as inscription of the will of God is known by reason and reason is an 
intrinsic property of the human species congenital in its nature then the superior will finds its 
presence only within and by reason held by humanity. It becomes re-presented in the human 
essence in the only locus it can obtain determinateness as incarnate will. The divine will is 
encapsulated in the human species and reason speaks for it. This condition of re-presentation 
opens the realm of (moral) human freedom since it is the exclusive responsibility of human 
reason to ‘investigate’ the superior will implanted within. The principal being’s will is not a set 
of explicit instructions to be followed to the letter for there is no letter to be read and obeyed. 
Rather the will of the ‘master’ has to be deciphered and decipherment entails ‘the tedious and not 
always successful Labour of strict Reasoning’61 and an attitude of self-reliance and personal 
liberation from authoritative opinion.62    
     At the same time the Lockean God is a rational entity bound by ‘his’ will. His ‘will’ is not 
‘unlimited’ like the one claimed by ‘arbitrary’ absolute rulership but it respects the norms of 
reason. ‘Promises and Oaths, which tye the infinite Deity’ (TG I § 6, p. 144) and his commitment 
not to transgress ‘the Rules of language in use’ when he speaks to Men (TG I § 46, p. 173), show 
his reasonable nature. The obligations of the law of nature as ‘Eternal Law’ are so strong ‘that 
Omnipotency it self can be tyed by them’ (TG II § 195, p. 396).  Thus humanity through the 
exercise of natural reason can reconstruct God’s bound will to ‘right reason’ as the law of nature.  
    The two conclusions that we can draw thus far on the salience of the relationship of 
representation in Locke’s social philosophy is firstly, that a bond of representation in the form of 
trusteeship regulated by the law of nature pervades the family institution, the parents-child 
relationship of authority. Secondly, the universal tie between the World-maker and humanity 
rests and it is acted out in the representative connection between ‘divine’ will and human reason. 
The binding force of the absent will of the ‘master’ is activated only when it is made present or 
‘declared’, re-presented within the domain of reason qua natural law by reason itself.  
    The political consequence of the rational nature of the divine will known by human reason is 
that it could never have endorsed any form of ‘absolute arbitrary’ political power on earth. Thus 
                                                            
61 Locke, An Essay concerning Human Understanding, Bk IV, ch. XIX, § 4, p. 451.  
62 On the connection between rational deliberation and the proper social virtues, see: Ruth W. Grant and Nathan 
Tarcov, ‘Introduction’ John Locke, Some Thoughts Concerning Education and Of  the Conduct of the 
Understanding, ed. by R. Grant and N. Tarcov (Indianapolis: Hackett Publ., 1996), pp. vii-xix, (p. xii). 
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the justification of absolute monarchy that it represents the will of the creator given as a ‘grant’ 
to Adam, father and representative of all humanity, falls to the ground.63  The Lockean analysis 
of the justificatory grounds of monarchical theory is an exhaustive, immanent critique of 
Filmer’s argument. From the standpoint of Locke’s understanding of political representation that 
concerns us, the most significant consideration is that Locke employs the notion of political 
representation as the evaluative criterion with which to judge whether the pro-monarchical claim 
of the divine appointment of the monarch as God’s political representative fulfills the conditions 
of genuine political representation. Specifically, he argues that God as ‘author’ nowhere specifies 
who the legitimate ‘heir’ of Adam may be. In the absence of a specifiable person in the line of 
descent in the supposed legitimate possession of political power no genuine political 
representative nexus can hold since a general authorisation to no one in particular violates the 
fundamental condition inherent in political representation that an authorised representative must 
somehow exist if the relation is to hold and political subjection is to be acknowledged. The 
Lockean methodological principle that grounds the critique of sham political representation is the 
illegitimacy of the bifurcation of an abstract will from its intended purposes. No will can 
authorise anyone if it does not authorise someone to be its representative. No will binds in 
anything if it does not provide the ‘manner’ of specifying the object of obligation.64    
     In Locke’s view, who is the legitimate holder of political power is the most pressing issue of 
all times in the history of political societies. He phrased it thus:  
 
The great Question which in all Ages has disturbed Mankind, and brought on them the 
greatest part of those Mischiefs which have ruin’d Cities, depopulated Countries, and 
                                                            
63 Robert Filmer, Patriarcha, in Patriarcha and Other Writings, ed. by J. P. Sommerville (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1991), pp. 1-68. ‘Filmer had assumed that God made Adam the political representative of 
mankind.’ I. Harris, The Mind of John Locke: A study of political theory in its intellectual setting, rev. ed. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998) , p. 233. John Dunn, The Political Thought of John Locke: An 
Historical Account of the Argument of the ‘Two Treatises of Government’ (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1969), pp. xi, 245-261.  
 
64 The two-dimensionality of Reason satisfies both conditions. Lockean reason is distinguished into ‘reasoning’ or 
‘the discursive faculty of the mind’ which is the fallible ‘manner’ of acceding to moral truths and ‘right reason’ or 
practical reason’s ‘moral principles’ which are the ‘object’ of reason to discover. (ELN, IV, p. 101).  
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disordered the Peace of the World, has been, Not whether there be Power in the World, 
nor whence it came, but who should have it. (TG I § 106, pp. 118-9).  
 
       Filmer’s account, even if his major premise that there was a ‘divine ordinance’ granting 
governmental power to Adam is conceded, is self-contradictory and ends up supposing an 
irrational God since he is construed as ‘nominating’ the ‘heir’ of power without furnishing at the 
same time a ‘rule’ specifying who he might be (TG I § 127, p. 234). In the absence of a 
designated ‘person’ to stand as holder of political power, no political subject can ever know to 
whom ‘obligation of conscience’ to pay obedience is due (TG I § 120, p. 229).  
    The attribution of the cause of all the great ‘mischiefs’ having occurred in history to struggles 
over the legitimate possession of political power demonstrates plainly that these have taken place 
within the context of political societies. This further supports my conclusion at the first section 
that the state of nature is a desirable alternative of a mode of living in the absence of political 
subjection especially in regard to the tumultuous political existence bred by illegitimate and 
unjust rulership or by an indefinable locus of power. In the next section I argue that political 
representation is precisely the relationship that provides a reasonable solution and clarification to 
this most crucial question of political theory of ‘who should have the power’.         
 
2.c  The Structure of Political Representation in the Lockean Political Society                                  
           
     I argue for the foundational role political representation has in Locke’s political theory. The 
political community is grounded on a relationship of political representation. The government 
established by the self-constituted ‘political body’ of society is legitimate only to the degree it 
respects the terms of its authorisation. Locke assigns the governing function to the legislative. 
The legislative is the ‘supreme power’ in all forms of government. Whatever the form of 
government, each and any form of government has to abide to the conditions of political 
representation, to the trust bestowed upon it by the political society. The trust bestowed on 
government is not unconditionally given so as the government could rule at its discretion. There 
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is an overarching principle circumscribing the conditions of exercise of political power, its 
lawmaking activity. Every political regulation enacted by the government must cater to the 
promotion of the public good. The supreme good for any commonwealth is the ‘preservation of 
society’. The structure of the relation of political representation is teleological not 
instrumentalist. The author entrusts the governing actor to act for the public benefit of the whole 
society, rather than to execute the represented body’s temporary and contingent will. The 
relationship is triadic not dyadic. The representative government is commissioned to act in order 
to realise a permanent deontic good not to fulfill the instructions of the represented. This schema 
of political representation grounds the reciprocal obligations that the represented and the 
representative owe to each other. The violation of the conditions of representation, of the trust, 
justifies the right of revolution and the legitimate overthrow of the standing government. 
Transgression of the trust restores political power to its original source, the people and allows the 
political community to either change the government or change the form of government or even 
dissolve the commonwealth and revert to the state of nature. Locke defines the foundation of 
political society as follows: 
 
there, and there only is Political Society, where every one of the Members hath quitted 
this natural Power, resign’d it up into the hands of the Community in all cases that 
exclude him not from appealing for Protection to the Law established by it. And thus all 
private judgment of every particular Member being excluded, the Community comes to 
be Umpire, by settled standing Rules, indifferent, and the same to all Parties; and by Men 
having Authority from the Community, for the execution of those Rules, decides, all the 
differences that may happen between any Members of that Society, concerning any 
matter of right; and punishes those Offences, which any Member hath committed against 
the Society [...] Whereby it is easie to discern who are, and who are not, in Political 
Society together. Those who are united into one Body, and have a common establish’d 
Law and Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, 
and punish Offenders, are in Civil Society one with another (TG II § 87, p. 324).  
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      The individual judgment is willingly resigned to the hands of the political community to 
judge collectively the controversies. The institution of justice is the political institution par 
excellence. It is this that confers the political character to the compact. The individual consents 
to transfer his judgment to the hands of the community. The community now judges on behalf of 
Right which is the moral end befitting the rational individual (but not in his favour necessarily). 
It represents his supreme moral interest. 
    The community authorises some men to execute the standing rules. The men with the 
authority put upon them by the community and the ‘judicature’ which judges in the name of the 
community become its representative political organs. They act under its authorisation. 
       The constitution of political society is the product of collective consent. Consent-giving is 
authorisation to an instituted body to exercise political power on behalf of the authorial unity of 
the polity. The granting of power to political society is limited by the condition that society uses 
its power to ‘act for’ the public good. Hence the basis of constituted political society is political 
representation. The constituted political society directs itself according to majority will. The 
expression of majority and minority wills is an instance of political representation of the currents 
running through the political body. 
     The appointment of magistrates is another case of representation. They are not supposed to 
decide as private persons but as public officials under the duty to represent the lawmaking will of 
the legislative and to serve the public good. Furthermore, the representative tie is stronger than it 
seems for the appointment of the judges means that the judiciary is not a separate power from the 
legislative. On principle since the legislative power is supreme no other power can be 
‘independent’ from it and in coeval terms with it as in liberal models of ‘checks and balances’ 
between separate powers. The individual’s judgment of offences ‘has been given up to the 
Legislative in all cases’ (TG II § 88, p. 325). 
      This transfer of the rightful capacity to judge gives the Commonwealth ‘a right to imploy his 
force’ for the execution of judgments if asked.  The legislative’s judgments ‘indeed are his own 
Judgments, they being made by himself, or his Representative. And herein we have the original 
of the Legislative and Executive Power of Civil Society’ (TG II § 88, 325). The identification of 
the individual judgment with that of the Legislative bespeaks of two possibilities. Either, the 
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individual member participates in person and thus the judgment arrived at is a collective one to 
which he has contributed himself (democracy as inclusive participation of all members in the 
decision-making process) or the judgment is expressed by ‘his Representative’. Not some 
representatives but ‘his’ representative. This connection to the representative obliges the member 
to own up the representative’s judgment as if it were his own (‘as to his own decrees’ TG II § 89, 
p. 325). We have a transposition of wills as if the representative is the extended self of the person 
or his double retroactively establishing the constituent’s will.  
    Freely given consent is the basis of legitimate government as authorised to represent the 
consenters. ‘For no Government can have a right to obedience from a people who have not freely 
consented to it: which they can never be supposed to do, till either they are put in a full state of 
Liberty to chuse their Government and Governors, or at least till they have such standing laws, to 
which they have by themselves or their representatives, given their free consent, and also till they 
are allowed their due property, [...] that no body can take away any part of it without their own 
consent’ (TG II § 192, p. 394).                
      There is a tension in Locke’s construction of the political architectonic of the commonwealth. 
He reclassifies ‘absolute monarchy’ as no form of civil government at all. (TG II § 90, p. 326). 
The reason for this is that in absolute monarchy the legislative and the executive power are 
concentrated ‘in himself alone’ and thus there is no Judge to appeal to (TG II § 91, p. 326). But 
in ‘civil society’ also the legislative and the executive are united in one ‘body’ if not in one 
person. If not united, certainly the executive is subordinate to the supremacy of the legislative as 
it is the case if the absolute monarch is considered the holder of the legislative power who has 
the executive power subordinated to him as is the case in civil society. So the conflation of the 
two powers does not really distinguish the ‘absolute monarchy’ from ‘civil society’. Only the 
relation of political representation can account for the qualitative distinction (civil against 
uncivil) between the two types of regime. Only an argument claiming that ‘absolute monarchy’ 
is unrepresentative of the commonwealth versus civil society as the representative expression of 
the commonwealth members can validate their distinction. 
    Even if we examine the situation regardless of the conflation of the two powers the problem 
remains. The absolute monarch is the holder of the legislative power and so his will is 
unquestionable law for all as in Hobbes. But in Locke’s civil society the will of the legislative is 
59 
 
supreme and the ‘legislative’ is also the judge. There is no independent authority to appeal to for 
judgment in case a law aggrieves one or a certain number of civil society’s members. So it is not 
the issue of an independent judge that makes the difference but the existence of ‘standing rule’ 
(TG II § 91, p. 326) or not. That the monarch’s will as unlimited is above law or rather it is law 
itself, whilst the legislative is under law continually limited by its lawmaking on behalf of 
society is the difference that grounds the qualitative difference of the two kinds of regime.      
      The possible origination of political government from ‘the natural authority’ of virtuous men 
who elicited ‘tacit consent’ to exercise civil functions turned with the passage of time and 
corruption into the people’s understanding that they were unsafe under the contemporary 
government and considered that they were not in civil society ‘till the Legislature was placed in 
collective Bodies of Men, call them Senate, Parliament [...] By which means every single person 
became subject, equally with other the meanest Men, to those Laws, which he himself, as part of 
the Legislative had established’ (TG II § 94, pp. 329-330). Isonomy or strict equality under law 
even between social classes (equally with the ‘meanest men’) is posited.  Also ‘Every single 
person’ participated in the establishment of laws, ‘he himself’ ‘as part of the legislative’. Only 
two interpretative possibilities are available. Either there exists direct participation in person in 
the making of the laws (direct democracy) or virtual participation via a representative (indirect 
democracy).  
     The condition of majority principle excludes the possibility of a single person legislative. The 
majority is the ‘greater force’ moving the body. The greater force refers to the arithmetical 
superiority of the majority over the numerical strength of the minority. This numerical strength is 
the product of the equal political power each has to participate in lawmaking. The majority will 
stands for the political will of the whole.  In assemblies ‘impowered to act by positive Laws [...] 
the act of the Majority passes for the act of the whole, and of course determines, as having by the 
Law of Nature and Reason, the power of the whole.’ (TG II § 96, p. 332). The majority has the 
power of the whole by reason and natural law. This suggests the principle of numerical or 
arithmetic equality.65 The obligation assumed by each consenter is ‘to every one of that Society, 
to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be concluded by it, or else this original 
                                                            
65 Numerical equality is the basis of democracy and conducive to the most stable form of government for it narrows 
down the causes of factional strife. Aristotle, Politics  trans. by E. Barker, rev. by R.F. Stalley (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1998), pp. 180-1 [1301b26-1302a15].  
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Compact’ would signify nothing if there is no new tie than those existing already in the state of 
nature (TG II § 97, p. 332). The consent giving takes place in ‘the publick Assembly’ (TG II § 
98, p. 332). 
       In the historical development of civil society, the spirit of the age bred ‘ambition and luxury’ 
and these motivated princes to ‘retain and increase the Power without doing the Business, for 
which [power] was given’. The consequence was that Princes were taught ‘to have distinct and 
separate Interests from their people’ (TG II § 111, p. 343). So the sovereign power catered to its 
own interests to the detriment of the public interest. We have clash of interests and no serving of 
the public good. Men started to look for ways to restrain the exorbitances and prevent the abuses. 
The governing power whenever it violates ‘that Power which they having intrusted in another’s 
hands only for their own good’ (TG II § 111, p. 343) provides us with an appropriate definition 
of political representation in Locke. Political representation is the power that a community or a 
constituted political body entrusts in someone’s hands in order to exercise this power only for 
the sake of the community’s own good.   
      The gist of the logic of Locke’s argument aims to provide the conditions that ensure that a 
legitimate government is set up that abides by the laws it enacts, and so to discredit any type of 
rule that rests on arbitrary unlimited power. He acknowledges that one of the constitutional 
choices of the commonwealth is to adopt the monarchical form of government bestowing to it 
the legislative power which as supreme has all others (judicial, executive and federative) 
subordinate to it. In this case we end up with a political regime which is exactly the one of 
absolute power. The only formal difference is that in ‘constitutional monarchy’ the legislative 
will of the monarch takes the form of settled known laws. His will for all intents and purposes 
remains unlimited. One could claim that the standing laws which he himself decided upon 
operate as a limitation upon his action. But he can change his will whenever he so pleases and 
being the exclusive holder of the legislative power he can annul or modify the established laws 
as he pleases. Being the legislator he has the authority to ‘dispense justice’ and ‘authorise’ and 
appoint the judges. So the judiciary is absolutely dependent on him and moreover the judges 
have to judge according to laws which he himself has decided upon. Lastly, the executive power 
(and this means control of the military) is at his discretion to deploy wherever and whenever he 
so desires and above all in a legitimate way since its use depends upon the legislative which he 
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himself holds. But the ultimate Lockean proviso is that the monarchy cannot define legally and 
interpret at will what the public good might be. If the letter of the legislated law injures the life, 
liberty and property of his subjects it is up to them to judge the unjustness of the law and 
‘whether the Prince or Legislative act contrary to their Trust […] for who shall be Judge whether 
his Trustee or Deputy acts well […] but he who deputies him, and must, by having deputed him 
have still a Power to discard him’ (TG II, § 240, pp. 426-7). Without political representation as 
the people’s power to evaluate the consonance of legality with the public good we would have an 
unlimited arbitrary governing power legally dressed which would have been even worse than 
absolute monarchy. For absolute monarchy is in a state of war with its subjects and this justifies 
their right of legitimate resistance and revolution. But in the case of legalised tyranny under (its 
own) law they do not even have a justifiable right to revolution for legal formalities may be kept 
to the letter. Human beings in the state of nature do not enjoy absolute liberty to do whatever 
they like due to the divine ownership of their selves so they are not free to sell themselves into 
slavery. How then could they be free to choose a form of government that would amount to 
political enslavement? So the presumable political freedom of the community to choose a 
monarchical form of government is an irrational choice according to its effects and must be 
derogated on principle. This is explicitly stated by Locke when he poses the supreme political 
principle. ‘It cannot be supposed that they should intend, had they a power so to do, to give to 
any one, or more, an absolute Arbitrary Power’ (my emphasis, TG II § 137, p. 359). ‘More’ 
involves the case of the oligarchic form of government which also shares the same aspect of 
concentrated legal power in its hands with legal monarchy. The only limitation set to the 
supreme power is that in its lawmaking concerning property (in the narrow sense) it requires 
‘from any Man’ ‘his own consent’ (TG II § 138, p. 360).                                                                                        
     Representation as an agent’s ‘acting for’ the purpose he has been authorised to by the author’s 
will, is inherent in the very nature of the commonwealth. ‘[I]n a Constituted Commonwealth, 
standing upon its own Basis, and acting according to its own Nature, that is, acting for the 
preservation of the Community’ there can be only one supreme power, the legislative (TG II § 
149, p. 366). The legislative power is supreme only because it has been authorised by the 
commonwealth to act for ‘certain ends’. It is a fiduciary power held in trust by the people. To the 
legislative all the other powers are subordinate. The legislative is entrusted to represent the ends 
of the community. The communal author cannot alienate the power of representation of his will. 
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He assigns not the power but the exercise of it to another agent. Thus the power always remains 
with the author. ‘[T]hey will always have a right to preserve what they have not a Power to part 
with’ (TG II § 149, p. 367). And he is the sole judge of whether the representative’s performance 
fulfils the tasks he has appointed him for. If the representative violates the trust bestowed he is 
liable to revocation of his imputed authority and the author can re-assign it at will. As put by 
Locke: 
 
yet the Legislative being only a Fiduciary Power to act for certain ends, there remains 
still in the People a Supream Power to remove or alter the Legislative, when they find 
the Legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them. (TG II § 149, p. 367).  
       In the Lockean view the authorisation of the representative is not unlimited but constrained 
by the ends he was selected to serve. If he neglects or opposes the duties or purposes he was set 
to fulfil he forfeits the trust. ‘[T]he Power devolve[s] into the hands of those that gave it, who 
may place it anew where they shall think best [...] And thus the Community perpetually retains a 
Supream Power of saving themselves [...] even [from] their Legislators’ (TG II § 149, p. 367).  
To designate Lockean government as ‘limited government’ is potentially inaccurate. If it is taken 
to mean that the government (as the legislative) is limited by the laws it enacts nothing then 
limits its unlimited power to make any laws it so desires and then to submit to them. The 
Lockean condition of limitation is not just submission of the government to the laws made but 
the limitation of lawmaking by the ends that the government has been entrusted to serve. Thus 
the community’s ends function both as a limitation in lawmaking but also as a normative 
standard through which the judiciousness or unjustness of the laws enacted can be judged.     
      Locke provides for elected representatives to the legislative (TG II § 154, p. 370). The issue 
of territorial representation is raised in TG II § 157, p. 372. The aporia Locke identifies is that in 
constitutions with elected popular representation ‘where part of the Legislative consists of 
Representatives chosen by the People, that in tract of time this Representation becomes very 
unequal and disproportionate [...] [and] the bare Name of a Town [...] sends as many 
Representatives to the grand Assembly of Lawmakers, as a whole County numerous in People’ 
(TG II § 157, p. 372). Locke argues for the principle of territorially based proportionate 
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representation where equal numbers of voters are represented by a proportionate number of 
representatives. His criticism rests on the political inequality which results from this 
disproportion and on the irrational character of maintaining a customary practice ‘when Reason 
has left it’ and ghost towns end up being grossly over-represented vis-à-vis burgeoning in 
population districts. The cul-de-sac that results involves the affront that a potential redistricting 
would cause to the design of the original constitution of the legislative as expression of the 
people. And the people in this representative form of government faced with its established 
frame do not have the power to modify it ‘as long as the Government stands’, that is before the 
existing governmental system is dissolved. His principled stance suggests that a frame of 
government must be flexible enough to make the necessary changes in adaptation to the 
‘constant flux of the things of this world’ so as to permit genuine proportional political 
representation respecting the arithmetic equality of the various electoral constituencies. 
    He admonishes the rule of ‘salus Populi Suprema Lex’ as a corrective to the political 
inequality in representative power furnished by the passage of time. He proposes that the 
executive should observe ‘the true proportion, than fashion of Representation’ (TG II § 158, p. 
373) and to regulate by ‘true reason, the number of Members, in all places, that have a right to be 
distinctly represented [...] in proportion to the assistance, which it affords to the publick’ (TG II § 
158, p. 373). Locke is referring to the representation of corporate bodies and chartered towns. 
The appeal to the reasonable use of the executive power’s prerogative rests on the condition that 
the executive has ‘the Power of Erecting new Corporations, and therewith new Representatives’ 
(TG II § 158, p. 373) thus ‘the measures of representation might vary’ and hence they should be 
taken in consideration in order to restore the true spirit of the original constitution (TG II § 158, 
p. 374). Such electoral reform does not make ‘an Inroad upon the Government’ as the existing 
misrepresentation of the people does by ‘set[ting] up one part, or Party, with a distinction from, 
and an unequal subjection of the rest.’ (TG II § 158, p. 374). The principle of representation that 
respects the original popular will about the frame of government (‘the will and act of the 
society’) is that ‘the People shall chuse their Representatives upon just and undeniably equal 
measures’ (TG II § 158, p. 374).   
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Chapter 3 
 
 The Role of Political Representation in the Constitution of Hegel’s Rational State 
 
      Political representation plays a far more crucial role for the constitution of the Hegelian State 
than it has been traditionally believed.66 From early on in his essay on The German Constitution 
Hegel grasps the historical uniqueness of the modern function of political representation which 
reverses the traditional feudal structure of the state where the Sovereign represents either God or 
his subjects. Instead, the novel form of political representation in the modern world ties the 
Sovereign to territoriality and to the political community residing there. This relation establishes 
the ground of the state’s ‘inner sovereignty’, as it is shown in the first section of the chapter. 
      In his Philosophy of Right Hegel fleshes out the relation of political representation as the 
mediating link that connects civil society to the political state. This theme is dealt with in the last 
two sections. Hegel argues that estate and corporate representation in the legislature establishes 
the political representation of civil society and this provides an organic bond between the 
politicised civil society and the state’s political authority such that civil society is elevated above 
its particularity of interests and adopts the universal ends of the state community. Additionally, I 
argue in the second section of the chapter that there exists a form of civil representation in the 
system of justice of the Hegelian state where the particular social estates enjoy representation of 
their particular ethicality in the dispensation of justice in a way which protects them from 
possible injustices committed by the ‘abstract right’ operative in the modern state. The 
representation of social estates in the judicial system and in the legislature intends to secure the 
stability of the state and to harmonise the principle of subjective freedom of civil society with the 
objective freedom of the political state and thus the state as a whole to exist as a rational 
organism. I examine how successful is Hegel’s construction of the rational state.  
                                                            
66 In a recent summary of the literature Henning Ottmann pinpoints that the issue of the representative system has 
been under-researched, especially the English case, in Hegel’s thought. ‘Hegel and Political Trends: A Criticism of 
the Political Hegel Legends’ in The Hegel Myths and Legends, ed. by Jon Stewart (Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1996), pp. 53-69, 326-334 (p. 333).   
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    Hegel recognises the importance of the institution of political representation for the proper 
functioning of a constitutionally established political community from early on. In his fragment 
‘The Magistrates should be Elected by the People’ written in 179867 on the occasion of the Duke 
of Württemberg calling the Assembly of Estates into session, Hegel captures the opportunity to 
voice some concern for the necessity of political reform of the antiquated representative 
institution. Reform is necessitated by the fact that a constitution may have ceased to reflect in its 
form the newly emergent feelings and understanding of the people. Such discrepancy renders 
parts of the constitution obsolete and their continuing existence, unjust. The sense of justice ‘is 
the only yardstick for such a judgement, and the courage to do justice is the only power […] 
which can […] remove the unstable edifice and produce secure conditions in its place.’ (M, p. 2). 
The condition of discrepancy between parts of the constitution and the popular desires makes the 
constitution politically unrepresentative and breeds hostility which may in the course of time 
result in the violent overthrow of the constitution. So, enactment of peaceful reform of the 
assembly is the best remedy in the face of violent revolution. Hegel accuses the ruling power for 
shortsightedness since it cannot grasp that the continuing existence of institutional forms cannot 
be maintained if such entities like institutions, laws, constitutions ‘no longer accord with men’s 
customs, needs, and opinions, and from which the spirit has departed’ or the lack of interest in 
them cannot ‘furnish a lasting bond for a nation [eines Volkes]!’ (M, p. 2). A representative 
assembly that reflects the concerns of the individual estate classes is the major institutional 
reform capable of re-aligning popular wishes with a modern constitutional existence. 
Furthermore, such genuine embodiment of the representative institution is the necessary 
counterpart for the renewal of the bond of unity of the political community. Hence, political 
representation a) aligns the constitution with popular desires under the normative guidance of 
justice, b) invigorates the community-wide bond of political association and c) prevents the 
disastrous outburst of ‘the ever-deceived, ever-oppressed mass’ which in a feverish paroxysm 
may bring ‘death’ to the ‘political edifice’ whose collapse will injure everyone. (M, p. 2). A 
reformed assembly of the estates and genuine political representation are the sine qua non 
bulwarks against the violent destruction of the state.  
                                                            
67 The fragment is accompanied with quotations provided by Rudolf Haym (Hegel und seine Zeit, Darmstadt, 1857, 
pp. 65-8, 483-5) in his account of the original manuscript. L. Dickey & H.B. Nisbet, eds., Hegel: Political writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 1-5. Hereafter the fragment is cited as M in the text.  
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      ‘Popular elections’ cannot be an immediate solution for the crisis of the representative organ 
for as long as a) ‘the people do not know their rights’, b) ‘there is no collective spirit’ 
[Gemeingeist] and c) ‘the power of the officials remains unchecked’, ‘popular elections would 
serve only to bring about the complete overthrow of the constitution.’ (M, p.5). This qualified 
mistrust of the logic of ‘popular elections’ premised on the ‘people’ as an uneducated mass 
without a developed political consciousness and thus manipulatable at will, will accompany 
Hegel to his maturity and underlies his critique of the democratic form of popular sovereignty.  
 
3.a.   The State Community as the Basis of the Representative Character of the Modern 
‘Political Authority’ 
    
       Throughout his political philosophy, Hegel highlights specific features of the institutional 
organisation of political representation which are necessary for the consolidation of the rational 
state. In his extended essay on the German Constitution he offers the lineaments of a theory of 
political representation which is tied to the very existence of state sovereignty. He presents the 
essential elements of the ‘concept of the State’ in order to demonstrate that the German Imperial 
state is a semblance of a state, not a real state despite the latter’s self-proclamations of the 
opposite. He employs a double methodological strategy to achieve this by reconstructing 
historically the evolution of Germanic society while at the same time he compares the Imperial 
state entity with the features developed by the modern rational state. 
    Historical study indicates that the real essence of the state is the necessary formation of ‘a 
common military force and political authority.’ The ‘concept of the state’ argues Hegel is 
conceptually independent from the ‘manner’ of its political articulation. The ‘one essential factor 
[das einzig Notwendige]’ is that ‘a mass should form a state’ having a ‘political authority’ 
concentrated in ‘a supreme point of convergence [Vereinigungspunkt]’ which is its sovereign 
power (GC, p. 17).          
       The manner the state union is effected, its various aspects, even the constitution established 
are ‘irrelevant to the formation of an authority by a mass [of people].’ (GC, 16).  As long as the 
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sovereign power or ‘political authority’ is constituted it is ‘of no importance’ whether it is 
‘vested in one [person] or many, whether the one or the many are born to such majesty or elected 
to it’ (GC, p. 17). So, regardless of the form of constitution of the state, sovereign power is 
always identical with the formation of an authority by the people. The community by 
establishing a common political authority crystallises itself as a political association which is 
externalised in a distinct authority. Such authority, whatever its features, is inexorably tied to the 
people, it is the embodied representation of their unity. This relation of constitution of authority 
by a community politically organised is explicitly recognised by Hegel in his Philosophy of Right 
when he states that the ultimate seat of ‘internal sovereignty lies with the people [when we refer 
to] the whole in general’ (PR, § 279R, p. 318) even though the people as the base of sovereignty 
does not mean that they hold the sovereign power. The people as a ‘formless mass’ are the 
‘substance’ not the ‘subject’ of state’s sovereignty. Hegel explicitly opposes the democratic idea 
of ‘popular sovereignty’ as the form of government which articulates state sovereignty.   
     The constitution of state sovereignty as such is conceptually distinguished from any ‘form of 
government’ which may articulate state sovereignty. For forms of political authority change 
historically, they accept ‘greater or lesser improvement’ and in general are subject to 
contingency whereas state sovereignty is always there if a state exists. (GC, p. 16).  
    The distinction between the ‘form of authority’ or form of government and the ‘substance of 
authority’ or state sovereignty is essentially a modern distinction generated with the birth of the 
modern state. Up to the end of feudalism the two were identified in the person of the ruler who 
embodied state sovereignty. The legitimation of the sovereign’s rule was based on the idea that 
he was the representative of God directly or indirectly. He was a direct representative through a 
political interpretation of divine law where God had delivered political power to the monarch, 
indirectly as ‘representative of his people’ ordained by the Pope who was the delegate of God 
and held supremacy over the universal/Catholic community of Christians. In either case 
personified rulership and state sovereignty were identical.  
       In the distinction between state sovereignty condensed into the sovereign power and the 
‘form of political authority’ we evidence two structures of political representation. The first, the 
fundamental one, is the relation of the political community to its sovereign power. The ‘common 
authority’ rests with the people but it becomes separate in an entity representing the condensation 
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of the community’s political power. In this relationship, political representation is the 
foundational bond by which the sovereign power represents and ought to represent the political 
unity of the society. The second structure pertains to the ‘form of government’, the type and 
system of rule, where particular mechanisms and methods of political representation may or may 
not exist which secure the citizens’ participation in government and their input in governmental 
decision-making. Whether the ‘form of authority’ involves political representation or not is a 
contingent matter and the form or political constitution is subject to amelioration by design.  
     The first structure of representation, the relation of political community to sovereignty, is 
immutable as long as the state continues to exist. The forms it takes change but it itself always 
remains as the bond of the political externalisation of the community. 
    In the modern state ‘the links between members may be equally loose, or even non-existent, as 
far as customs, education, and language are concerned; and identity in these respects, which was 
once a pillar of national union, now counts as one of those fortuitous circumstances whose nature 
does not prevent a mass [of people] from constituting a political authority.’ (my emphasis, GC, 
p.19). Hegel considers cultural commonalities to be insignificant for the unity of a political 
community. Modern states can be multi-ethnic as well. How is this possible? Such 
heterogeneous elements are held together ‘in modern states by the spirit and art of political 
organisation. Consequently, disparity of culture and customs has become a necessary product, as 
well as a necessary condition, of the continued existence of modern states’ (GC, 20). 68  
The political association of the members of the state (which includes an intrinsic socio-ethical 
disposition geared to the whole and is expressed as trust)69 connected to the sovereign power is 
the highest bond that consolidates the union of the state over and above the cultural disparity.   
                                                            
68 Mark Tunick in his ‘Hegel on Political Identity and the Ties That Bind’ in Beyond Liberalism and 
Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, ed. R. R. Williams, (Albany: State University of New 
York, 2001), 67–89, suggests that what ties the citizens politically in the state are the ‘shared memories, 
accomplishments, and practices and institutions’ (p. 80) located in ‘civil society’ (p. 81). He, thus, conflates genus 
with species since religion, education, language, customs are also ‘practices and institutions’ which do not connect 
citizens politically and as a consequence the differentia specifica of the political tie of ‘the political state proper’ (PR 
§ 267, p. 288) resting on political representation, the  uniqueness of ‘political disposition’ and ‘the spirit and art of 
political organisation’ vanish.     
 
69 Hegel, Philosophy of Mind: Part Three of the Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences (1830), trans. by W. 
Wallace, together with the Zusặtze in Boumann’s text (1845), trans. by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), § 515, p. 254. 
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    Political representation is not a modern phenomenon since it had existed before the emergence 
of the modern state. What constitutes its novelty is that the modern relation of political 
representation reverses the traditional feudal structure of the state where the Sovereign 
represented either God or his subjects. Instead, in the modern state, political representation ties 
the Sovereign to territoriality and to the community residing there.  
     This reversal took a long period to take effect. Two interlinked socio-historical processes 
contributed the most to the emergence of the modern relation of representation. These were the 
genesis of the nascent bourgeoisie and the divisiveness of Christian religion. The growing 
importance of bourgeois strata brought in civil society a dynamic class that on the one hand 
demanded to translate its increasing socio-economic power as political representation into the 
structure of authority while at the same time being self-centred and concerned primarily with its 
particularistic interests, it loosened the erstwhile political-religious bond that kept the feudal state 
intact.  
    Religious divisiveness became an important force of dissolution by making religious believers 
turn inwards and face political power as a secular entity, external to their subjectivity and thus 
no more obligated to pay allegiance to it. By a dialectical inversion, with the withdrawal of 
religious sensibility from its attachment to the communal state bond, the clarity of the political 
tie itself became illuminated. It revealed that it was not the religious communal bond that kept 
the state together or alternatively that no real state community existed in the absence of a 
political association. Moreover, the strife of the clashing religious denominations to monopolise 
legally and materially the spiritual realm of their respective communities compelled them to 
politicise religion, to push in the direction of establishing political states in conformity to their 
religion. (GC, 54). These processes grounded the birth of modern political representation.            
    Voting in the Imperial bodies depended on the personal presence of the princes. 
 
[T]hey had votes only when they appeared in person, and the prince of different and 
[geographically] separate territories had only one vote. His person and his territory, his 
personality and his quality as representative of the territory, did not appear as distinct. 
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The distinction arose as a result of the religious schism. On which side was a vote to be 
cast if the prince and his territory were of different religions[?] (GC, 54).  
 
     The new principle of political representation presupposes the divorce in the person of the 
prince between himself and the territory. Till then the ‘representation of the territory’ appeared 
as a personal dignity of the prince. Religious divisiveness revealed   a schism between public and 
private roles by which the political representative status could not be held as personal majesty 
but only as product of territorial representation. This is the first move in the transformation of the 
feudal structure of political representation. There is a second move which completes the new 
structural form of representation by inverting the traditional one.  
      The separation of the person of the prince from his standing as a representative of his 
territorial dominion within the interstate structure of the German Empire is reflected in the 
princedom’s territory itself. ‘[T]his distinction between the personality of the prince and his 
representation of a territory […] became more conspicuous […] when this separation of prince 
and subjects had already been introduced in the provincial Diet [Landstände] of that prince’s 
own territory.’ (GC, 55).  
    The primacy of territorial religion:  
 
[W]as given precedence over the personality of the prince; the latter accordingly 
appeared in the Imperial Diet not as an individual, but as a representative. The attention 
which was devoted to this distinction occasioned by religion has now been extended to 
other differences, and territories which have come under a single ruler have passed on 
their individual votes to him. In this case too, the individual as a unit, i.e. the individual 
personality, is no longer made into a principle, as occurred in the past when even the 
ruler of various principalities had only one vote, or when several princes among whom a 
single principality was divided each had a vote of his own. The principle now is the ruler 
in his capacity as a representative. (my emphasis, GC, 55). 
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      In the logic of the modern state’s constitution the political legitimacy and competence to hold 
authority rests exclusively on the ruler’s capacity to represent the sovereign territoriality. In the 
past the territorial subjects were tied to the persona of the prince, they belonged to him. Now, the 
ruler is bound to the state’s territory, he belongs to his subjects/citizens. He holds political 
power over his dominion not as a matter of personal grace but only on condition that he is 
acknowledged by the territorial state as its political representative. ‘[The] true and genuine 
principle […] is the territory which confers the power and the right to vote’ (GC, 55). In this 
constitutive principle of the modern state we see an inversion of the structure of rule. Before the 
territory was an extension of the person of the ruler. Now, the territory rules over its ruler. Being 
dependent on his representative status the ruler’s will loses its arbitrary personal character and 
becomes publicly confined. The monarch has to abide to the community’s supremacy which 
recognises the legitimacy of the monarch’s will only if the latter is tied in a political 
representative relation to its territorially-based state existence. Sovereign power has ceased to be 
an attribute of the monarch’s person. The person of the monarch has become an attribute of the 
state community’s sovereign power. 
    The structure of the modern state is characterised by the development of a stratum exclusively 
dealing with national affairs becoming a class [Stand] on its own. Thus a distance has developed 
between individuals and national affairs with the consequence that responsibility for them has 
become more and more concentrated ‘in a single centre consisting of the monarch and the 
Estates, - i.e. one part of the nation made up of the nobility and clergy on the one hand, who 
spoke for themselves and in person, and of the third estate on the other, which represented the 
rest of the people.’ (GC, 63). The executive and legal power rests with the monarch but the 
Estates have a share in legislation and furnish the means which sustain his power. ‘This system of 
representation is the system of all modern European states.’ (GC, 63). ‘[I]t marks an epoch in 
world history.’ (GC, 63). The principle of political representation constitutes the mean between 
the two extremes developed in the continuum of world culture, the mean between the 
civilisational movement from oriental despotism to a republic (Roman) and through its decay to 
the present mean. (GC, 63). The modern form of state that mediates the extremes of world 
culture, absolute rule and popular government, is based on the principle of ‘limited monarchy’ 
which encompasses ‘modern republics’ too since both are identical in having a single ‘centre’ of 
concentrated political power ‘freely determined by laws’ (GC, p. 77). The status of kings as 
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representatives of their communities and so ethically bound to be agents of their collective 
welfare was transubstantiated into the form of constitutional monarchy where the sovereign is 
presumably not arbitrary but obedient to universal laws whose power is to enact. (PR §§ 278R, 
279A, pp. 316, 321). Political representation appears to be the principle of reconciliation of the 
world-spirit with itself incarnated in the modern state. For it reconciles the absolute will of 
primitive despotism with the political Enlightenment’s universality of laws while at the same 
time it integrates organically the state community as the necessary basis of any ‘political 
authority’ into the will of the sovereign power which itself is the socio-ethical substantive 
condition for the political community’s subsistence.    
 
3.b.  Representation of Social Estates in the Sphere of Justice  
 
    The Hegelian framework assigns structural or organic necessity to the operation of the 
complex of institutions that incarnate political representation, all the more so, since political 
representation provides the mediation with which civil society and the political state cohere into 
the state community as a whole.  
    The central Hegelian concern is to reconcile the particularity of civil society with the ethical 
universality of the state, where the state itself is the ‘universal end’ but the reconciliation must be 
such that particularity by itself acknowledges this higher end in order to be elevated to the 
espousal of the ‘universal end’ for-itself. If the self-transcendence of particularity from its 
narrow self-centreness is achieved and becomes self-aware that the state universality is the 
ultimate precondition of its own subsistence then the unity of subjective and objective freedom is 
realised and the ethical rationality of the state is vouchsafed.  
    A central institution in civil society that reflects a relation of representation which binds the 
community to the state is the administration of justice. The relation of dispensation of justice 
becomes politicised because civil members are treated by justice universally or as carriers of a 
universalistic identity, i.e. state citizenship. The supersession of the private existence of civil 
members and their entrance into the public interface with the laws and the dispensation of justice 
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is conditioned by the right and duty of publicity. ‘[T]he laws should be made universally known’ 
(PR § 215, p. 246). Only the publication of laws respects the right of self-consciousness to know 
which manner of conduct is prescribed or proscribed and punished accordingly. Only a relation 
of knowledge can sustain the legitimacy of law and ‘its binding force’ for self-consciousness if 
its subjective freedom is not to be violated. The necessary publicity of laws extends and 
encompasses both the formal procedures of administering justice and the justifications of judicial 
dispensation.70 The public knowledge of laws makes also evident to the individual that his right 
(of personhood, of property) has become ‘part of the existent [existierenden] universal will’ (PR 
§ 217, p. 249). To the cunning objection that people are not ‘legal experts’ and hence 
incompetent to comprehend the law Hegel retorts that the ‘legalese’ or the techno-legal 
obfuscation that surrounds legal formulation and discourse is rather a device of the ‘legal 
profession’ to protect ‘its monopoly’ and its ‘specialised expertise’. As against this, ‘as one need 
not be a shoemaker to know whether one’s shoes fit, so is there no need to belong to a specific 
profession in order to know about matters of universal interest. Right is concerned with freedom 
[…] and man must know about it if it is to have binding force for him’ (PR § 215A, p. 247). 
    The formal procedures through which justice is dispensed, ‘the right to stand in a court of law’ 
acknowledged to all members of civil society (PR § 221, p. 253), the provision of evidence and 
‘legal arguments’, the justification of the verdict, the conditions in general associated with the 
principle of ‘fair trial’, all these steps in the ‘process of law’ ‘are themselves rights’ necessarily 
to be determined by law. (PR § 222, p. 253). Despite the lawful character of the legal procedural 
‘formalities’ since these have their end external to them and are means towards the adjudication 
of the ‘matter at hand’ [Sache], these procedures ‘may also be turned into an evil [Übel] and 
even into an instrument of injustice [Unrecht]’ (PR § 223, pp. 253-4). Therefore, citizens must 
have the right to appeal or even access to a ‘court of equity’ where legal technicalities can be by-
passed and the ‘content’ of the legal action be judged on the merits of its individual case. In this 
regard ‘formal right’ gives way to the primacy of substantial moral considerations. 
                                                            
70 ‘The rights of the subjective consciousness include […] also the possibility of knowing [zu kennen] how the law 
is actualized in particular cases […] the publicity of the administration of justice; for the course of law is in itself an 
occurrence of universal validity […] [and] its universal content (i.e. the right within it and the decision on this right) 
is of interest to everyone.’ (PR § 224, p. 254). 
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    The knowledge provided through the publicity of both law and the administration of justice to 
the citizens suffices to make them competent in ‘the supervision of the whole course of the 
inquiry’ (PR§ 226, p. 255) and in the ‘categorization’ of any individual case. The judgment on 
procedure and on the empirical content of the case is not the exclusive preserve of ‘legal 
dispensation’ but a ‘knowledge to which every educated person may aspire’ (PR § 227, p. 256). 
Hegel thereby has set the conditions for ‘popular’ or democratically-inclined dispensation of 
justice in the form of ‘trial by jury’, the basis of which is a form of socio-ethical representation. 
Any kind of verdict in civil and criminal law must come in agreement with the universal content 
of subjective consciousness or the general ethical ‘conscience’ of the people so as to uphold its 
freedom. No verdict must oppose the popular ethical sentiment. The rightfulness of the judges’ 
pronouncement must reflect itself in the self-confession of the criminal so as to guarantee that a 
just verdict has been issued. The contingent alignment of the judicial verdict with the self-
acceptance of it by the criminal leaves open the possibility that the criminal may not own up to 
his guilt. In that case if ‘the subjective conviction of the judge is to prevail, an element of 
harshness is again introduced, for the person in question is no longer treated as a free individual. 
The mediation [between these possibilities] is the requirement that the verdict of guilt or 
innocence should emanate from the soul of the criminal – as in trial by jury’. (PR § 227A, p. 
257). For the cynical mind of bourgeois society it is almost unimaginable that the criminal’s non-
confession could be a criterion invalidating the ethicality of the judicial decision. What Hegel 
suggests is that the defendant ought not to be treated as an inert object by the administrative 
machine of justice as if his being human (and rational and free) is of no concern in arriving at the 
judgment. The deprivation of freedom imposed on the ‘criminal’ would not be a just punishment 
if he has been treated as an unfree person. You cannot deprive someone from something he is not 
acknowledged to have in the first place. How is the emanation from ‘the soul of the criminal’ 
connected to trial by jury so as to restitute the ethical validity of verdict? The ‘soul of the 
criminal’ is represented by his fellow citizens who will adjudicate the case. This representation 
of the defendant is both social and political (not legal since it does not concern the mode of 
selection and/or the quality of his defence). It is social representation because the confidence 
bestowed on the jury’s verdict (by the defendant and society at large) ‘is based primarily on their 
equality with the party concerned in respect of their particularity –their social status [Stand] and 
the like’ (PR§ 228, p. 258). It is political in that it takes place wholly within the public realm. 
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        In societies with a prominent hierarchical class stratification (like Prussia at the time)71 to be 
judged by class or status superiors (as professional judges then and now are) amounts to a 
complete disregard of the socially specific circumstances that determine one’s bearing in life, the 
attendant manner and ways of conduct and the socio-cultural context that provides the meaning 
for the practices followed. To mend the social qua ethical inequality and the power difference as 
it translates itself in the content of judicial dispensation Hegel considers of utmost importance 
the institutional activation of a relation of representation premised on the egalitarian principle 
that those who share similar social circumstances or equivalent social standing are better judges 
of a person of their own social circle. The jury judgment holds the high moral ground even in 
punishing the culprit, for the punishment does not take place in the name of ‘punishment for the 
sake of punishment’72 but for the sake of the ‘criminal’ if it is to recognise his subjective 
freedom. 
    The structure of the socio-ethical relationship of representation between the jury and the 
‘criminal’ discloses the following aspects. The ‘criminal’ belongs to the same social group or 
social estate that judges him.73 So they share the same social substance hence they are alike. To 
that degree the ‘criminal’ is a passive representative of his social estate, not an agent 
‘representing’ a principal. But the act he has committed violates the (specific) normative order 
characteristic of his social estate. In doing so, in coming to opposition to the accepted norm he 
emerges as a negative representative.74 He is what they are not. Since they share the same social 
substance then his opposition is internal to the ethicality expressive of the group. The ethical 
judgment of the jury then restitutes via its negative representative, its own normativity 
confirming it in case of a guilty sentence. Additionally, the jury is not the whole social estate but 
                                                            
71 An indication that Hegel’s rational state does not coincide with the extant ‘modern state’ of his time since neither 
trials were public nor judged by juries. A. W. Wood, note I in PR, p. 449.  
72 Contrary to British Hegelianism’s thinking of the ethical appropriateness that   ‘punishment for punishment’s sake 
will always be a civic necessity’. Bernard Bosanquet, ‘Introduction to the Second Edition’, The Philosophical 
Theory of the State and Related Essays (St. Augustine’s Press: Indiana, 2001[1923]), p. 45.  
73 In this regard, Hegel incorporates the fundamental legal maxim of the Middle Ages in his construction of the 
ethical state which is envisioned to be an ethico-historical concretion of anterior ethical layers ‘preserved’ in a 
superseded fashion in the modern state. The maxim of folk-law that was honoured in the post-Roman era was ‘that 
every man must be judged by the law of his own people’. John B. Morall, Political Thought in Medieval Times 
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press/Medieval Academy of America, 1980), p. 17.   
74 He represents the negation of both his estate and of himself thus by his violation he acts against his ‘own implicit 
will’. Mark Tunick, ‘Are There Natural Rights? – Hegel’s Break with Kant’, in Hegel on the Modern World, ed. by 
A. B. Collins (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995), pp. 219-235 (p. 227).     
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a representative sample of it. In this we have a second connection of representation between the 
jury and the social estate. So in the judgment of the jury the social estate itself is represented.  
    In this double representative connection between the jury as the equivalent of the social estate 
but in opposition to it (for the jury is a particularity vis-a-vis the wholeness of the estate) and in 
its representative function (of the social estate) vis-a-vis its negative representative, the 
‘criminal’, there is reciprocal representativity. The social estate represents itself via the jury to 
the ‘criminal’ whereas the ‘criminal’ (as singularity) represents through the jury (with which it 
shares the same social substance) the negative of the social estate itself. In both moments of the 
dual representative relation the ‘jury’ functions as the mediating link. 
          The relation of representation evinces the character of infinity as contradiction reflected 
into itself or in the equivalent Hegelian formulation as ‘being-outside-itself within being-within-
itself’.75 The ‘criminal’ is ‘flesh of the flesh’ of the social estate. As a singular being by 
belonging to the estate is one (or in unity) with it and shares with it a common form of social 
being. He exists within it as a singular instance of its universality. At the same time by having 
committed a presumable transgression he posits himself outside the commonality in opposition 
to it. But this opposition obtains its meaningfulness only within the ethical confines of the social 
estate he belongs to. So the ‘criminal’ represents the outside aspect (the difference) of the social 
estate as integrally incorporated within it (difference-within-identity).  
    How does the entanglement in the nexus of representation uphold the ‘subjective freedom’ of 
the ‘criminal’? The relation of representation concretised in a trial by jury (by equals) emerges as 
a protection shield against the judicial judgment of a professional corps of justices who by their 
monopoly of knowledge of right, of ‘the course of court proceedings’ and the command of a 
mystifying legal discourse constitute themselves as an exclusive and ‘superior’ estate. The 
application of formal right in the judgment of a case becomes the indifferent treatment of any and 
all cases in disregard of the subjectivity in question. ‘The right of self-consciousness’ is 
suppressed under the formal abstractness of the treatment and the particular subjectivity is reified 
by being reduced to another case in the manifold of cases. 
                                                            
75 G.W.F. Hegel, The Jena System, 1804-5: Logic and Metaphysics, trans. & ed. by J. W. Burbidge and G. di 
Giovanni, intro. & notes by H. S. Harris (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1986), p. 35.  
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 In this situation, members of civil society, who depend for their livelihood on their 
activity [labourers included], their own knowledge [Wissen] and volition, remain 
alienated not only from their own most personal interests but also from the substantial 
and rational basis of these, namely right, and they are reduced to a condition of tutelage, 
or even a kind of serfdom, in relation to the class [Stand] in question (PR § 228R, p. 258). 
      
       Even if they are physically present in court they are absent in spirit from it and the ‘right 
which they receive will remain an external fate for them’ (PR § 228R, p. 259). The relation of 
representation inscribed in the trial by jury by acknowledging the ‘substantial/rational basis of 
right’ of one’s social station in life provides for adjudication in the name of the individual by his 
social estate self. Whatever the verdict may be, the individual faces a realisation by proxy of his 
‘subjective freedom’ instead of confronting an alien fate.76  
    The relationship of representation in the triad of social estate-jury-‘criminal’ expresses also the 
essential conceptual content of representation itself as making the absent present. The jury itself 
is not a perennial standing institution but it is convened due to the presence of the ‘criminal’. It 
exists implicitly as a possibility but the mediation of the ‘criminal’ is the condition of its 
actualisation. In the representative relation between the jury and the social estate the latter 
certainly enjoys an independent existence. But as a particular ethical substance it does not exist 
as such but becomes presentified itself as a particular will ‘embodied’ only in the decision 
enunciated by the jury itself. The ethical relationship of the three moments in representation 
emerges as an organic link. According to Hegel, ‘[i]t is one of the most important insights of 
logic that a specific moment which, when it stands in opposition, has the position of an extreme, 
loses this quality and becomes an organic moment by being simultaneously a mean’ (PR § 302R, 
p. 342). In the relation of representation that we examine the two extremes are the social estate 
and the ‘criminal’. The ‘criminal’ by activating the other two moments emerges as a totality that 
encompasses the other two moments within him. Hence apart from being an extreme he also 
                                                            
76 This essential condition vouchsafing ‘subjective freedom’ of the accused civil member is disregarded by Allen 
Wood in his discussion of Hegel’s ethic of ‘consenting to be punished’. See: A. W. Wood, Hegel’s Ethical Thought 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 114ff.   
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appears as the mean that activates the representative connection between the estate and its jury. 
On the other hand, the social estate apart from being the other extreme in the relationship is 
simultaneously the mean in the relation of the jury to the ‘criminal’ since both are brought in 
connection because they share a common substance which is that of the social estate itself. If the 
jury and the ‘criminal’ did not partake of the same social substance via their belonging to the 
same estate then the ‘criminal’ would have been adjudged by the judicial officialdom of formal 
right and the jury would not have been formed at all.  
    The connection of the moments of the relationship of representation exhibits also necessity. If 
necessity is ‘the being of one in its opposite’77 then the dual representative relatedness of the 
three elements emerges as necessary. In the representation of the social estate by the jury (the 
one ‘instead of’ the other, the jury standing for the estate), the opposition rests on the social 
estate being a (finite) universal (the unity of a specific estate) as against the particular 
individuality of the jury. At the same time each is within the other since they belong to the same 
socio-ethical substance. As regards the other aspect of the tripartite relation (the other form of 
representation between the jury and the ‘criminal’) they are in opposition since the criminal is 
the ‘negative representative’ of the jury (the transgressor of their ethic) and likewise to the other 
aspect, the jury and the ‘criminal’ are internally connected by sharing the same substance, or 
being reflected within each other as is also shown by the identity of the jury with ‘the soul of the 
criminal’. 
    Hegel’s suggestion that the ‘subjective freedom’ of the criminal can be preserved only by a 
verdict reached by a jury partaking of the same particular ethical substance with him while the 
state participates through the subsumption of the case under the generality of the law and the 
handling of the court proceedings by the judiciary, pays its respect to the vitality of common law 
as a conscious manifestation of the ethicality of self-subsistent collectivities. Otherwise, the 
adjudication of the ‘criminal’ would be analogous to the situation of a professional judge of a 
foreign colonial administration pontificating on the internal dispute of an indigenous ethnicity. 
Since the state consists of a diversity of social estates it follows that there is a plurality of ethical 
templates corresponding to the different social estates.   
                                                            
77 Hegel, The Jena System, p. 62. 
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      Hegel’s conception of the dispensation of justice within civil society activates a norm of 
‘equity’ that goes even against the injunctions of ‘formal right’ (PR § 223R, p. 254).78 This norm 
of equity is grounded on a relation of socio-ethical equality shared by the members of the 
particular social estate, an equality that generates the ‘confidence’ attached to the validity of the 
ethical judgment (PR § 228, p. 258). Even if civil society exhibited a traditional hierarchical 
order based on ‘the principle that differences were to interlock with and complement one 
another’79 the condition of equality as the basis of socio-ethical representation shows a proximity 
to the growing egalitarian substrate of contemporary politics of representation.  
 
3.c.  Civil Society’s Corporate Representation and the Right of Suffrage   
 
     There is a general contradiction that permeates Hegel’s thought of the speculative 
construction of the rational state. His theoretical description of the institutional complex that 
manifests the political constitution of the ‘organic state’ (PR § 302, p. 342) comes in conflict at 
crucial nodes with the principles of the ‘rational state’.  
The ‘rationality’ of the state consists in ‘the unity of objective freedom [...] and subjective 
freedom’ (PR§ 258, p. 276). It necessitates the existence of three principled conditions in order 
to be actualised, namely the universality of membership in the state (PR § 258, p. 275), the 
inclusion of universal subjective freedom/will into the political state, and the integration of civil 
society through political representation into the governance of the state. All three conditions are 
violated by the institutional structure incarnating Hegel’s concept of the state.  A plausible 
reason which may explain the generation of such incongruities in the Hegelian construction is his 
effort to give to the Idea of the rational state realistic features so that it resembles the modern 
                                                            
78 In this Hegel follows Aristotle for whom ‘the nature of the equitable [is] a correction of law where it is defective 
owing to its universality.’ The Nicomachean Ethics, p.133 [1137b8]. Because equity attends to the particularity of 
the situation by-passed by the law’s universality, Hegel rightly observes that the equitable decision should not turn 
itself into a legal precedent, a general ethical rule that extinguishes ‘its own right’ in the interest of ‘making a 
universal legal disposition’. (PR § 223, p. 254).    
79 Pierre Rosanvallon, ‘Inaugural Lecture, Collège de France’, Democracy Past and Future, ed. by Samuel Moyn 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 31-58 (p. 42). 
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state in the form of constitutional monarchy which was Hegel’s ideal form of government. (PR § 
273, p. 308).80  
      I will argue, in this and the subsequent section, that two conceptual incongruities mar the 
articulation of the political state and Hegel’s notion of political representation that underpins it. 
1) Hegel allots a narrowly confined suffrage to the members of the state and thus divides citizens 
into those who have the freedom of political representation in the affairs of the state and those 
who are deprived of this freedom. Such exclusion conflicts with reason’s requirement that 
membership in the state must be universally enjoyed for universality is the condition of 
rationality of the state organism.  
       2) There is a tension between acknowledgement of the principle of ‘subjective freedom’ in 
civil society and its token recognition as ‘formal freedom’ in civil society’s participation in the 
government of the state. The function of political representation of the estates in the 
representative assemblies is divorced from any participation in the law-making function of the 
legislative power and political representation of civil society is reduced to the one-sided facet of 
nominal participation in the general affairs of the political state.              
       The Hegelian state consists of three estates. The ‘universal estate’ which encompasses the 
civil administration, the executive power and the power of the sovereign and its exclusive 
preserve is the engagement with the general affairs of the state. The other two social estates, the 
‘agricultural estate’ that is, the family-based landed property and the ‘mobile’ estate constitute 
civil society. The ‘mobile’ estate engaged in trade and industry deals with the particular and the 
corporation is characteristic of it (in assisting it to attain universality) since the other two estates 
already have the universal disposition in their substantive character. The agricultural estate is a 
‘concrete universal’ as immediacy, the universal estate of state administration engages with the 
universal end by definition (PR § 250, p. 270). The particular productive engagement of each in 
the ‘mobile’ estate is done also by others and this ‘inherent likeness’ through association 
                                                            
80 K.-H. Ilting seems indirectly to acknowledge this when in his general estimation of the Philosophy of Right in 
comparison to the 1818-9 lectures on the philosophy of right he deems the ‘many instances’ of Hegel’s retractions to 
suggest that ‘[t]hese temporally conditioned concessions are indeed contrary to his basic conception’. ‘Hegel’s 
concept of the state and Marx’s early critique’, in The State & Civil Society: Studies in Hegel’s Political Philosophy, 
ed. by Z.A. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), pp. 93-113 (p. 112).      
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becomes a universalistic end (common to the category of similar types of engagement) and 
establishes membership in corporation (PR § 251, p. 270). 
      The corporation under supervision by the public authority, admits members, looks after its 
own interests, protects members from contingencies and trains prospective members. It assumes 
the role of a ‘second family’ for its members (PR § 252, p. 270). The corporate association 
provides for security of livelihood and official recognition of competence and it thereby ensures 
the social credentials of status supportive of the member’s self-esteem81 and consequently of his 
sense of being a member of a corporate whole ‘which is itself a member of society in general’ 
and thus the individual has an interest to promote the less selfish end of this whole (PR § 253, p. 
271). In the corporation the skill of members is rationally determined and consequently ‘raised to 
a conscious activity for a common end’ (PR § 254, p. 272). Hegel’s conception must be 
disambiguated for two distinct senses are signified by the ‘common end’. The corporate 
individuals work under the norms of the corporation often for their own particular end (for 
example traders), not for the benefit of the corporation and thus the ‘common end’ referred to is 
not the common end of their corporation but refers to a similar end common to them all. What 
the ‘common end’ mentioned here means is that the standardisation of practice and its formal 
accreditation by the corporation results in the productive activity of each corporate member to 
lose its idiosyncratic character and to become universalistic, geared to the others in general as a 
social activity functional for the whole state community. In general, individuals have to act in a 
‘universal way’ (orient themselves to the abstract other) to fulfil their own ends and so to ‘make 
themselves links in the chain of this continuum that ties them in an overall unity (PR § 187, p. 
224). This universalistic orientation is effected partly unconsciously by the ‘system of needs’ 
where to gain satisfaction and self-expression the others are needed and the mediation of one 
through the others is the principle of universality (PR § 182, p. 220) but corporate membership 
imbibes it in a way which makes it a self-conscious attitude. 
     It has been claimed that in Hegel political representation does not rest on universal suffrage 
but instead excludes certain categories of citizens and so the Hegelian state is premised on 
conditions of political inequality and evinces a strong anti-democratic tenor that distances it from 
                                                            
81 Thus the corporate member avoids ‘alienation’, the discrepancy between the publicly practiced norms and the loss 
of citizen allegiance to them. Charles Taylor, Hegel and Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), p. 91.  
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representative democracy. It is correctly claimed that ‘Hegel is famously one of those who reject 
the idea that all citizens must be able to participate in deliberations concerning the laws and 
policies of the state’ and ‘Hegel does not consider it necessary that all citizens have the vote or 
that all participate equally in the political process’.82 Given the existence of the institution of 
political representation through which citizens supposedly express their concerns and interests 
via the selection of corporate representatives then the non-participation of all in political 
deliberation must refer to a restricted entitlement to the right of vote and consequently that a 
certain segment of the citizens remains unrepresented. 
        Hegel criticises the idea of ‘all citizens participating in public deliberation’ having in mind 
the liberal frame of mind which conceives citizens abstractly as isolated individual units and then 
it ‘stops short at the abstract determination of membership of the state (PR § 308R, p. 347) thus 
disregarding the socioeconomic embedding of individuals in concrete communities, corporations 
and social estates through which civil life is organised. The liberal understanding of the citizenry 
as a social aggregate articulated on the basis of numerical equality without any concrete social 
ties among themselves ‘seeks to implant in the organism of the state a democratic element 
devoid of rational form, although it is only by virtue of its rational form that the state is an 
organism’ (PR § 308R, p. 347). Prima facie it is not the ‘democratic element’ per se that bothers 
Hegel, since the many as indicative of the empirical all, the people or the democratic element 
(PR § 301R, pp. 339-340)  is presumably incorporated in the rational state through corporate 
representation, but the lack of substantive rationality in the liberal conception. A lack of rational 
form means in this case the elimination of all mediating institutions between the single voter and 
his government, a glorification of the citizen in his private capacity and the absence of the self-
conscious citizen as political being endowed with a universalistic ethos, a lack which destroys 
the organic character of the state. As an abstract singular voter the individual can only express 
his arbitrary subjective will and his sole political criterion for it is his self-serving particularistic 
interest. The generalisation of this individualistic logic as the basis of political representation 
reduces the state to an instrument of particularistic interests and in reality it establishes political 
inequality rather than translating abstract equality into a universal political condition of the state. 
                                                            
82 Stephen Houlgate, ‘Hegel, Rawls, and the Rational State’ in Robert R. Williams (ed.) Beyond  Liberalism and 
Communitarianism: Studies in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 
2001), pp. 249-273 (pp. 255, 256).   
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Political inequality results because the single voter realises the numerical insignificance of his 
vote given the electorate size of modern states and thus becomes depoliticised letting those 
whose particular interests are stronger to dominate the political arena and thus impose their own 
particular interest (PR § 311R, p. 350). Secondly, the liberal conception disregards the political 
socialisation of individuals into responsible citizens through belongingness in corporate, 
collective bodies and the associational life of civil society.83 
      In place of the abstraction of ‘one man one vote’ Hegel introduces corporate representation 
as the method of selection of parliamentary representatives.  Where the Hegelian conception 
differs drastically from the liberal one is in the type of identity under which the person votes. If 
he is conceived as an unattached individual denuded from any kind of socioeconomic nexus then 
his vote is irresponsible ‘[f]or the individual has no duties qua individual. One has duties only to 
the extent that one exists and has to act for a universal.’84  Corporate bodies like municipalities, 
labour unions, trade associations, professional groups, non-governmental organisations, political 
parties, religious congregations85 and other ‘recognised associations’ by definition cater to 
collective interests of a public character geared to the whole. The selection of representatives to 
the national assembly is decided by the associations and ‘[i]f it is for associations to send 
deputies, and all citizens must be members of an association, then every active citizen can also 
take part in the election. It goes without saying that day laborers, servants, etc., are not [allowed 
to vote, but] are excluded as not being members of an association.’ (LNRPS, p. 286/236, my 
emphasis). Hence all members of associations enjoy the right of vote individually. Hegel 
suggests the exclusion from suffrage of those individuals who are not members of an association 
like ‘day laborers, servants’ and others. Hence the impression is formed that he is against 
universal suffrage. From an empirical point of view Hegel condones the exclusion from suffrage 
of all citizens who are unincorporated. From the same perspective it must be noted that his 
corporate political representation scheme is relatively progressive since no popular 
                                                            
83 G. Heiman, ‘The sources and significance of Hegel’s corporate doctrine’ in Hegel’s Political Philosophy: 
Problems and Perspectives, ed. by Z. A. Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), pp. 111-135 
(p. 129). 
84 Hegel, Lectures on Natural Right and Political Science: The First Philosophy of Right (Heidelberg 1817-8) ed. by 
Staff of the Hegel Archives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), § 153, p. 286/236-7. Subsequent page 
reference is to Vorlesungen über Naturrecht und Staatwissenschaft (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1983). 
Hereafter cited as LNRPS in the text.  
85 Howard P. Kainz, G.W.F. Hegel: The Philosophical System (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1996), p. 120. 
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representative institutions existed in the Absolutist Prussian monarchy in any case.86 So, limited 
political representation is better than none but certainly quite unsatisfactory in regard to universal 
suffrage and the category of universality which must pervade the ‘rational state’. Nevertheless, 
the Hegelian exclusion from the franchise of certain categories is based on the public criterion of 
the unincorporated status of such categories which are not denied on principle the right of future 
incorporation. Normatively, there is a Hegelian proviso that allows for universal suffrage. If the 
condition of enfranchisement and political representation is ‘citizen membership of an 
association’ then universal suffrage becomes necessitated by the maxim that ‘[n]o one in the 
state must be allowed not to be a member of an association’ (my emphasis, LNRPS, § 153, p. 
285/235, PR§ 290A, p. 331). Therefore since everyone must be an associational member 
regardless of his station in life and membership in an association is the condition for electoral 
capacity and his being represented then everyone ought to enjoy the right to vote. Hegel’s ethical 
supposition that all members of the state ought to be incorporated and thus to be enfranchised 
contradicts his empirical acknowledgement of restricted suffrage.87  
     Citizens as members of associations actually hold a double voting power. They are politically 
represented by electing their corporate deputies to the national and provincial assemblies but 
they also vote to elect the directors of their own associations and corporations (LNRPS, § 142, p. 
263/212-3). So they do have intra-corporate representation. Nevertheless the pattern of intra-
corporate representation is adulterated. This is the first major instance of limitation of public 
freedom cum representation imposed on the social estate of corporate citizens by Hegel’s 
political state. The selection of the administrative officials who manage the particular affairs of 
their own corporations involves ‘a mixture of popular election by the interested parties, and 
confirmation and determination by a higher authority’ (PR § 288, p. 329). Some corporate 
officials are elected and some are appointed by the executive power while the elected ones are 
                                                            
86 Shlomo Avineri, Hegel’s Theory of the Modern State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974), pp. 57, 
161. 
87 Allen W. Wood correctly pinpoints that Hegel ‘cannot justify’ the ‘systematic exclusion of the people from the 
subjective freedoms’ but Wood fails to see that this is done on pain of self-contradiction. ‘Hegel and Marxism’ in 
The Cambridge Companion to Hegel, ed. by Frederick C. Beiser (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 
pp. 414-444 (p. 422). An accusation has been launched against Enlightenment philosophers, Rousseau, Montesquieu 
and Hegel, who exhibit a trenchant disparity between their philosophical opposition to an institution (slavery) and its 
acceptance on pragmatic grounds. Susan Buck-Morss, Hegel, Haiti, and Universal History (Pittsburgh: University 
of Pittsburgh Press, 2009), pp. 29-34, (p.74).    
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subject to ratification ultimately from the sovereign power.88 The administration of the corporate 
affairs cannot be left to ‘its own supervisors’ who are ‘often inept’, tend to collude with each 
other and are ignorant of the ‘universal view’ of the state (PR § 289R, p. 330). Consequently, the 
alignment of corporate interests with the ‘universal interest’ needs to be performed by ‘delegates 
of the executive power, i.e. the executive civil servants’ (PR § 289R, p. 329). The general reason 
for the intervention of the state’s bureaucracy into corporate life and the restrictions placed on its 
civil autonomy is that ‘these circles must be subordinated to the higher interests of the state’ (PR 
§ 288, p. 329). Civil society cannot be trusted with the management of its own particular 
interests because they will tend to oppose the ‘higher interests’ of the political state. The same 
general mistrust of civil society’s ‘subjective freedom’, though it should have been properly 
politicised by corporate membership, underlies political representation in the representative 
assemblies.  
     
3.d.  The Semblance of Political Representation of Civil Society in the Political State 
 
       In Hegel, the ‘world spirit’ is ultimately realised ‘through the freedom of each individual’ in 
an ‘internally organised state’ which embodies objectively the subject’s consciousness of ‘its 
subjective freedom and rationality’.89 This is the identity of subjective and objective freedom 
which grounds the ‘rational state’. This identity presupposes that the subjective freedom of civil 
society is expressed as political freedom in the ‘objective spirit’ of the political organism of the 
state. If civil society is deprived of political participation and determination of the universal 
affairs of the state then the political state itself emerges as a superordinate system of power 
subordinating civil society to its own authoritarian will thus destroying the organic unity of the 
rational state. Hegel’s institutional articulation of state power leads to such an effect by 
trivialising civil society’s political participation.     
                                                            
88 Heiman wrongly believes that election is merely ‘subject to scrutiny by public authority’. ‘The sources and 
significance’, p. 130.   
89 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History, ed. J. Hoffmeister 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980[1830]), pp. 55, 208-9.    
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       Hegel opposes the modern doctrine of the ‘separation of powers’ since ‘separation’ entails 
externality and independence and consequently an unresolved opposition which in the absence of 
a superior power to adjudicate between them spells disaster for any political edifice and its unity. 
(PR § 300A, p. 339).90 Instead of ‘separation’ he proposes ‘division of powers’ which in a 
dialectical gesture indicates both their distinctness, their differentiation from each other and 
simultaneously their union since for any two entities to become differentiated, it must be 
presupposed their emanation from a common source. The dialectical difference-in-identity 
conception of the three powers of the ‘political state’, the sovereign power, the executive (which 
is dependent on the sovereign) and the legislative power is revealed by the ultimate incorporation 
of all elements in the ‘subjectivity’ of the sovereign (PR § 273, p. 308). 
    Citizen participation in the political state takes two forms. All citizens if they have the ability 
and competence can potentially enter as individuals in the ‘universal estate’ and become civil 
servants. This means that they automatically change status and they cease being members of the 
social estates of civil society. The other form of participation is political representation in the 
legislature. The two social estates are provided with two different ways of political participation. 
One section of civil society, the ‘agricultural estate’ is privileged to obtain representation in the 
legislature without elections but by birth (PR § 307, p. 346). Here Hegel’s thought is mired in a 
practical contradiction. He assigns participation in person (of the oldest son of the family) to the 
whole estate consisting of the gentry and any land-holding peasant owner. It is obvious that it is a 
practical impossibility for the entire estate to exist as an assembly. Behind the theoretical façade 
of the abstract formulation is hidden his unjustifiable desire to attribute pride of place in the 
legislature to the aristocratic magnates and notables. It is an instance of the perennial tension 
existing between a principled position of his and his effort to streamline the ‘rational state’ to the 
fixtures of an empirically extant state.  
     All the other members of civil society obtain political representation only to the degree they 
are members of corporations and elect their own deputies to the estates’ assembly (PR §§ 308, 
311 pp. 346, 350).91 Election of deputies to a representative assembly ought to mean that the 
                                                            
90 ‘[A] balance of powers external to each other’ contravenes the idea of the state. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, § 
544, p. 275.  
91 Westphal who wants to boost the republican credentials of Hegel asserts that Hegel ‘advocated a permanent 
representative assembly’. K. Westphal, ‘The basic context and structure of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’ in The 
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particular concerns and interests of the communities and corporations which send their deputies 
are being voiced in the assembly and thus the organised diversity of the subjective will of civil 
society attains political expression. Nothing of the sort is possible in the Hegelian view of the 
political representative.  
      The elected deputies must satisfy three conditions. Firstly, they must be those who have 
superior understanding of the ‘universal concern’ (not of the particular concerns of their 
constituency) than their electors. Secondly, they must not be ‘commissioned or mandated agents’ 
that is, not to be bound by any instructions or directions on how and what they are going to 
deliberate about. Thirdly, and most significantly, ‘these individuals will not subordinate the 
universal interest to the particular interest of a community or corporation, but will give it their 
essential support’ (PR § 309, p. 348). Therefore the duty of the representatives is not to represent 
the interests of the communities which elected them but to disregard them in the name of the 
universal concerns of the political state which sets the agenda of deliberations. The construal of 
the legitimate functioning of the representative is such that it severs the representative tie with 
the particularity of the corporate and communal interests of civil society. The ‘elected deputy’ is 
derogated to the status of a nominal representative of his estate. The sum-total of the particular 
interests which representatives ought to put aside in ‘supporting essentially’ the universal interest 
is the totality of the interests of civil society. Therefore the ‘universal interest’ is distinct and 
separate from the combined interests of civil society and it is the interest of the state as it is 
formulated by the sovereign power and its subordinate executive power.92     
       Nonetheless, because the institution of political representation [Repräsentation] does not 
involve the giving of direct consent by everyone but only consent by ‘authorized deputies’ (PR § 
309A, p. 348) it follows that the exercise of consent by the entrusted deputy obligates his electors 
too. In Hegel’s conception of the political representative his function is not to act for the group 
he represents but to stand in for the group as an emblem of its political presence in the 
legislature.    
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Cambridge Companion to Hegel, pp. 234-269 (pp. 238-9). On the contrary, the estate obtains political representation 
‘at the request of the sovereign power’ (PR § 308, p. 347).   
92 The universal interest is the will of the sovereign monarch and no ‘common will’ either of society as a whole (the 
‘democratic principle’) or of its representatives (the ‘aristocratic principle’) can replace it. Hegel’s Philosophy of 
Mind, § 542, p. 271.   
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If the deputies are regarded as representatives, this term cannot be applied to them in an 
organic and rational sense unless they are representatives not of individuals as a crowd, 
but one of the essential spheres of society, i.e. of its major interests. Thus, representation 
no longer means the replacement of one individual by another; on the contrary, the 
interest itself is actually present in its representative, and the latter is there to represent 
the objective element he himself embodies (PR § 311 R, p. 350). 
 
    As noted above, the representative is not called upon to represent the actual interests of the 
‘sphere of society’ he ought to represent. The fact that he has been selected by a particular sphere 
of society as an identical element of it makes him be the singular personification embodying the 
‘objective’ character of the community he shares with the same social substance. It is the 
embodiment of the objective interest of the particular ‘social sphere’ which defines the 
representative not the representative who defines the interest. The political representative 
represents by (his) being not by (his) doing. This opposition at the heart of representation is 
going to be sublated into unity by Marx for whom the human being represents ‘by what he is and 
does’ (CHDS, p. 190).  
      This sharing of the same social substance as the foundation of the relationship of 
representation is exactly analogous to the representative relationship that we saw to exist in the 
dispensation of ‘concrete justice’ between the ‘criminal’, the ‘jury’ and the social estate to which 
they belong. But there are two significant differences between the two forms of representation. In 
the dispensation of ‘concrete justice’ the jury realised the ‘subjective freedom’ of both the estate 
and the ‘criminal’ by judging on the basis of their own particular ethical standards expressive of 
their substantial existence. Here the political representative shares the same social substance, 
embodies in person its objective interest but he is not allowed to speak for it being under the 
obligation to be independent-minded and concerned only with the state’s concerns. The second 
difference concerns the element of equality. In the juridical form of representation the judges and 
the judged were equal in status and their underlying equality justified the acceptance of the 
verdict. In political representation the representative enjoys equal social status with the members 
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of his corporate community but he must be politically experienced and have a ‘better 
understanding’ of the state’s affairs than his electors. Political experience of state affairs is 
gained only if someone has occupied ‘positions of authority or political office’ (PR § 310, p. 
349). Thus the exemplary candidate for the representative post must have served in the executive 
power or be a kind of professional politician. This intimacy with the centres of political power 
clearly distinguishes the ideal political representative from his corporate community and endows 
him with superior political status.93 Thus the representative appears as a kind of ideal figure in 
regard to his constituency and this explains the element of trust bestowed upon him. Trust is the 
basis of representation and presupposes that the representative will treat the community’s ‘cause 
as if it were his own’ (PR § 309A, p. 348). This description of trust is quite valid but it does not 
fit with Hegel’s conception of the representative since the latter’s duty is not to treat the interest 
of his electors ‘as if it were his own’ but to exercise his independent judgment for the sake of the 
state’s universal interest to the detriment of his electors’ interest if they happen to conflict. Hegel 
commits a surreptitious displacement between the two aspects constitutive of the notion of trust. 
The basic aspect of trust is that the representative will act for another’s own cause. The second 
aspect is that his character is such that he will pursue the cause to the best of his ability and 
knowledge. By putting the stress on the second aspect he downplays the commitment to 
another’s cause and thus he can assert that the ‘principle of the individual subjective will is no 
longer applicable’ (PR § 309A, p. 348) for the particular cause for which the representative has 
been entrusted is extinguished under the generality of promoting ‘a cause’ which the 
representative, due to the integrity of his character, will perform effectively. Given the superior 
ethical and political character of the ‘deputy’ and the fact that he is familiar with ‘the needs and 
particular interests’ of the corporate collectivity he is associated with then even his ‘election 
itself is either completely superfluous or can be reduced to an insignificant play of arbitrary 
opinion’ (PR § 311, p. 350). The subjective will of civil society does not really need to ‘elect’ its 
representatives. It would suffice to set up a permanent caste of political representatives to look 
after the ‘state-business’ and civil society could go on minding its own business.  
                                                            
93 Robert Fine, Political Investigations: Hegel, Marx, Arendt (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 64. Fine thinks Hegel 
criticises the ‘representative system’ but his discussion is blinded to the fact that the criticism is directed at the 
liberal representative system based on ‘abstract equality’ not at Hegel’s own corporate representative system. Thus 
he is led to deny basic political convictions of Hegel (pp. 64-5).   
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        Political representation of civil society in the political organism of the state must involve 
participation of the representative assembly (divided into two houses, one for each social estate) 
in the legislature if it is to exist at all, since it does not have any share in the executive and the 
sovereign powers. In contrast to representative democracy where the legislative power belongs to 
the representative assembly in the Hegelian political state the ‘primary part’ in ‘the legislative 
power as a whole’ is played by the ‘monarchy as the power of ultimate decision’ and ‘the 
executive power’ which has ‘concrete knowledge [Kenntnis] and oversight of the whole’ (PR § 
300, p. 339). In criticising the exclusion of the executive from the legislative bodies in the 
French Constituent Assembly, Hegel demands the executive’s ‘ex officio share’ in the 
legislature. (PR § 300A, p. 339).94 Since the sovereign and executive powers hold the ‘primary 
part’ of the legislative power what is the role the representative organs of civil society play in 
legislative activity and law-making?             
        The representative assemblies do not have ‘to achieve optimum results in their deliberations 
and decisions on the business of the state in itself, for their role in this respect is purely 
accessory’ (PR § 314, p. 351). This is the consequence of the fact that they cannot play any role 
in the legislative function. Law-making and state policy formation is the ‘fruit of profound 
cognition and insight’ which the representative ‘Estates’ do not possess. Actually, in Hegel’s 
view, ‘the highest officials’ ‘have a more profound and comprehensive insight’ into the state 
affairs, they are ‘more skilled in dealing with them, so that they are able to do what is best even 
without the Estates’ (PR § 301R, 340). So, the representative bodies are legislatively useless and 
irrelevant in terms of a meaningful and rational contribution to the state business which could 
have been performed more efficiently by the executive power without the decorative 
representative presence of civil society. Why then have any political representation at all if the 
‘subjective will’ of civil society is effectively excluded from the determination of state affairs?        
       The distinctive role political representation and the constitution of the representative 
assemblies have, is to ensure that through their participation in deliberations on ‘matters of 
universal concern’ ‘formal freedom attains its right in relation to those members of civil society 
who have no share in government’ (PR§ 314, p. 351). Instead of having political freedom to 
participate in the decision-making process on the business of the system of power, deliberations 
                                                            
94 Cf. Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, § 544, p.274. 
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of the representatives merely amount to the symbolic significance that the ‘formal freedom’ of 
civil society is being respected. Political representation of the interests of civil society becomes a 
semblance of representation reduced to a form of symbolic representation of the ‘formal 
freedom’ civil society ought to have within the institutional apparatus of the political state since 
the majority of its members ‘have no share in government’. This ‘formal freedom’ is secured 
only via its representatives who themselves do not enjoy any real political freedom to participate 
in government. The universal subjective freedom acknowledged to civil society has disappeared 
within the unitary sovereign will of the political state and ‘the state of the citizens has become 
the state of office-holders, and the republican state has become the authoritarian state.’95    
     The assemblies’ political contribution is exhausted in providing publicity to the issues 
discussed and thus increasing the ‘universal knowledge’ circulating in the public realm (PR § 
314, p. 352). Political representation becomes an enlightening elitist institution for civil society. 
It educates ‘public opinion’ on the state affairs and enables it to form ‘more rational judgments’ 
about these affairs (PR § 315, p. 352).96 Thereby the public ‘learns to respect, the functions, 
abilities, virtues, and skills of the official bodies and civil servants’ (PR § 315, p. 352). The 
representative assemblies function as a kind of ‘propaganda machine’ for the executive power 
while they teach a lesson of political propriety to ‘the self-conceit of individuals and of the mass’ 
(PR § 315, p. 352). Political representation ends up becoming not the reflection of civil society 
into the sovereign power but the reflection of the power of the sovereign into civil society. This 
is another instance of the contradiction vitiating Hegel’s philosophy of the state. If in the 
‘rational state’ the people need to be ‘educated’ in order to grasp its ‘universal end’ then either 
the ‘rational’ state is not based on universal self-consciousness (PR§ 258, p. 275), i.e. it is not 
rational or the institutional articulation of the modern state is not that of the ‘rational state’ and 
the latter remains unrealisable. 
    The principle of universal subjective free will whose objective existence in the political state 
should have grounded the Hegelian identity of the rational state has turned ‘into its own opposite, 
i.e. in subjectivity as identical with the substantial will, the subjectivity which constitutes the 
concept of the power of the sovereign’ (PR § 320, p. 359) in order to justify ‘monarchy’ as the 
                                                            
95 K-H Ilting, ‘Hegel’s concept of the state’, p. 104. 
96 K. Westphal stresses one-sidedly this ‘educative’ function of the representative assemblies. ‘The basic context’, p. 
261.   
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supreme political constitution of the most developed reason.97 The universal subjectivity of civil 
society has been ‘substituted’ by the singularised subjectivity of the monarch.98 This is the third 
instance of Hegel compromising his principles. Since entrance to the ‘universal estate’ which 
serves the universal end exclusively requires proof of competence, skill, expertise, knowledge 
and insight, i.e. elimination of natural contingency, how come the person who embodies the 
‘substantial will’ of the state, who holds the supreme and ‘ultimate decision’ on any state affair 
(PR§ 275, p. 313), who represents the epitome of ‘free subjectivity’ of everyone is a person 
whose incumbency of the ‘apex of the state’ is left to the natural contingency of birth (PR § 280, 
p. 321) when at the same time Hegel has condemned the ‘contingent origin’ of leadership in the 
democratic and aristocratic forms of state (PR § 279R, p. 320). The cogency of speculative 
reason has been sacrificed on the altar of the sovereign’s power concrete individuality.  
    Hegel’s originality in his theorisation of the rational state consists in his explicit 
acknowledgement of the differentiation of civil society from the political state as an independent 
realm of socio-economic life where subjective freedom must prevail as a universal condition and 
be guaranteed by the state itself. This form of modern self-consciousness is absent from both 
Hobbes and Locke for whom ‘civil society’ is still identical with ‘political society’ or the 
commonwealth and the private self is not recognised on its own right but only to the degree he 
complies with his political subjecthood. The dynamic of the growing independence of civil 
society generates basic strains in the organic unity of the state and Hegel proposes corporate and 
political representation as a viable solution that ensures the politico-ethical integrity of the state 
while at the same time representation provides for the formal incorporation of subjective 
freedom in the political articulation of the state. Marx takes up the issue of the political 
feasibility of an harmonious integration of civil society with the political state. In the next 
chapter we will see that Marx confronts the Hegelian conception of the rational state head-on 
arguing that the divide of civil society from the state is unbridgeable. Instead of the political state 
elevating civil society into the self-awareness of the primordial end of the state, it is the inner 
division of civil society itself that determines the civil society/political state rift. In developing 
his critique Marx will be led to furnish his own conception of democracy.  
                                                            
97 Hegel’s Philosophy of Mind, § 542, p. 270. 
98 K. Westphal confesses that Hegel’s ‘greatest internal weakness’ is ‘his account of the monarch’ though on 
different grounds. ‘The basic context’, p. 262. 
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Chapter 4  
 
Marx’s Conception of Democracy in his Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State 
 
      Marx’s conception of democracy is one of the most incisive critiques of the ‘political state’ 
in political philosophy. Any discussion of democracy is faced with two major difficulties. Firstly, 
the notion of democracy is a contested terrain revealing clashing political worldviews behind its 
theory. Because of its hegemonic role in the existing general consciousness even authoritarian 
politics masks itself as ‘democratic’.   
      The second difficulty concerns the historical conditions of mid-19th century where 
democratic institutional life was absent in practice. Universal enfranchisement, political parties, 
public trials and an independent judiciary, parliaments as representation of the general will, 
publicity of assembly proceedings,99 open and publicly accountable state bureaucracies and other 
political institutions associated with representative democracy were unimaginable.100 Demand 
for a democratic state based on popular sovereignty amid reigning monarchies was considered an 
ultra-revolutionary demand and official state censorship did not even permit to write or speak its 
name. 
    In such political context dominated by centralised absolutisms and an anaemic civil society, 
Marx’s 1843 critique of the principles of the modern constitutional state through a detailed 
critical examination of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right is quite original. He had already criticised in 
1842 the exclusivist forms of political representation of the monarchical state arriving at his core 
idea that if there is to be true political representation it ‘must be conceived only as the people’s 
self-representation [Selbst-vertretung]’.101 By the end of 1843 he considers ‘universal 
enfranchisement’ as a necessary political precondition in order to overcome the ‘abstract political 
state’ as a separate realm from civil life so as to restore to society, its real human form as a 
                                                            
99 Marx, ‘Debates on Freedom of the Press’, MECW, v.1, pp. 132-181 (pp. 145, 147).  
100 On the lack of such conditions in the Germanic territories, see Jonathan Sperber, Rhineland Radicals: The 
Democratic Movement and the Revolution of 1848-1849 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991).   
101 ‘On the Commissions of the Estates in Prussia’, MECW, v. 1, pp. 292-306 (p. 306). 
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unified societal community of all. The communal essence of man was manifested in an ‘ideal 
form’ in religion before the political state relegated religion to an exclusive private concern of 
civil society (OJQ, pp. 225, 221). Thus the political state brought in political emancipation from 
state religion but by making it a private affair it destroyed the communal essence of human 
existence at the basis of religion, making religious belief ‘the essence of difference’ (OJQ, p. 
221).   
       I submit that the basic lineaments of Marx’s critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right which 
lead him to conclude that the organic constitution of civil society with the  political state into a 
‘rational’ state as argued by Hegel, is really a ‘dualism’ of its two component parts with no 
organic connection between them and thus not really rational at all. It is also argued that the 
duality between civil society and the political state is a necessary reflection of the conditions 
prevalent within civil society itself. Marx recognises for the first time in his intellectual 
trajectory the salience of the institution of private property and its effect on the constitution of 
political power in the state. The seminal essay On the Jewish Question written shortly after the 
Critique is jointly analysed to clarify the ‘political emancipation’ associated with political 
democracy and its attendant limits.  
      Two relationships express the divided essence of the political constitution of the communal 
being of society. These are the relationship between civil society and the political state and the 
relationship between state sovereignty and the people. The first manifests the opposition between 
particularity and universality. In modern civil society individuals live an unpolitical life as ‘self-
enclosed monads’. In the political state they are supposed to realise their universal self as 
members of a political community which exists for itself. The division of the two spheres is 
duplicated within the individual self as the tension between the self-interested individual and the 
citizen. The second relationship expresses the internal division of the politically constituted 
community between the people or ‘the demos as a whole’ as its universal, communal being and 
state sovereignty or ‘form of state’ as a particular system of rule confronting the community. 
Marx’s concept of democracy opposes both forms of division aiming at their supersession into a 
human societal configuration which realises the species-being of ‘man’ or his communal 
essence. In democracy the particular (individual) is elevated into the universal (communal being) 
while the universal becomes the condition of the self-conscious existence of the particular. Thus 
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the diremption of the universal and the particular is annulled. In democracy the political 
constitution of the people is its ‘own’ self-determining, ‘free creation’ that realises its universal 
communal being. The societal community does not countenance anymore the representation of 
its universal self in an external sphere in the shape of the ‘abstract political state’.  The 
realisation of human emancipation has as one of its preconditions ‘political democracy’ based on 
universal suffrage, which is superior to the law-based Hegelian constitutional state with its 
restricted political representation of the people and opens the way for the overcoming of the 
divide between the political state and civil society into a higher form of communal association, a 
human societal democracy. 
 
4.a.  The Antinomy between the Political State and Civil Society 
 
    Marx engages with the hard core of the Philosophy of Right which deals with the constitution 
of the ‘inner sovereignty’ of the modern state, the political state proper. Hegel’s State (der Staat) 
is an ethico-political organism that realises as its universal end the unity of ‘subjective and 
objective freedom’ (PR § 258, p. 276).  In contradistinction to the state as a whole, the ‘political 
state’ (politische Staat) is the plexus of political institutions (the three Powers of monarchy, the 
executive and the legislative) that in their espousal of the universal aims of the state as a whole 
secure objective freedom as the highest end and as a prerequisite for the exercise of the 
subjective freedom of the particular individuals who constitute the members of civil society.    
       Marx in the unfolding of his critique follows Hegel’s exposition which is structured as a 
movement from the general to the specific, from the most abstract to the most concrete and this 
obliges Marx to face on from the very start the essential blueprint of Hegel’s conception of the 
modern state (PR §§ 261-2, pp. 283-6). Marx immediately identifies ‘an unresolved antinomy’ in 
the organic connection that Hegel posits between ‘family and civil society’ and the political state 
in § 261. ‘On the one hand, the political state stands opposed to the sphere of the family and civil 
society as an ‘external necessity’ to which the family institution and civil society ‘are 
subordinate […] and […] dependent’. On the other hand, Hegel counterpoises to the relation of 
‘external necessity’ that ‘other relationship in which the family and civil society are related to the 
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political state as their ‘immanent end’’ (CHDS, p. 59). To talk of the state as an organic unity of 
civil society and the political state and at the same time to see it composed by a dual relationship 
of ‘external necessity’ and ‘immanent end’ is to posit an unsurpassable conflict in the conceptual 
articulation of the whole state. If the political state was the real immanent end of civil society it 
would not need to impose itself upon civil society as an external necessity. Since ‘Hegel makes 
no mention of empirical conflicts’ this clash must concern ‘the essential relationship between 
these spheres themselves’ (CHDS, p. 59). Philosophically, no ‘two-sided identity’ is true to its 
concept if one side is ‘subordinate’ to the other for this condition suggests enforced connection 
making the identity ‘specious’ (CHDS, p. 60).  
       It is not only a logical contradiction that lurks in Hegel’s theorisation of the organic unity of 
the whole state but also an antinomy in the very essence of the modern state which Hegel 
‘describes’ speculatively. In Marx’s view Hegel’s construction of the ‘rational state’ as the 
essence of the state  reflects the modern state’s empirical reality and thus the logical 
contradiction in the relationship between the political state and civil society reflects the actual 
antinomy that exists between the two in society.102  
      Marx organises his critique methodologically by employing the mode of immanent or 
internal critique that rests on holding accountable the theorist under criticism for logical 
contradictions and inconsistencies which derive from his own premises.103 These are self-
contradictions that result in the self-destructive negation of the coherence of the system in the 
eyes of critical Reason. This is a mode of critique that works via determinate negation of the 
opponent’s premises and presuppositions and of socio-historical reality itself.104 Hegel, for 
instance, seeks out the philosophical essence of the state and ends up describing theoretically the 
empirical institutions of the modern state. Marx does not castigate Hegel for misdescription of 
empirical reality on the contrary he praises him for it, but he calls him into account for not 
                                                            
102 ‘Hegel should not be blamed for describing the essence of the modern state as it is, but for identifying what is 
with the essence of the state.’ (CHDS, p. 127). 
103 This critical method is ignored by Teeple’s penetrating reconstruction of Marx’s ‘method’ in his Critique. G. 
Teeple, Marx’s Critique of Politics, 1842-1847 (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1984), pp. 86-90. 
104 K. Marx, ‘A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction’, in Marx: Early political 
writings, ed. by J. O’ Malley (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 57-70 (p.58). 
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providing a philosophical exposition of the essential components of the state like the executive 
power or the administration of the state (CHDS, p. 105) as Hegel had intended to set forth. 105 
      The philosophical crux of Marx’s rebuttal is that no organic unity can exist as such if it is 
internally divided in such a way that its membra disjecta are perennially in conflict, unified 
through an opposition that continually tends to explode ‘the internal essence of the thing’ 
(CHDS, p. 60), to disintegrate it into its component member parts. Hegel’s concept of the divided 
identity of the whole state has unduly privileged ‘one side’ of the identity, ‘the aspect of 
estrangement within the unity’ (CHDS, p. 60) and this estrangement as separation has turned the 
political state into a despot over civil society, ‘a merely external compulsion exerted by the 
ruling power upon private life’ (CHDS, pp. 78-9) instead of providing a ‘rational system’ that 
harmoniously resolves their mode of imbrication.  
     Hegel’s idea of the rational state as an ‘ethical organism’ which integrates civil society with 
the political state as a system of rule is premised on three conditions. Firstly, that the citizens are 
bearers of an ethical duty to acknowledge the universal interest of the state as their own. 
Secondly, that there exists ‘abstract right’ as universal law which is ‘known as universally valid’ 
(PR § 210, p. 240) and safeguards their ‘imprescriptible rights’ (PR § 66R, p. 96). Thirdly, that 
through political representation in the representative organs of the political state, the estates’ 
assemblies, civil society finds its particular interests accommodated amid the universal ends of 
the political state (PR § 302, p. 342). Marx’s argumentative gist is that none of these conditions 
holds and thus the presumable unity of civil society and the political state is illusory.    
      The ethical attitude towards the state qua political community presupposes that citizens of 
the state have self-consciously accepted and internalised as ‘second nature’ the institutionalised 
political constitution and thus they recognise the necessity of existence of a political authority 
                                                            
105 The neglect of this Marxian methodological approach leads to misjudgment of Marx’s critical intent. Duquette 
thinks Marx employs a ‘genetic account’ to criticise the contradictions of the modern state as well as a ‘utopian 
vision’ exoteric to it thus he is committed to an idealist critique of Hegel’s ‘material presuppositions’ of the state, 
i.e. civil society. David A. Duquette,  ‘Marx’s Idealist Critique of Hegel’s Theory of Society and Politics’, The 
Review of Politics, 51.2 (1989), pp. 218-240 (pp. 225, 236, 238). On the contrary, Marx castigates Hegel for internal 
‘dualism’ in the organism of the state between the political state and civil society which remains unreconciled 
though it ought to be reconciled if the essence of the state  is to be rational from Hegel’s own perspective. It is 
precisely the material presuppositions of the modern state that Hegel duplicates in his account which do not allow 
him to arrive at the rational essence of the state as an organic unity and render his account contradictory reflecting 
the actual contradictions of modern sociopolitical life.             
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that takes care of the universal interest since they themselves in their particularity are mainly 
engaged with their private concerns. This political authority also recognises and guarantees their 
rights and ensures their free exercise. Thus they ought to respect and be committed to the duties 
they owe to the state whose ‘strength consists in the unity of its universal and ultimate end with 
the particular interest of individuals’ (PR § 261, p. 283). The very strength of the (political) state 
itself rests on the degree of concordance of the universal aims it pursues with the particular 
interests of the individuals. The more consonant they are with each other, the greater the strength 
of the state, the more they diverge, the less its strength and the greater the loss of its ethical 
character. 
     If the ethical bond of duty which grounds the legitimacy of the political state as a 
universalistic agency over the particular interests of individuals in their own consciousness is not 
to remain an empty ideal, introduced externally then it has to face up to the presence of its 
absence in the actual civil society. For such an ethical bond to subsist which unifies the particular 
with the universal after their divorce, the members of civil society themselves must not be 
inherently divided into private selves and public personae in their empirical social existence as a 
consequence of the modern political emancipation that resulted from the separation of the 
political and the private sphere (OJQ, p. 222). They should not be intrinsically split into self-
seeking egoists in their private existence while at the same time they are called upon to conduct 
themselves as universalistic beings having in mind only the universal interest of their political 
community which constitutes their ‘communal essence’ (Gemeinwesen).  
         It is precisely the dissolution of this ethical bond that has been realised in the modern 
constitutional state encapsulated in the ‘image’ of what we may call the schizophrenic citizen. In 
his political/public identity as member of the political community the citizen understands that 
taxation is necessary to provide for social welfare and the other collective functions (education, 
public health, pension, defense, material infrastructures) needed to maintain the social 
integration of the whole society intact. But in his private/egoistic identity he does not want to 
pay any taxes (or the less the better) ‘feeling’ taxation as an ‘oppressive’ burden on his ‘free’ 
individuality. Instead, in a self-contradictory fashion he desires everyone else to pay taxes.106 Or, 
                                                            
106 ‘The attitude of the bourgeois to the institutions of his regime […] he evades them whenever it is possible to do 
so in each individual case, but he wants everyone else to observe them.’ K. Marx and F. Engels, The German 
99 
 
in the form of a spurious universality no one to pay any taxes in blatant opposition to his citizen 
status and its concomitant political and ethical obligations, a misconception acknowledged by 
Hegel himself as prevalent in civil society (PR § 194A, p. 221), in contrast to his own conviction 
that in well-ordered constitutional states citizens willingly pay higher taxes (PR § 302A, p. 343). 
Thus citizens’ ethical commitment to put the universal interest of the state (its preservation as a 
communal association) above their particular self-interests is mere illusion.              
    The second condition of the ethical/rational state is the universality of laws. Laws in their 
generality must not discriminate against citizens nor privilege any special interests.107 Marx 
questions the idea that the abstract generality of laws constitutes a sufficient ground that could 
provide a sense of participation in the political community such that the individuals in civil 
society would acknowledge themselves as members of the political state. Instead, the 
constitution of the political state as an independent complex of political institutions meant at the 
same time the depoliticisation of civil society and its dissolution ‘into independent individuals, 
who are related by law’ (OJQ, p. 233). The ‘rights of man’ which were given universal legal 
substance by the political republic, supreme among them the ‘right of freedom’, actually 
entrenched the ‘separation of man from man’ rather than their ‘association’ with each other in an 
overall community (OJQ, p. 229). Certainly, Marx acknowledges the distinction between 
‘political rights’ as rights ‘exercised in community with others’ and thus that they involve 
participation in the political community’ (OJQ, p. 227) as against the ‘rights of man’ construed 
as rights held by the ‘natural’ individual. The legitimacy of the representative republic that rests 
on the universality of individual rights, in Marx’s account, ‘presupposes rather than abolishes the 
very particulars that it claims to overcome’108 which means that the particular individuals of civil 
society prioritise the ‘rights of man’ (individual liberty, right to private property, personal 
security) which truly reflect their condition of existence and their egotistic needs rather than the 
‘political rights’ which could elevate them into a universal self.         
                                                                                                                                                                                               
Ideology including the Theses on Feuerbach and the Introduction to the Critique of Political Economy (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 1998), pp. 25-568 (p. 194).  
107 Hegel, ‘On the Scientific Ways of Treating Natural Law’ in Dickey & Nisbet (eds.) Hegel: Political Writings 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 102-180 (p. 177).  
108 Wendy Brown, ‘Revaluing Critique: A Response to Kenneth Baynes’, Political Theory, 28.4 (2000), pp. 469-479 
(p. 473) 
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      Moreover, in spite of its ‘formal rationality’ the principle of universalistic law is defective in 
itself within the context of bourgeois civil society. The modern constitutional state which 
operates on the principle of the ‘rule of law’ and thus prima facie treats its citizens 
universalistically still suffers, in Marx’s view, from the ‘absolute’ contradiction that it reduces 
human beings to ‘legal persons’ in order afterwards to recognise their ‘essential human rights’ as 
supposedly intrinsic in their very individuality. The law instead of being the self-expression of 
the human community and thus its derivative product, itself defines legally who is to count as 
human by conferring ‘natural’ individual rights to individuals who must firstly be recognised as 
citizens and then to enjoy the rights which they ought to have had by being human beings per se 
than by legal convention as citizens of a state. Human beings have ‘human rights’ not on the 
condition that they are human but on the condition that they are foremost citizens under the 
dominion of the political state. Within bourgeois social life ‘juridical personality’ is divorced 
from and thus opposed to the actual existence of human beings with the consequence that ‘legal 
existence’ becomes the absolute presupposition of being human rather than the inverse. Thus, in 
opposition to the constitutional, law-based political republic or monarchy, Marx contends that: 
 
In democracy [Demokratie], man does not exist for the sake of law, but the law exists for 
the sake of man, it is human existence, whereas in other political systems man is a legal 
existence. This is the fundamental distinguishing feature of democracy. (CHDS, p. 88)  
 
       The ‘abstract’ existence of law in bourgeois modernity is further accentuated not only by the 
problem of the ‘implementation deficit’109 but even more due to its actual implementation. Not 
only there is lack of accountability and of popular control of the state’s administrative action but 
also no protection against its use of legal power as abuse, whenever the ‘bureaucratic hierarchy’ 
itself ‘sins’ through the official action of its civil servants (CHDS, p. 114). Lastly, because of the 
separation of the political state from civil society the positive laws enacted are not the expression 
                                                            
109 ‘Indeed, the motion of that world within its laws is necessarily a continual supersession [Aufhebung] of the law.’ 
(OJQ, p. 240).  
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of popular will but they ‘dominate’ over them and submission to the law takes place out of fear 
of its punishing power that ‘avenges’ the breaches of its proscriptions (OJQ, p. 239).   
      The third type of bond that Hegel considers to furnish the mediating link incorporating civil 
society into the political state and thus transforming their particular interests into the state’s 
universal ends is the process of political representation. This consists of two distinct levels of 
representation. The individual interests of the members of civil society find a common 
expression into the administrative structure of the various corporate bodies (trade, professional 
and municipal organisations) which manage and regulate the particular affairs of the respective 
social groups and communities which fall under their jurisdiction. The filling of the corporate 
administrative posts is the product of a ‘mixture of popular election’ and ‘determination by a 
higher authority’ (PR § 288, p. 329). Hence civil society is politically restricted in the election of 
its own administrative representatives even in the framework of their own corporations. Either 
executive ratification from above is required or direct appointment of corporate officials by the 
state’s bureaucracy itself. Furthermore, the proper functioning of the corporations is under 
continuous supervision by ‘delegates of the executive’ (PR§ 289, p. 329).  The corporate ‘self-
administration’ of civil society is actually premised on the state’s bureaucracy (CHDS, p. 105). 
Instead of having an ‘identity’ between the particular interests of civil society with the universal 
interest of the political state via representation in the corporations we get an antithetical 
‘mixture’ that perpetuates a concrete ‘unresolved dualism’ of private property interests and the 
state’s universal interest (CHDS, p. 110) analogous to the antinomic dualism that Marx has 
shown to exist logically in Hegel’s essential relationship of the political state to civil society. The 
external supervisory control over the corporate affairs by ‘representatives’ of the executive arm 
of the state in the name of the universal interest manifests the real relationship that takes place in 
the state community. 
 
Through its ‘representatives’ the ‘state’ intervenes as something alien and external to the 
nature of civil society. The ‘police’, the ‘judiciary’ and the ‘administration’ are not the 
representatives of a civil society which administers its own universal interests in them 
and through them; they are the representatives of the state and their task is to administer 
the state against civil society. (CHDS, p. 111).   
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    For an organic connection to exist that makes the state community cohere as a whole the 
interests of civil society must be represented by the political/public institutions that administer 
the affairs of civil society. Political representation in Marx’s understanding entails both the 
ethical obligation and the practical requirement that civil society’s own interests must be 
embodied in the public institutions and thus attaining a universal character. Secondly, the 
administration of such representative institutions must be under the control of civil society if the 
representative tie is not to fall apart. The case of a political state which defines on its own, to the 
detriment of society’s interests, what the universal interests of the political community are, is not 
only unrepresentative but a clear sign that there is no extant political community to which 
citizens are members of and to which they owe allegiance. 
    The final element that guarantees participation of civil society into the political state and thus 
secures their organic linkage is political representation in the legislature. A schema of limited 
corporate political representation in the legislature (PR §§ 308-9, pp. 346-8) is taken to be the 
vehicle that makes known to the political state the state of mind of the ‘many’ while, at the same 
time, it supposedly binds civil society to the universal interest of the state. The estates’ assembly 
participation in the legislature is a sham form of political representation completely 
unrepresentative of the people (the corporate representatives must not be mandated delegates and 
not even to pursue the interests of their constituencies – PR § 309, p. 348). This makes Marx 
conclude that in ‘the constitutional state’ political representation is a mere ‘formality’, a ‘legally 
sanctioned lie’ that ‘the people is the interest of the state’. (CHDS, p. 129).      
 
4.b.  People’s Democratic Sovereignty versus the ‘Organic’ Political State                       
    
      Hegel supposes that the rationality of his conception of the political state consists in the 
organic political articulation of the three political principles which distinguish the forms of 
government from Aristotle onwards, namely the monarchical, the aristocratic and the democratic 
principles. Because of that the political state organism is not a particular form of government 
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among others but it encompasses all forms of government and thus it is universal, i.e., rational. 
Consequently, the Hegelian political state consists of the ‘inner differentiation’ of the developed 
state-spirit into the three powers of the legislative, the executive, and the sovereign who 
embodies the decisionism of supreme will, all powers being dialectically interlocked in the 
unitary form of the constitutional monarchy (PR § 273, p. 308). Each of the three powers 
embodies one of each of the three political principles and the result is that in the rational political 
state ‘[t]he monarch is one; several participate in the executive power, and the many at large 
participate in the legislative power.’ (PR § 273, p. 309). 
      Marx criticises all three powers as fundamentally incapable of supplying the mediating links 
which could make civil society cohere with the political state in an organic whole. In the 
legislature in which both the monarch and the executive participate and this intertwining of all 
powers within the legislative is taken as the condition which warrants their organic character, as 
we have seen, the ‘democratic element’ of the many is effectively excluded remaining 
unrepresented or it is merely assigned a ‘symbolic representation’ in the representative assembly 
(CHDS, 131). The executive as the civil administration consists of a strict hierarchy subordinated 
to the apex of the state, the monarch, who appoints and authorises its personnel. The bureaucracy 
itself which is constituted as the ‘corporation’ of the political state treats the state as its private 
property (CHDS, p. 108) and follows its own particular interests.110        
        The butt of criticism is received by the institution of the monarch presented by Hegel as the 
apex of the state’s power system. A major defect of the monarchical principle concerns the issue 
of incumbency. Hegel supports hereditary monarchy and this commits him necessarily to natural 
birth as the criterion for selection of the incumbent to the supreme political post of the state. It is 
quite irrational to suppose that any ‘rational’ state should elevate a natural accident like birth and 
the natural features associated with such accident into the highest principle of its political 
constitution. To reduce the personification of state sovereignty to such a natural phenomenon 
naturalises political rule and makes the ‘state as the existence of a people as a whole’ (CHDS, p. 
144) to appear as an attachment of the sovereign’s ‘naturally’ held sovereignty. The people 
instead of being the actual basis of the constituted state sovereignty appear to be constituted by 
                                                            
110 Hal Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, vol. I:  State and Bureaucracy (New York: Monthly Review 
Press, 1977), p. 82. 
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the sovereign’s person. The fundamental relationship of politico-symbolic representation which 
rests at the basis of the constitutional state and in which the sovereign is meant to represent ‘his’ 
people and not the people to represent their sovereign, has been inverted. If:      
 
 he is sovereign only as the representative of the united people, then he is himself only a 
representative and symbol of the sovereignty of the people. The sovereignty of the people 
is not based on him, but he on it. (CHDS, p. 85).  
 
       The foundation of any kind of state sovereignty is the people as a whole. For in the absence 
of the people no state sovereignty could ever possibly exist. It has been established on a reading 
of the Roman lex regia, already from the 14th century onwards, that ‘the community was always 
the true and permanent repository of power whatever the form of government’111 and this 
constitutional doctrine explains the otherwise odd remarks made by Marx when he designated 
‘democracy as the generic constitution’ and ‘the truth of monarchy’ (CHDS, p. 87) or in a similar 
vein that ‘democracy is the essence of all political constitutions’ (CHDS, p. 88).112 Accordingly, 
the political constitution of the people is always ‘the life-expression of the people’ and 
consequently the ‘people make the constitution’ and ‘not the constitution the people’ (CHDS, p. 
87) as it had been thought by Hegel. In this foundational condition of the political in which the 
community of Man is the originator of state power, we see the inversion of the Hegelian political 
subject-predicate connection where instead of the political state being the subject and man the 
mere object of state action, it is man who is the creator of the Idea of the state.113  
     We have reached the result that democracy is the ‘essence of all political constitutions’ due to 
the condition that the human community is the permanent source of all forms of state 
                                                            
111 F. H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, second ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), p. 92. 
112 The principle that the community or the people as a whole is the ultimate holder of political power and the 
equation of this principle with democracy by Marx explains also the paradoxically sounding description of his of the 
‘political constitution’ of the Middle Ages as ‘a democracy of unfreedom’ where ‘[m]an was the real principle of the 
state, but man was not free’ (CHDS, p. 90).  
113 Allan Megill, The Burden of Reason: Why Marx Rejected Politics and the Market (Lanham: Rowman & 
Littlefield Pub., 2002), p. 98. 
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sovereignty. The question which naturally follows is which political constitution realises the 
essence of democracy by giving it a determinate form?   
 
democracy is the essence of all political constitutions, socialized man as a particular 
political constitution; it is related to other forms of constitution as a genus to its various 
species, only here the genus itself comes into existence and hence manifests itself as a 
particular species in relation to the other species whose existence does not correspond to 
the generic essence. (CHDS, p. 88).  
 
Democracy is socialised man as a particular political constitution. As the essence of all political 
constitutions democracy is merely a formal universality of the community’s articulation into a 
political constitution as a form of state power. To realise this essence by bringing it into real 
existence, democracy must obtain a determinate content in the form of a particular political 
constitution of communal life representative of ‘socialised man’. In this way democracy’s 
universal form of all political constitutions or its status as ‘generic constitution’ ceases to be the 
abstraction from the various species of political constitutions and becomes ‘a particular species’ 
itself next to other ‘species’ of political constitutions ‘whose existence does not correspondence 
to the generic essence’. Democracy emerges as such when its universal form meets its concrete 
instantiation as a specific political constitution corresponding to its generic essence. In this 
encounter the abstract universal becomes concretised as a species or the ‘genus itself manifests 
itself as a particular species’. ‘For this reason it is the true unity of the particular and the 
universal’ (CHDS, p. 88), the political expression of the communal being of man ‘posited as the 
people’s own creation’ (CHDS, p. 87). In democracy people cease to be merely the source or 
substance of political power and state sovereignty and become the actual authorial subject of 
state sovereignty. Democracy in Marx’s account is authentic popular sovereignty of the people’s 
self-constitution as political society. Not just a polity of their ‘own creation’ but above all ‘the 
free creation of man’ (CHDS, p. 87).  
            Sovereignty in the history of political philosophy has been conceived as necessarily 
indivisible resting in a single locus for otherwise the power conflict between different sources of 
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sovereignty is interminable and destructive of the state itself.114 This is a position accepted by 
both Hegel and Marx.115 Since we cannot have two sovereignties in one but only two ‘opposed 
conceptions’ of it, of which only one can be true and since sovereignty must express the ‘demos 
as a whole’ (CHDS, p. 87) and not be embodied in a part superimposed on the whole, then all 
forms of government which presuppose the separation of the political state from the people and 
prescribe the assignation of political power to bodies which function independently of the people 
even if they claim to ‘represent’ them do not satisfy the standard of Marxian democracy.  
     Only democracy satisfies the rational condition of being the identity of ‘both form and 
content’ of establishing as the universal end the common affairs of the society and in being 
actually ‘the free creation’ of the social co-participation of all members of society in its self-
determination, a recognition and realisation of our human essence as a universalistic social 
species-being. 
        In real democracy, law-making together with the constitution, the political state tout court, 
ought to be re-appropriated by the people as a societal whole and be its ‘determinate content’ as 
an expression of the ‘self-determination of the people’ (CHDS, p. 89). Law itself must be the 
‘incarnation of reason’, of the people’s will as ‘species-will’ [Gattungswillen] (CHDS, p. 120) 
and not a political product issuing as if by the ‘blind necessity of nature’ (CHDS, p. 118). 
Therefore in Marx’s democracy the legislative power must pass into the hands of the demos and 
be an expression of their self-government not be merely a power exercised by a separate law-
making representative organ governing in the name of the people as in the representative 
republic.  
       In democracy also, the executive power of the state ‘is the property of the whole people’ 
(CHDS, p. 116). Thus, active participatory involvement of the whole in the executive operation 
of the democratic community becomes its ethical norm. What is crucial in the ‘true state’, a 
universalistic state to which all are equal participant members, says Marx, is not that every 
citizen should have ‘the chance’ to be employed in the ‘particular class’ whose function is the 
execution of the universal interest (Hegel’s civil administration as the ‘universal class’) ‘but the 
                                                            
114 Jean Bodin, On Sovereignty,  ed. by J. H. Franklin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 27, 92.   
115 ‘[I]t is part of the concept of sovereignty that it cannot exist in a double form, to say nothing of an opposed, 
antagonistic one.’ (CHDS, p. 86). 
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capacity of the universal class to be really universal, i.e. to be the class of every citizen’ (CHDS, 
112). Thus in the ‘true’ democratic state sharing in the executive power of the state must be 
universal and all citizens should partake in its exercise. It follows that the existence of the 
bureaucracy as an independent, particular and self-enclosed ‘corporation of the state’ pursuing 
the ‘universal interest’ as a distinctive ‘particular interest’ and thus in conflict with all other 
particular interests (CHDS, pp. 106-7) should cease to exist and this can happen only when the 
executive power and the management of the administrative functions (including the judiciary) as 
the universal interest really becomes the particular interest of all which in turn means that the 
particular interest has been universalised (CHDS, p. 109), that is, distributed and held by all the 
members of the democratic community.   
     The realisation of democracy does not necessarily lead to the elimination of the political state. 
This is one of the two options left to the self-constitution of the democratic community. We 
could have alternatively the presence of political functions and agencies which implement 
particular purposes with the proviso that such ‘political state’ reflects a particular form of 
existence of the people and it does not ‘assume the significance of the universal’ (CHDS, p. 88) 
concealing its particularity. The genuineness of democracy consists in being the authentic 
expression of the communal self, its self-representation in political constitution. If the democratic 
community articulates its political mode of existence as a distinctive apparatus handling the 
communal affairs then such political power complex ought not to dissimulate its existence as the 
universal that encompasses the whole community but to limit itself to the functions it was set up 
to execute. Consequently, the political state as a distinctive complex loses its superordinate 
position and becomes subordinated to the democratic rule of society. Marx recognises that the 
political state in its developed form as political republic is a ‘form of universal reason’ albeit in 
abstractness and hence in opposition to, transcendent to and in ‘remoteness’ from the other 
spheres of society. As an expression of ‘the life of the people’ it was ‘the hardest to evolve’ in an 
historical process subtended by ‘universal reason’ (CHDS, 89) that can be called the labour of 
democratising politics.116 Democracy is not a ready-made constitutional blueprint to be adopted 
when people desire to do so but a protracted socio-historical process of humanity reclaiming its 
                                                            
116 ‘[T]he political state is a register of the practical struggles of mankind.’ Marx, letter to Ruge, Sept. 1843, MECW 
v. 3, pp. 141-145 (p. 143).  Also, S. Kouvelakis, Philosophy and Revolution: From Kant to Marx (London: Verso, 
2003), pp. 305, 310. 
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rational, communal existence as its own collective freedom. The people labour to give birth to 
novel forms of political existence that bring democracy closer to its essential character and they 
also labour through struggles and revolutions to produce the contents of democracy. In the late 
feudal world ‘civil society’ was politically constituted by the political prerogative of the 
sovereign and thus it had a direct political involvement in the affairs of the state. The political 
community was identical to this narrow ‘political class’ and in the inter-state system of the 
Germanic Empire such ‘political class’ as the political state was merely ‘the representation of 
nationality’ (CHDS, p. 137). The individual could participate in the universal life of the state 
only to the degree his social existence was mediated by his belongingness in a fixed corporate 
group which meant that the great majority of individuals who were unincorporated were 
effectively excluded from the political system and hence from the state-community. People’s 
estrangement from the system of rule led to a political revolution. Thus political emancipation 
did not come from above but it was the product of the non-political civil society (OJQ, p. 232) 
striving to attain a political existence, to universalise itself by overcoming the segmentation of 
social life into ‘separate societies within society’ pinning down the individuals under 
particularistic forms of existence and thus to negate ‘the separation of the people from its 
community’ (OJQ, p. 232). Such universality is attainable politically, according to Marx, only 
because ‘[t]he sphere of politics has been the only state-sphere in the state, the only sphere in 
which both form and content was that of the species [Gattungsinhalt], i.e. truly universal’ 
(CHDS, p. 89), that is, the political individual is ideally (in ‘form’) universalistic, unattached to 
any civil particularity and engaged with the ‘universal concerns’ of the state hence universalistic 
in ‘content’ too.            
 
4.c.  Civil Society as the Foundation of the Modern Political State 
 
        The bifurcation of the state into the political state and civil society is at the same time the 
separation of civil society from the state. This separate, independent existence of civil society is 
the principal condition of the modern political world (CHDS, p. 137). It is the other pole of the 
antinomy that vitiates modern society. Hegel is aware that if the mediating links, the ethical duty 
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of citizenship, patriotism, civic trust, regulative and welfare agencies, overseeing authorities, 
corporate associations as intermediary bodies, parliaments as representative assemblies of the 
‘many’, and the civil service as a ‘universal class’ serving the universal end and being a 
meritocratic institution open to all, that integrate civil society with the political state are de-
legitimated and lose their organic character then the state as an ethical organism does not have 
any chances of self-preservation.117 In such a case the state becomes an arena of conflicting 
particular interests that fight over its ‘universal and permanent resources’ (PR §199, p. 233) or it 
gradually disappears and the political community reverts to a ‘state of nature’ with its contingent 
atrocities. So Hegel is cognisant of the disastrous consequences that follow if the political state is 
uncoupled from civil society. His inability to ground philosophically the organic coupling of the 
two spheres stems from his attempt to construct the rational state as a hybrid ‘mixture’ of pre-
modern (prior to the French revolution) obsolete political institutions and the modern 
constitutional state so that its ‘syncretism’, like the conflation of the ‘medieval-estates system’ 
with the modern ‘legislature’ (CHDS, p. 163), can vouchsafe the state-spirit’s continuity and 
trivialise the revolutionary genesis of the political republic.  
Hegel’s constitutional model has contradictorily conflated the pre-modern political 
constitution of civil society as estates with the modern civil society within which the ‘class of 
private citizens’ are not permeated by political distinctions but have only ‘social differences in 
private life’ (CHDS, p. 146). In comparison to Hegel, the ‘theories’ of the ‘representative 
constitution’ are a ‘great advance’ because they express in ‘undisguised form’ the contradiction 
of the modern state, the real separation of the political state from civil society (CHDS, pp. 141, 
137), completed by the French Revolution (CHDS, p. 146). The political republic conceived as 
‘representative system’ reflects the historical change whereby ‘the individual members of the 
people became equal in the heaven of their political world’ though remained ‘unequal in society’ 
(CHDS, p. 146). As a consequence both conceptions reflect the duality at the core of the modern 
state without overcoming theoretically the reflected ‘dualism’ in their accounts. The actual state 
of modern civil society is its division into a ‘social order’ of community life forms and the realm 
of an individualising political sphere. The private citizen in order to attain ‘the status of citizen of 
the state’ and obtain political significance and efficacy must withdraw from all ‘available forms 
                                                            
117 Georgios Daremas, ‘The ‘‘Lebenswelt’’ of the State in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right’, in A. Arndt, P. Cruysberghs 
and A. Przylebski (eds) Das Leben denken, vol. 1 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2006), pp. 335-346  (p. 337).  
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of community’ in civil life into a ‘pure unadorned individuality’ (CHDS, p. 143). To enter the 
realm of the political society the private citizen must abstract from his social embedment and 
consider himself as a denuded individuality. The political republic as ‘representative system’ 
recognises participation of the citizen in the political community which realises the higher 
substance of the human being only under the universality of ‘abstract individuality’ and its 
resultant formal equality.118 
A new formation of social life has emerged in the modern civil society. In contrast to the 
former rigidified political civil society constituted by the political state, in modern society:  
   
distinctions are variable and fluid and their principle is that of arbitrariness. The chief 
criteria are those of money and education [...] The principle underlying civil society is 
neither need, a natural moment, nor politics. It is a fluid division of masses whose various 
formations are arbitrary and without organization. The only noteworthy feature is that the 
absence of property and the class of immediate labour, of concrete labour, do not so 
much constitute a class of civil society as provide the ground on which the circles of civil 
society move and have their being’ (CHDS, pp. 146-7). 
 
     Civil life lacks any patterns of social organisation such that the individuals could be classified 
under distinctive class groupings. The multitudes of individuals are contingent aggregates 
‘dispersed into its atoms’ (CHDS, p. 142) whose division is fluid and the formation of social 
circles which seem to depend on money and education are equally arbitrary, manifestations of 
civil society’s underlying principle of arbitrariness. The existence of a class of manual labourers 
who seem to compose a distinctive class does not partake in the life of civil (bourgeois) society 
and it is rather a material substrate by which civil life ensures its social enjoyment.119 The 
                                                            
118 Marx had defined ‘abstract individuality’ in his dissertation as ‘freedom from being, not freedom in being’. 
Difference between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, MECW v. 1, pp. 25-106 (p. 62). 
119 The identification of a ‘class of immediate labour’ in the underbelly of civil society can be plausibly construed as 
a first indication of the class composition of bourgeois society. But the grasp of the principle of class constitution by 
which ‘the class in its turn assumes an independent existence as against the individuals, so that the latter find their 
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distinguishing feature of the modern society in comparison to the preceding one is that ‘civil 
society does not sustain the individual as a member of a community, as a communal being 
[Gemeinwesen]’ (CHDS, p. 147) which indicates that all communal ties have been dissolved and 
the individual’s social life has been transformed into an independent private existence.120 Marx 
sees modern civil (bourgeois) society as the ‘logical conclusion of the principle of individualism’ 
where individualistic existence is the ‘ultimate goal’ and social activity, work, recreation, 
spiritual aims, cultivation of personality, have turned into mere means (CHDS, p. 147). Since the 
principle of individualism’ is the universal principle which shapes the life of individuals in civil 
society and the modern political state is characterised by the acknowledgment of abstract 
individuality as the basis of the formation of its political community we can infer that civil 
society is the real source of determination of the abstract political state rather than the reverse as 
was argued by Hegel. (CHDS, p. 158).121 
      The absoluteness of the principle of individualism dissolves all the erstwhile social bonds 
that united actual men in an interdependent communal co-existence. The individual is abstracted 
from his sociality in his actual empirical situation since the social determinations that previously 
defined his essential social being as a member of a particular community through which he 
sustained his ‘station in life’ have now become purely exoteric and contingently exercised upon 
him. These external determinations are necessary for his existence but the bond which they 
furnish in tying him to the social whole is a bond he can ‘cast away’ at will (CHDS, p. 147). So 
the individual becomes necessarily a one-sided formal existence, a generic abstraction in his 
empirical individuality and set apart and in opposition to the substantive self he formerly had as 
communal being. This constitution of the individual in the modern civil society as abstract 
individuality is isomorphic to the one-sided formal abstraction of the citizen as separate from his 
social being presupposed by the political state. But the isomorphism between the abstract 
individuality in civil society and of the citizen as member of the political republic is not a mere 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
conditions of life predetermined, and have their position in life and hence their personal development assigned to 
them by their class’ is surely absent. (my emphasis). Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, pp. 85-6.   
120 Marx nowhere mentions that modern civil society is an ‘economic sphere’ as it is mis-labeled by David Leopold, 
The Young Karl Marx: German philosophy, modern politics, and human flourishing (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007), p. 63. The Marxian emphasis is shed on the independent individualistic comportment of 
private persons.   
121 On Marx’s persistent criticism that Hegel transforms the ‘empirical’ into the ‘speculative’ and then attributing the 
origin of the ‘empirical’ to speculative reason, see: D. Leopold, The Young Karl Marx, pp. 48-9.    
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reflection but an inverted reflection. For while individuality in civil society is singular and exists 
as such, in the political state abstract individuality is meaningful only as a political universality 
of the individual constituting the political community. Therefore the ‘atomism of society’ 
reflects itself in an inverted form as the political universalism of the political state with its duty 
to promote the universal end while it itself only universalises the atomisation of the abstract 
political citizen since it acknowledges him only as such. The duplication of atomised civil 
society into the sphere of a separate universalising political state suggests that ‘the political state 
is an abstraction from civil society’ (CHDS, p. 145). The duplication of civil society into the 
separate political state is reflected also within the citizen himself. The political state in its 
empirical existence constitutes the ‘bureaucratic order’ of society. This order stands remote to 
the private citizen and treats him as the ‘material’ of state activity. On the other hand, the private 
citizen is ‘part of the social order, the order of civil society’ (CHDS, p. 143) occupied with his 
private concerns. Consequently, if the private citizen is to exist as a ‘citizen of the state’, his true 
vocation under the condition that he ought to realise his universal self as species-being, then he 
must partake of the two orders simultaneously and given their division ‘he must therefore divide 
up his own essence. As a real citizen he finds himself in a double organization’ (CHDS, p. 143). 
We could draw the consequence derived from this antinomic situation the citizen finds himself in 
the modern state by saying that as private person he is the real object of the state’s bureaucracy 
while at the same time as citizen he is the imaginary sovereign subject of the state.          
The bestowal of a permanent political role to private property in the system of political 
representation by Hegel compels Marx to grapple with the salience of private property in the 
constitution of the political state. Hegel assigns permanent political representation to the landed 
gentry via the institution of primogeniture which bequeaths the whole land to the first born male 
and thus keeps the property intact and ensures ‘independence of means’, a prerequisite for Hegel 
for the growth of a political orientation ‘beyond’ any particularistic interests and thus conducive 
to an ‘unharnessed’ service of the common affairs. Since in primogeniture landed property is 
transferred from generation to generation, its existence transcends the life-span of its successive 
owners. And since Hegel had tied the possession of land property to its possessor’s 
‘independent’ will formation it follows that the real determination of individual will is private 
property itself rather than the free volition of the owner himself. Private property itself emerges 
as ‘the subject of will; the will survives only as the predicate of private property’ (CHDS, p. 
113 
 
168). A real inversion takes place. Private property emerges as the substantive characteristic of 
the human personality and human will as the quintessence of freedom turns into a ‘property of 
property’. Given that all the contemporary forms of political representation in the state’s 
legislature presupposed property qualifications, it becomes plausible to claim, as Marx does, that 
the abstract political state in the semblance of its independence from private property is actually 
‘the power of private property itself’ and what remains to the state is ‘the illusion that it 
determines where it is in fact determined’ (CHDS, p. 168).  
      Marx in connection to property makes an association that underpins his later mature writings. 
Since society is the necessary socio-material substratum constitutive of private property and the 
latter is legally recognised by the representative ‘will of society’, private property is directly or 
indirectly ‘conditioned by its connections with the wealth of the whole society, with property 
conceived as social property’ and thus there ‘is no true private property’ (CHDS, p. 166) as a 
kind of natural endowment. Private property is in a sense a practical illusion albeit with very real 
effects. 
      Any theory of democracy must conceptualise a rational state within which people’s 
sovereignty is or can be self-consciously actualised. Marx’s critique of both Hegel’s 
constitutional state and of the representative republic castigates the disembodied character of 
existing ‘democracy’ as pure formalism where the ‘democratic element’ participates only ‘in 
abstraction’ in an ‘abstract political state’ divorced from the ‘universal affairs’ of the actual 
society. The first step to remedy this schism is the actualisation of political democracy via the 
consolidation of genuine popular representation through ‘electoral reform’ and the 
universalisation of suffrage (CHDS, p. 191).122  For only ‘[i]n his political role the member of 
civil society breaks away from his class, his real private position; only then does he come into his 
own as a human being, only then does his determination as the member of a state, as a social 
being, appear as his human determination’ (CHDS, p. 147). If political democracy secures the 
manifestation of the will of the people that is knowledgeable and bound to ‘the laws of reason’ 
(CHDS, p. 120) then a major precondition have been set to overcome political democracy itself. 
For the ‘republic’s political life’ is ‘the negation of the estrangement’ characteristic of the 
monarchical state’s ceremonial politics premised on the exclusion of the people but such 
                                                            
122 Kosmas Psychopedis, Norms and Antinomies in Politics (Athens: Polis, 1999), pp. 463-4.   
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negation by the republic takes place only ‘within its own sphere’ leaving the separate civil 
society unaltered. (CHDS, p. 90). Universal participation in the political community does not 
guarantee but it actualises the possibility of annulment of the separation between political state 
and civil society by eliminating both simultaneously and ‘elevating’ the human qua social 
essence divided between political and private existence to its true identity as a non-fragmented 
communal social existence of humanity. 
      Marx responds to the constitutive schism of modernity between its abstract political 
universalism and its crass particularism of self-regarding individualistic civil society by offering 
the normatively grounded ‘utopian’ solution of the de-differentiation of the political state from 
civil/bourgeois society into a novel societal configuration where ‘political power’ is not a 
separate power apart from the community’s organisation of its trans-individual ‘social forces’. 
By this social appropriation of the state’s ‘universal political power’ (OJQ, p. 232) the 
transcendence of the abstract forms of the political and the civil is achieved. This requires that 
the individual person ‘has become a species-being in his empirical life, his individual work and 
his individual relationships’ (OJO, p. 234) that is, universalistic through and through in respect 
to all others whom he ought to treat as pure human beings, equal co-participants in the realisation 
of their communal being or ‘species-life itself, society’ (OJQ, p. 230). The transformation of 
empirical life into species-existence has as its final precondition the ‘abolition of the market and 
the conditions which give rise to it’ (OJQ, p. 241) suggesting that the commercialisation of civil 
life and the reign of the principle of private property are the ultimate impediments to the human 
species’ s realisation. Hence, the democratic polity that realises human emancipation and the 
organisation of man’s ‘social forces’ (OJQ, p. 234) must lie beyond the provenance of private 
property. This is societal democracy’s presupposition if it is to supersede the divided essence of 
communal social life rent into the private, egoistic individual, the ‘self-enclosed monad’ on the 
one hand and the universalistic, ‘abstract’ political existence of the citizen on the other.  
    In the next chapter, we address Marx’s criticism of the duality of political representation in 
Hegel’s state, his critique of the abstract political individuality of the representative republic and 
his idea of social representation as the kind of social relationship that expresses the communal 
essence of the human species being.     
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Chapter 5 
 
Marx’s Critique of Political Representation and the Social Representation of the Species-
being 
 
      In this chapter I present Marx’s critique of political representation as it is articulated in the 
two major texts of 1843, the Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State and On the Jewish 
Question. The basic claim Marx addresses against the modern institution of political 
representation is that it is impregnated and socially circumscribed by the dominant form of civil 
society, the bourgeois organisation of social life as a gamut of self-regarding interests based on 
‘practical need’. The bourgeois form of social existence thrives by securing a deeply entrenched 
divide between the private (socio-economic life) and the public (the political sphere). The divide 
is such that the question of ‘human emancipation’ becomes excluded as a possibility from the 
social agenda.  
       The theoretical accounts of liberalism and the Hegelian approach that attempt to provide a 
coherent argument for the place of political representation in the institutional complex of the 
modern state so as to ground the state’s ‘democratic’ character on the one hand and to 
acknowledge the socio-ethical import of political representation as a guarantee of the stability of 
the rational state on the other, fail as long as the divide between civil society and the political 
state remains in place and the ‘political community’ as a human species bond is left subordinated 
to the sway of the market society. The Hegelian account fails because his notion of political 
representation does not admit of equality of citizen representation in the affairs of the state and 
this belies the principle of universality of freedom that must be expressed by Hegel’s ‘rational 
state’. The liberal account fails because though it acknowledges universality of political 
representation of the individuals, it assumes this universality to be an aggregate of wills lacking 
the necessary unity that renders the political community an organic whole.   
Nevertheless, in Marx’s account, political representation in so far as it reflects the possibility of 
the identity of the citizen being a universalistic being overcoming his particularistic attachments 
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provides a stepping stone for the ultimate transcendence into a form of human consciousness that 
acknowledges social representation as the essential structural relation constitutive of the human 
species-being. Marx’s critique is launched from the normative perspective of the ‘species-being’ 
as the ideal standard of which the ‘really rational state’ should be a concrete instantiation.  
  
5.a.  The Critique of Hegel’s and Liberalism’s Conception of Political Representation    
 
    Marx focuses his critique on Hegel’s criticism of the democratic liberal conception of 
representative politics. Hegel distinguishes the social estates constituting the membership of civil 
society into the ‘fluctuating element’ and the ‘immobile element’ (landed property) each 
corresponding respectively to the bicameral constitution of the political state that Hegel deems 
appropriate. For Marx, Hegel has wrongly conflated two opposing principles of representation, 
the ‘hierarchical representation’ with the ‘political representation’ which rather than being 
‘different manifestations of the same principle’ they are ‘two essentially different principles’ 
corresponding to distinctive social conditions, the principle of ‘political representation’ 
expressing ‘the political constitution of civil society in the modern sense’ whilst ‘hierarchical 
representation’ is pre-modern (CHDS, p. 182). Since ‘hierarchical representation’ in the chamber 
of peers by ‘right’ belongs to the landed estate whereas political representation to the chamber of 
deputies is effected by election then there is no effective political universality of the members of 
civil society. The two estates do not obtain representation in the state as common members of it, 
as an ‘empirical universal’, but their distinctive particular social situation assigns them a 
differential mode of participation in the general affairs of the state. Furthermore, the Hegelian 
idea of representation juggles conceptually the political with the social. The fact that the ‘landed 
gentry’, the nobility can participate in the legislature ‘by birthright’, that is on the basis of a 
political prerogative means that political representation for them is not separate from their social 
being. They do not have to exit the particularity of social existence within civil society in order 
to enter the universal realm of the political state. ‘[T]he legislature is an attribute of their 
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empirical person; they are there not as deputies but in their own right.’ (CHDS, p. 181).123 In 
contrast the ‘second estate’ is mired in the social particularity of its civil existence and in order to 
elevate itself to the domain of ‘rational deliberation’ and acquire a political role in the general 
affairs of the state it must elect deputies so as to be politically represented. It follows that the 
members of the state community do not share the same ‘empirical’ status universally since the 
one class’s social being is directly political whilst the rest live under a divide between their social 
life and the higher form of political participation in the representative organs of the state.124 The 
same stricture applies to the ‘corporations’ which are meant to be the agencies through which 
civil society can achieve its political representation. They are legally constituted by the political 
state as particular corporate bodies and by having the exclusive political ‘right’ to represent 
themselves politically it means a) that their social standing is directly coincidental with their 
political capacity to be represented and b) that the right of political representation is not really 
political in the sense of it being universally attached to ‘citizenship’ but a privilege afforded to ‘a 
particular existent being’ therefore annulling the universality of right or law constitutive of the 
political sphere. (CHDS, p. 185).      
    These tensions vitiating Hegel’s understanding of the role of political representation as the 
vehicle that allows the un-political civil society to integrate itself into the representative political 
system is the product of his attempt to marry within the political framework of the ‘rational state’ 
the co-existence of a medieval hierarchical organisation of the estates with the ‘abstract political 
existence’ of modern civil society (CHDS, p. 182). In this regard, the French post-revolutionary 
constitutions which reflected the formation of the modern political sphere as ‘the abstraction of 
civil society from itself’ and thus they have produced ‘the political principle itself’ (CHDS, p. 
183) are more advanced than Hegel’s constitutional model of a rational political order. 
    The fundamental political reason for the advance of political democracy over constitutional 
monarchy is the prioritisation of the legislature over the executive power and thus of the 
expression of popular representation. Whenever the legislature has emerged as ‘the dominant 
factor’ it has brought forth ‘great, organic, universal revolutions’ because ‘the legislature acted 
                                                            
123 Elsewhere Marx calls the owners of entailed estates ‘born legislators’ who, in Hegel’s account, are assigned  the 
role ‘of representatives of the body politic’ through ‘selection by birth’ (CHDS, p. 173). 
124 Marx’s view of ‘hierarchical representation’ contests Leopold’s reading that in Hegel representation involves 
‘central representative institutions’ and not ‘assemblies with restricted memberships’. D. Leopold, The Young Karl 
Marx, p. 59.  
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as the representative of the people, of the species-will [Gattungswillen]’, (CHDS, pp. 119-120). 
The democratic representative polity, through the legislature, aligns the character of the state in 
conformity to the general will of the people and thus it progresses in accordance with the 
people’s development (CHDS, p. 119), whereas in regimes where the executive reigns supreme, 
the executive power is ‘the representative of the particular will’ (CHDS, p. 120) and the political 
order is subject to arbitrariness and irrationality. The constitutional priority of the legislature over 
the executive power is not a democratic panacea for there exists historically the possibility of ‘an 
irrational people’ whose representation of will as law would not result in the ‘rational 
organization of the state’.  The ultimate defence against populist irrationalism according to Marx 
rests on respect of ‘reason’ which is ‘a matter of knowledge than will’ and so reason’s tribunal is 
the insuperable limitation of will so that ‘[t]he will of a people may not transcend the laws of 
reason any more than the will of an individual’ (CHDS, p. 120). It follows that under the 
constraint of the ‘laws of reason’ (die Gesetze der Vernunft) legislative practice ‘does not make 
the law’ unconditionally but in being guided by reason ‘it only discovers and formulates’ the 
law. (CHDS, p. 120). 125           
     Such advance of the modern liberal democratic principle of the abstract political universality 
of the citizen over the contradictorily compound constitutional state propounded by Hegel does 
not imply that the former is bereft of problems of its own. Marx treads on the footsteps of Hegel 
himself who castigated the liberal democratic conception for abstract universalism that 
disregards the concrete empirical organisation of the particular social estates of civil society (PR 
§ 308R, p. 347). The basic idea of democratic liberalism is that the totality of citizens or ‘every 
member of the people is an equal participant in popular sovereignty’ regardless of social 
distinctions ‘based on birth, rank, education and occupation’ (OJQ, p. 219). The singular 
individual as citizen is considered in abstraction from his social embedment in civil society and 
the dominance of practical egoism and self-interest that pervades it.   
    Hegel considers the liberal democratic view to be highly problematical because it rests on the 
abstract idea of state membership which by itself is taken to confer on everyone the right to 
                                                            
125 The ‘laws of reason’ as limiting condition of legislative activity is ignored in Teeple’s account while he attributes 
law-making to the executive power. Marx’s Critique of Politics, pp. 80-1. Kouvelakis also neglects the normative 
limitation the ‘laws of reason’ set to the legislative will of the people and thus he is misled to characterise it as 
‘absolute’. Philosophy and Revolution, p. 295.       
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participate individually into the general affairs of the state thus destroying the rational 
organisation of the state which in turn is based on the articulation of the various social estates 
constituting the state as a concrete whole. This liberal democratic abstraction amounts to the 
implantation into the state organism of ‘a democratic element devoid of rational form’ (PR § 
308R, p. 347). Marx’s response reveals his democratic credentials. It is not a pre-existing 
‘rational form’ of the state to which the ‘democratic element’ ought to accommodate itself but 
‘the democratic element should rather be the real element which confers a rational form on the 
organism of the state as a whole.’ (CHDS, pp. 185-6). How can a state be rational, i.e., grounded 
on the universal self-determination of the members it consists of, if it either excludes the 
majority of its members from participation in its affairs or if it acknowledges the ‘democratic 
element’ only on condition that the latter abides to an externally imposed, pre-established 
heteronomous rationality?         
     Marx addresses the Hegelian dilemma of whether ‘direct democracy’ as participation of all 
individuals in political deliberation of the general state affairs is preferable on grounds of 
principle or ‘indirect’ participation of the ‘mass of individuals’ through deputies is more 
amenable to the proper political functioning of the state. If direct participation of all individuals 
in public deliberation involves an ‘essential contradiction’ in Hegel’s viewpoint, it rather 
involves an ‘actual contradiction’, the prosaic problem that the sheer magnitude of the mass of 
participants negates the possibility of effective deliberation126 and this is ‘still the best argument 
against the direct participation of all’. (CHDS, p. 186). For Marx, either horn of the dilemma is a 
non-solution to the problem of the political representation of civil society since the very 
formation of the problem itself is a determined consequence of the existence of the ‘abstract 
political state’ and it arises solely for it. (CHDS, p. 187). 
   Hegel summarises the liberal democratic view in the proposition ‘All, as individuals, should 
share in deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern’ taken up by Marx 
(CHDS, p. 186), in order to bring to light his essential opposition to the conception of (political) 
universality underpinning the liberal conception. It must be noted that Marx bypasses the explicit 
distancing of Hegel’s standpoint from the liberal view and assumes that Hegel shares a similar 
                                                            
126 For proposals to address the quantitative problem of political deliberative input in large constituencies, though 
within the frame of the separation of governmental power from civil society, see: James S. Fishkin, Democracy and 
Deliberation: New Directions for Democratic Reform (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), pp. 81-104. 
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view by the fact that he had defined the social estates as the ‘empirical universal’ which by 
political representation seeks to establish itself as an ‘explicit universal’ whereby the ‘concerns 
of the state’ become the concerns of all the state members. Marx’s critical stress vis-a-vis the 
liberal conception that acknowledges the universality of individuals as political participants in 
the state is that the universality in question must become an overall political unity.           
 
In a really rational state one could reply: ‘Not all, as individuals should share in 
deliberating and deciding on political matters of general concern, for ‘individuals’ do share 
in deliberating and deciding on matters of general concern as ‘all’, i.e. within society and 
as the members of society. Not all as individuals, but the individuals as all. (CHDS, p.186)             
 
 
      All the individuals being members of one society by producing and consuming and 
interacting with each other contribute to the general matters of society shaping it as a single unit. 
Society is the combined result of their individual efforts. But this overall singleness of society as 
a whole does not find its political counterpart in the state. The rational state ought to be 
organised as a political association which reflects the organic wholeness which the social 
members enjoy. All must be capable to partake in the formation of the political whole in a way 
that it is not a mere aggregation of their individual wills but the concerted outcome of them as a 
unitary political community. This unitary political community in Marx is democratic par 
excellence for it exhibits inclusion of all individuals in their concernment over political matters, 
it affords equality in individuals’ contribution to the deliberation of the common affairs (no 
distinction between ‘hierarchical’ and ‘political’ representation that privileges one segment over 
others), and freedom in deciding the general matters in-togetherness (‘as all’).  
    In juxtaposing to the totality constituted by ‘all as individuals’ his formula of the totality of 
‘individuals as all’ Marx is stressing the element of active unity formed by the individuals as an 
entity that exceeds their mere aggregation as individuals. It emerges as a unitary entity that 
surpasses each individual element taken severally though composed by these very individuals. It 
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is a kind of unity that is the unity of a kind. As political, this kind of unity amounts to a ‘general 
will’ irreducible to the addition of particular wills even if no particular will is excluded from 
being counted in. This type of unity of the universality of societal members suggests that the 
individuals self-consciously posit their own unity in a way that encompasses a specific socio-
political communal relationship that transcends their existence as a collection of individuals co-
existing ‘externally’ or next to each other. Formally, the unity is a set of individual elements 
whose inner connection constitutes a distinct but not separate element of the set.127  
     The liberal idea of the political aggregation of individuals as an ‘abstract universality’ that 
does not reflect the interconnectedness of the social members into an organic whole is criticised 
by Marx in stressing that the aggregation of the individuals however extensive it may be, it does 
not express a real connection between the individuals themselves and thus it does not constitute 
an aspect of their individuality. Rather, the individual is conceived abstractly in separation from 
the concrete social interrelations he is entangled with, construed simply as an ‘abstract 
individuality’. 
 
‘Allness’, the aggregate, is not an essential, mental, real attribute of the individual. An 
aggregate is not acquired at the cost of one’s abstract individuality. Instead, the aggregate is 
only the complete sum of individuality. One individual, many individuals, all individuals. 
One, many, all – none of these determinations affects the essence of the subject, of the 
individual. (CHDS, p. 187).   
 
    Whatever the numerical size of the constituency is, it does not affect the mode of existence of 
political subjects or citizens in a representative polity conceived under the sign of abstract 
individuality. Citizens under representative government are considered as atomised. State 
                                                            
127 An empirical instance of this unity is the combined force that cooperative production creates. The strength that 
results from team-work that would neither exist in the absence of the team members nor if there were present but 
working singly and their work product was simply added up. The relation of cooperation is the inner bond that 
distinguishes this unity from an aggregate. In Marx’s words, the ‘social force’ effected by ‘combined labour’ is ‘the 
creation of a new productive power, which is intrinscically a collective one’ (Cap. I, p. 443). In a similar vein, 
Aristotle in presenting one of the main arguments in defence of democracy pinpoints that when people ‘assemble 
together’, the resultant supra-individual unity (ouh os ekaston alla os sympantas) ‘collectively and as a body, 
although not individually’ surpasses ‘the quality of the few best’. Politics, p. 108 [1281a39].     
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conferral of political status denudes them of any social reference. Social class position, status, 
beliefs and attitudes do not shape the political character of the abstract individuality. This 
extinction of (socially) qualitative distinctions permits their reduction to number and hence their 
addition in lesser or greater aggregates. The quantification of the citizen qua political monad 
renders the question of participation of all or of some in the legislature, irrelevant since in either 
case it is a matter of indifferent magnitude and of formal representation.128 
     The division of the political state from civil society means that the individual when he obtains 
a political presence in the political state has to leave behind or ignore all the social ties in which 
he is enmeshed. Consequently, political participation of the individual in abstraction from his 
social embedment necessitates a separation within the individual between his political function 
and the particularity of his civil existence.  
The perfected political state is by its nature the species-life of man in opposition to his 
material life. [...] Where the political state has attained its full degree of development man 
leads a double life, [...] not only in his mind, in his consciousness, but in reality. He lives 
in the political community, where he regards himself as a communal being, and in civil 
society, where he is active as a private individual, regards other men as means, debases 
himself to a means and becomes a plaything of alien powers. (OJQ, p. 220).   
 
       The separateness of the realm of politics from social life duplicates itself as an internal 
schism in the consciousness of the individual. This interior chasm holds the individual in 
perennial tension between the universalistic political role he is called upon to perform and the 
social vicissitudes he is exposed to. The same tension is reflected in the disjunction between the 
consideration of the universal interest that the political role demands and the actual particularistic 
interests reflecting his positioning in the bourgeois social order. The incompatibility of the 
political and civil spheres that pervades the individual makes his double self conditioned by his 
‘double life’ to subsist in contradiction. To partake in the political domain he must bracket his 
social empirical essence.129 To accommodate himself in private life he must denounce the 
                                                            
128 G. Teeple, Marx’s Critique of Politics, p. 79.       
129 Especially his or her forms of group-based social existence like social class, gender, race, ethnicity. The 
contemporary version of ‘abstract political individuality’, the so-called ‘procedural fairness’ theory of political 
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universalistic aspect of his political self, his inclusion in the identicalness of abstract political 
individuality. To realise the common good as the universal interest he is called to transcend self-
interested pursuits. If he affirms the latter he experiences his difference ‘between the living 
individual and the citizen’ (OJQ, p. 221). The integrity of personhood is dissolved into the 
alternate tergiversation of political commitment and privatistic engagement. Instead of the unity 
of the social self, the disunity of the civil and political selves is expressed. Political 
representation of the schizoid individual condemns him to either have his social particularity 
extinguished in the purity of political abstractness or if he prioritises the representation of his 
private interests then the ‘ideal superiority’ of the sphere of politics as the realm of the 
communal realisation of politically emancipated man is derogated to the service of the financial 
power that reigns supreme in civil society (OJQ, p. 238). 
     The insuperable impasse of ‘political democracy’ which regards man, ‘not just one man but 
all men as a sovereign and supreme being’ but disregards the actuality of man who ‘is not yet a 
true species-being’ in ‘his contingent existence’, in his exposure ‘to the rule of inhuman 
conditions and elements by the entire organization of our society’ (OJQ, pp. 225-6) can only be 
transcended if the material presuppositions of political democracy’s rift from civil society are 
superseded. Since for Marx the material presupposition of the democratic state is civil society 
itself then only the elimination of the conditions that shape civil society’s attitudes of egoism and 
self-interest can allow the species relation of political universality to flourish. This elimination 
amounts to the abolition of ‘the market and the conditions which give rise to it’ and only thus 
‘the conflict between man’s individual sensuous existence and his species-existence will have 
become superseded’ (OJQ, p. 241).          
 
5.b.  Membership in the Marxian ‘Really Rational State’ 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
representation lacks any conceptual power to account for the systematic political ‘under-representation’ of 
historically marginalised groups. See: Melissa S. Williams, Voice, Trust, and Memory: Marginalized Groups and 
the Failings of Liberal Representation (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 4-5. 
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      To clarify the social relationship at the basis of the state or the type of connection that the 
individual might hold to the community it is appropriate to introduce a double conceptual 
contradistinction between multiplicity, collectivity and community. These three entities constitute 
forms of universality and even, in a certain respect, overlapping moments of social development 
of the interrelationship of individuals.130 
    Multiplicity can be defined as an aggregate without unity.131 It is an indefinite collection of 
individuals who can be subsumed under the same class on the basis of an identical, objective 
predicate which characterises each instance of the class (for instance, all those who are exposed 
to the same social determination or live in similar social conditions without being cognisant of 
the fact or of each other). Multiplicity is a form of universality because its lack of unity means 
that it can be extended indefinitely like the series of numbers though it lacks the latter’s seriatim 
ordering. The individuals in the multiplicity are completely indifferent and unrelated to each 
other. As such the multiplicity lacks the power of representation either political or social for it 
lacks any sense of common identity. Even the connection of indifference or the possession of the 
identical attribute exists behind the backs, so to speak, of the individuals forming the formless 
multiplicity.132  
    Collectivity is an aggregate with a unity which is externally provided by a representation, a 
symbol, an interest, or an essential attribute to which individuals relate to consciously. It is a 
form of universality in that its unity renders it into a universal which encompasses the totality of 
all those who have the same relation to the unifying externality. The audience members of a 
television programme, the followers of a political party, the citizen-voters in a representative 
polity or the believers of a religious denomination are exemplary instances of this type of 
connection. Though the collectivity forms sorts of a body due to the unity bestowed upon it, its 
individuals are unrelated with each other. They are interrelated only through the mediation of the 
                                                            
130 Rosanvallon defines the ‘political’ in a parallel developmental way as ‘the process whereby a human collectivity, 
which is never to be understood as a simple “population”, progressively takes on the face of an actual community. 
’(emphasis mine). Pierre Rosanvallon, ‘Inaugural Lecture’, p. 34.  
131 I do not borrow the concept of ‘multiplicity’ from Alain Badiou’s similarly sounding notion of the ‘multiple-
without-oneness’. My concept refers explicitly to human individuals living in society, it is existential not 
operational. See: ‘One, Multiple, Multiplicities’ in A. Badiou, Theoretical Writings, ed. by R. Brassier and A. 
Toscano (London: Continuum, 2004), pp. 67-80, (p.70).        
132 My concept of ‘multiplicity’ encompasses Marx’s understanding of ‘multiplicity’ as diversity of ‘outward forms’ 
lacking ‘inner connection’ at the surface level. K. Marx, Theories of Surplus-Value, Part III (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1975), p. 500.    
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same relatum to which they attach themselves or recognise themselves under its auspices and 
which provides a certain overall coherence to the collective.133  The external unity of the 
collectivity secures the possibility of collective representation albeit in an alienated way since the 
formation of the collectivity comes from the outside. It is not self-positing for it lacks inner 
bonds among the individuals which could generate a self-unity. Rather it is beholden under the 
spell of the power of the representative figure (symbol, discourse, political leader, representative 
government, Godhead) to constitute the individuals as a particular collectivity. Nevertheless, the 
ability of the individual to freely enter and exit from any given collectivity testifies to the 
existence of a certain sense of freedom to associate with others. This individual freedom of 
attachment to collectives at will, reflects the riddance of ‘natural ties’ that bourgeois society 
allows to the individual consolidating his seeming independence from the web of social 
relationships.134 The unity which political democracy affords to the citizens is that of a 
collectivity. The citizens are externally connected by the representative government which 
results from the aggregate choice of their singular wills premised on the principle of political 
representation of ‘one man, one vote’.  
    The community (or commune) is a group with an organic unity. Its organic character means 
that the individuals who comprise it are interconnected with each other by an inner bond that 
constitutes their association into a social whole to which each and everyone is dependent upon. 
The individuals do not depend simply on the societal whole as an entity apart, as the mere 
precondition of their social subsistence, but they also depend upon each other by having direct 
relations with each other. By depending directly on (some) others who in turn depend upon 
others and so on, they depend indirectly or in a mediate way upon all other communal members 
hence they are interdependent overall. All forms of society from the simplest to the most 
complex are illustrations of ‘community’ even though the social processes that determine the 
communal interdependence (mode of production, division of labour, shared values or social 
ethics, communal property, system of right, form of government) may differ in their determining 
                                                            
133 This unificatory function is illustrated according to Marx by the figure of the Asiatic despot ‘in whom the unity 
of the commune exists’. (Gr, p. 493). 
134 ‘The individual in this society of free competition seems to be rid of natural ties, etc., which made him an 
appurtenance of a particular, limited aggregation of human beings in previous historical epochs.’ K. Marx, 
‘Introduction’ (1857), appendix to CCPE, pp. 188-217 (p. 188).  
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import on the shape the community takes. By being an organic totality the community constitutes 
a singular universal.  
    Community is the highest developed form of the social relationship. It involves face-to-face 
interaction between the communal members as in primitive communes or interconnection among 
societal members through the mediation of objects (in common production or in commodity 
exchange), of persons and of nature that fleshes out the interdependence of each with each other 
and with the social whole.  
     The category of the community can be distinguished into two social forms, the alienated and 
the non-alienated form of community. The alienated form of community is grounded on the 
condition that the social interdependence pervading the members’ social life has not been self-
consciously posited by them but it is ‘found already there’ as a structured mechanism that 
predetermines the life chances of the individuals. Even though it is the historical product of the 
social activity of living individuals and of past generations, the mode of organisation of the 
dominant relations and connections has not been instituted as the consequence of the exercise of 
the common will of the society at large. This is the type of social interdependence that Hegel 
identifies as constitutive of the modern civil society as a ‘system of needs’, without 
acknowledging its alienated character but assuming it as the realm of realisation of subjective 
freedom. Each particular individual works for his own end but its realisation requires the 
universal mediation of others and thus it ‘gains satisfaction by simultaneously satisfying the 
welfare of others’ (PR § 182A, p. 220). The actualisation of each selfish end necessitated by the 
mediation of the general other ‘establishes a system of all-round interdependence’ (PR § 183, p. 
221). Individuals have to act in a ‘universal way’ (orient themselves to the abstract other) to 
fulfil their own ends and so to ‘make themselves links in the chain of this continuum that ties 
them in an overall unity (PR § 187, p. 224). Hence civil society in Hegel is structured as an 
‘interdependent community’. It allows subjective freedom to the individuals to pursue their 
particular ends but its major deficiency is that the presumably resultant general welfare takes 
place behind the backs of the interrelated subjects. It is ‘unconscious necessity’ that grounds the 
communal interrelationship whereby ‘in providing for himself, the individual in civil society is 
also acting for others.’ (PR § 255A, p. 273). The communal relationship that ties the members of 
civil society into an integral whole and provides for their mutual satisfaction is neither self-
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consciously posited by them nor even present in their consciousness as the outcome of their 
concerted endeavours. They are bearers and ‘links’ in a social ‘chain’ whereby they are blind to 
their communal interconnection which emerges as both alien and itself subordinating the totality 
of particular subjectivities to its quasi-autonomous imperatives. The individuals by exercising 
their subjective freedom end up in overall unfreedom.135       
     Marx describes the alienated character of the community under the command of capital, the 
becoming independent of the social relation interconnecting the productive members of the 
‘social body’ from those same social agents who constitute it in the first place.  
 
The social character of activity, as well as the social form of the product, and the share of 
individuals in production here [in generally commodified society] appear as something 
alien and objective, confronting the individuals, not as their relation to one another, but as 
their subordination to relations which subsist independently of them and which arise out of 
collisions between mutually indifferent individuals. The general exchange of activities and 
products, which has become a vital condition – their mutual interconnection – here appears 
as something alien to them, autonomous, as a thing. (my emphasis, Gr., p. 157).  
 
    The negative ethics exuded by Marx’s critical description of the primary social relation 
shaping communal existence under capitalism indicates the emancipatory telos, the negation of 
what it is taking place, though it ought ‘not to be taking place’, that could salvage the alienated 
community. The basic social relations of production, distribution and consumption through 
which (social) individuals sustain and reproduce their life ought not to be independent from them 
and hypostasised as an alien force but be subordinated to their self-conscious communal rational 
will becoming thus the template of social representation of the community’s life expression.  
                                                            
135 Marx finds in Hegel a pattern of resolution of contradictions relevant to the realisation of ‘free spirit’ in the state, 
‘by appealing to a natural necessity antithetical to freedom. Thus the transition from the particular interest to the 
universal interest is not achieved by a conscious law of the state, but is mediated by chance and against 
consciousness. ’ (CHDS, pp. 118-9).   
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    Marx had already furnished the mould of the non-alienated community whose overall 
interconnection does not ‘subsist’ as an independent relationship, alienated as an entity apart, in 
his idea of membership in the ‘really rational state’. He contends that if individuals:  
 
[…] are a part of the state, it is obvious that their very social existence already constitutes 
their real participation in it. Not only do they share in the state, but the state is their share. 
To be a conscious part of a thing means to take part of it and to take part in it consciously. 
Without this consciousness the member of the state would be an animal. (CHDS, p. 187).  
 
     Three ideas can be derived from Marx’s concept of what it means to be a ‘member of the 
state’. The first is the necessity of consciousness mediating the relation of belonging in the state. 
This consciousness does not refer to a simple awareness of being listed as a subject under the 
sovereignty of the state and subjected to its law. It refers to a self-conscious attitude by which the 
individual voluntarily partakes of the state.136 It follows that the state itself must be a conscious 
product of the individuals participating in it. The self-conscious relationship with the state entails 
a double dimension. The individual ‘takes part’ in the state as if the state is a distinct entity 
encompassing the individual(s), and its existence as a discrete oneness, as a determinate state 
association, must be acknowledged as such. The self-conscious individuals by forming the state 
as a self-union constitute a ‘We which is an I’. Furthermore, the individual ‘takes part’ of the 
state in a conscious manner. This means that the state though distinct from the individual(s) is 
not separate from him. It does not stand at a distance as an abstract universal subsuming the 
individuals under itself. It does not appear as an external entity consisting of an objectified 
complex of political institutions in the form of the ‘political state’. Since the state is none other 
than the association of the totality of the individuals composing it then to partake of it means 
that the state is a trans-individual tie where each cognises that his contribution is essential to 
preserve the linkage of the whole made up of each. In this trans-individual interconnectivity each 
must acknowledge that he is ‘an I which is a We’. That to be an individual (member) he must be 
more than an individual, in the sense that his whole social existence is implicated in the state 
                                                            
136 David A. Duquette, ‘Marx’s Idealist Critique of Hegel’s Theory of Society and Politics’, p. 233. 
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association. And certainly to be more than a mere (human) animal which partakes in its species-
being, the unity of itself as multiplicity, unaware or unconcerned of doing so. The double aspect 
of the individual’s self-conscious membership in the state unity and through it with himself as 
otherness-in-commonality137 leads to the second idea, namely that ‘the state is their share.’ The 
condition that individuals as ‘members of the state’ ‘share in the state’ is a straightforward 
analytical judgment. As such it does not specify at all in what manner the members of the state 
relate to it. Being in the state, one or the other and ultimately ‘all’ share the identical condition of 
membership. Consequently, all of them may share the status of being inert objects treated by the 
state at (its own) will. The formal equality of state membership does not warrant necessarily the 
type of relationship they enjoy in respect to the state. They could equally well be equally 
subjected to tyrannical rule without exception or to a liberal regime that recognises universal 
equality of individual rights. 
       Nevertheless, Marx’s completion of the conceptual definition of state membership 
introduces a synthetic judgment. The totality of individuals also shares the state. Rather than 
having a mere common connection to a state standing externally to them, the individuals by 
sharing the state between themselves establish an inner connection linking each with each other. 
That ‘the state is their share’ means that they are shareholders of the state. Each particular 
(individual) is a necessary member-part in the constitution of the universal (the state). Moreover, 
in view of the fact that this relation forming the state is a self-conscious one, i.e. posited by the 
individuals themselves then their holistic interconnection is a concrete universality or a 
concretised universal. There is no negative relation between the particulars and the universal as 
in the case of the Hegelian ‘abstract universal’ where the particulars are opposed to the universal 
by not being the universal and the universal is opposed to the particulars by not being any 
particular. Since Marx’s ‘really rational state’ is meant to embody these two conditions of the 
abstract universality of common state membership and concrete universality of the state as the 
self-conscious general interconnection of the particular individuals themselves then this state 
association fulfils the condition defining the essence of democracy itself. It satisfies the essential 
conceptual determination of Marxian democracy, the identity of the formal principle (abstract 
                                                            
137 This approximates Nancy’s idea of communism as the ‘being-in-common’ of the ‘in-common of being’ as 
compearance. Jean-Luc Nancy, ‘La Comparution/The Compearance: From the Existence of  ‘‘Communism’’ to the 
Community of ‘‘Existence’’, Political Theory, 20.3 (1992), pp. 371-398 (p. 378).   
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universality) with the material or substantive principle (concrete universality). By realising the 
identity of formalism with materiality the ‘really rational state’ becomes democracy which is ‘the 
first true unity of the particular and the universal’ (CHDS, p. 88).  The political constitution of 
the democratic state is a particular product ‘posited as the people’s own creation’. It is the 
‘demos as a whole’ which institutes the particular form of its constitution; and democracy’s 
distinguishing characteristic from all other forms of government is that ‘in it the constitution is 
only one facet of the people, that the political constitution does not form the state for itself.’ 
(CHDS, p. 87).  The democratic political association of the members of the state community is 
only a dimension of their communal co-existence and does not constitute an independent domain 
in which the societal members would be formally recognised as members of a political state that 
exists for itself.             
     The Marxian democratic state with its three foundational conditions, universal inclusiveness, 
all-round social interconnectedness and society’s conscious self-articulation, constitutes the germ 
of mature Marx’s concept of communism. What remains to be specified for the completion of the 
concept of communism is the mode of distribution of the social product or the manner of sharing 
the state that pertains to socialised humanity.138 
    The third idea or conceptual component of the definition of Marx’s ‘really rational state’ is 
that the individuals’ ‘social existence already constitutes their real participation’ in the state. This 
means that they do not have to seek the realisation of their essential being, their communal 
essence as species-being in a remote realm, be it religion or politics. They would not have to 
‘exit’ society, so to speak, in order to ‘enter’ another domain so as to be recognised as equal, free 
and participants in an overall (political) union that ratifies such participation as their higher self.        
    The state as the common share of its members and the mode of their social interconnectedness 
obtains conceptual concreteness in the paradigm of a society organised along the lines of 
‘communal production’. In contrast to an exchange society where labour becomes general or 
social only indirectly through commodity exchange, and the linkage of the individuals 
necessitates the objective mediation of money which means that their linkage is imposed 
                                                            
138 The stipulated conditions for such shared distribution are formulated in an austere way in Marx, ‘Critique of the 
Gotha Programme’, in Later Political Writings ed. by T. Carver (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 
pp. 212-3.   
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externally, in communist society general labour, i.e. production by society for the sake of society 
itself, is presupposed from the outset, 
 
[General labour] would have to be posited from the outset as a link in general production. 
But on this presupposition it would not be exchange which gave labour its general 
character, but rather its presupposed communal character would determine the distribution 
of products. The communal character of production would make the product into a 
communal, general product from the outset. The exchange which originally takes place in 
production – which would not be an exchange of exchange values but of activities, 
determined by communal needs and communal purposes – would from the outset include 
the participation of the individual in the communal world of products. […] whatever the 
particular material form of the product he creates or helps to create, what he has bought 
with his labour is not a specific and particular product, but rather a specific share of the 
communal production. […] there would take place an organization of labour whose 
consequence would be the participation of the individual in communal consumption. (Gr, 
pp. 172-3).  
 
    In this description of a communally organised society the three pillars of the Marxian rational 
state re-appear in clarity. Universal inclusiveness is grounded on the indubitable ‘participation of 
the individual in the communal world’ from the outset. The universal bond of the individuals in 
their ‘very social existence’ as a social relationship that traverses them all and makes the state 
their share is exemplified by the character of communal production and consumption where the 
individual does not appropriate one or another product according to his purchasing power but the 
share of communal production that ought to be allotted to him. Lastly, the self-conscious 
character of the instituted state as a societal association is reflected in the element of positedness 
of the ‘general labour’ which must be presupposed at the outset as the organising premise for 
communal production to take place. A totality of cooperative labour that sets up by itself the 
arrangement of the ‘exchange of activities’ as precondition of production instead of the linkage 
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of general labour being effected by an alien division of labour that sutures the independent 
producers through the money ruled commodity exchange mechanism. 
 
5.c.  The Species-being’s Bond of Social Representation  
 
     Given the modern divide between the unpolitical civil society and the political state there is 
no overall political association that encompasses the totality of the members of society and 
consequently ‘the state exists only as a political state’ (CHDS, p. 188). For civil society to attain 
political representation it must participate in the legislature and its law-making activity. Since the 
function of the executive power of the state is the administrative implementation of the laws 
formulated by the legislature it cannot exist as an independent power but only as an appurtenance 
of the legislature. Hence ‘the totality of the political state is the legislature’ (CHDS, p. 188). The 
aspiration of civil society to participate in the legislature shows its social desire to obtain 
political existence and constitute itself as a ‘political society’. There are only two alternative 
routes to civil society’s participation in the legislature. One method of political participation is to 
select ‘deputies’ who will represent the various particular civil interests in the legislature. The 
other is that everyone becomes a co-legislator himself. Both methods have defects in respect to 
the two forms of government that espouse the separation of the political state from civil society, 
namely constitutional monarchy and the republican view of the ‘abstract political state’. As far as 
constitutional monarchy is concerned, en masse participation in the representative assemblies 
undermines the delicate balancing among its decision-making organs of political power and 
subverts its principle of representation based as it is on restricted and politically privileged 
corporate representation (CHDS, p. 188-9). For the political republic the problem is twofold. If 
civil society participates in the legislature with its ‘deputies’ and since the legislature is the only 
form which provides political membership then civil society still remains unpolitical and the 
dualism between the political state and civil society is further entrenched (CHDS, p. 189). The 
permanent separation of an elite corps of representatives (regardless of the periodic circulation of 
persons occupying the fixed loci of political representation) from the body of society reflects the 
permanent exclusion of the great majority of the people from the actual exercise of legislative 
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duties. It tacitly advises civil society to ‘mind its own business’ rather than ask to be actively 
involved in the general affairs of the state. 
     On the other hand, if ‘all people as individuals’ are to participate in the legislative body then a 
practical and a theoretical difficulty emerge as impediments. From a pragmatic viewpoint ‘civil 
society would cease to exist if everyone became a legislator’ (CHDS, p. 189). Theoretically, 
participation of all individuals requires their conceptual reduction to abstract individuality. Since 
the legislative activity is not viewed by democratic liberalism as a directly exercisable activity 
connected with the life conditions shaping the ‘societal existence’ of the members but it is only 
legislative participation as the properly ‘social, i.e. political function’ that constitutes the 
individuals into a political body out of their civil condition as an unorganised mass then the 
constitution of civil society as a legislature, as their exclusive mode of political existence, 
requires the conception of the legislative participants as single individuals who stand opposed to 
each other as self-seeking beings (CHDS, pp. 189, 79). In the liberal theory of the ‘abstract 
political state’ the communal interdependence of the members of society is disregarded and only 
as a communally unencumbered individual can he partake of the political association as co-
legislator. A political function deemed necessary if the individual is to be morally obligated to 
the laws of the republic.139  
     There is a radical alternative to the separation of civil society from the political state and of 
the questionable role that political representation plays as a device that could politicise civil 
society while at the same time it functions to perpetuate the very divide that called representation 
into existence in order to mend it. Marx’s alternative envisages that ‘civil society is the real 
political society’ (CHDS, p. 189). This alternative mode of political constitution of civil society 
builds on three paramount motifs that help us elucidate the core of young Marx’s political 
thought. 1) It allows the completion of the critique of political representation by highlighting its 
insignificance in the new form of state. 2) It overcomes the separation of civil society from the 
political state in a way that it does not eliminate the political domain altogether but makes 
political activity an integral aspect of the ‘societal existence’ of the community. 3) It introduces 
                                                            
139 In Kantian liberalism, the participation of persons in legislation […] [which] is part of the very definition of a 
moral person – consists in the fact that only such laws can be considered obligatory that can also be viewed as an 
instance of a universal, cooperatively established law.’ Ludwig Siep, ‘Person and Law in Kant and Hegel’ in Reiner 
Schürmann, ed., The Public Realm: Essays on Discursive Types in Political Philosophy (Albany, N.Y: State 
University of New York Press, 1989), pp. 82-104 (p. 91).  
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the form of social representation in lieu of political representation as the universal bond of 
membership in the ‘really rational state’. On the assumption that ‘civil society is the real political 
society’:        
 
[...] the legislature entirely ceases to be important as a representative body. The 
legislature is representative only in the sense that every function is representative. For 
example, a cobbler is my representative in so far as he satisfies a social need, just as 
every definite form of social activity, because it is a species activity, represents only the 
species. That is to say, it represents a determination of my own being just as every man is 
representative of other men. In this sense he is a representative not by virtue of another 
thing which he represents but by virtue of what he is and does. (CHDS, pp. 189-190).   
 
    If civil society becomes the political society, the legislature loses its importance as a 
‘representative body’. The ‘legislative power’ in the representative polity entails two distinctive 
political functions. It formulates the laws of society and it establishes the political representation 
of the various social segments in the law-making process. Political representation is the vehicle 
that translates popular will into public law. We have seen that this aspect of the translation of 
will into law cannot presuppose the unconditional expression of the will since it has to follow the 
imperatives of reason. It is not the will which defines the ‘laws of reason’ but reason which 
ought to guide the formation of will. ‘The legislature embodies the energy of the will in its 
theoretical form’ and its function ‘is not to substitute the will for the law, but to discover and 
formulate the real law’ (CHDS, p. 190). Consequently the aspect of political representation that 
involves will’s transmission into law is not intrinsically tied to the relationship of political 
representation. What makes political representation attractive is ‘its formal political significance’ 
especially in view of the fact that there was no other outlet for unpolitical civil society to obtain 
political existence. Its significance arose ‘because the legislative power also represents the 
political form of civil society’. Actually Marx believed that participation in the executive power 
would have been a ‘more appropriate goal’ of popular aspiration than participation in the 
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legislature (CHDS, p. 190). So the appeal of political representation was rather the upshot of the 
exclusion of the people from politics than any intrinsic need to legislate for society.                   
     The possibility of the becoming political society of civil society is seen by Marx to be the 
potential outcome of the dialectical tension generated by the popular demand for ‘electoral 
reform’. He is rather optimistic about the power of the vote and his wager on the political effect 
of the ‘universalization of vote’ is in conceptual tension with his critical stance vis-a-vis the 
liberal idea of ‘all as individuals’ participating in the legislature since universal suffrage itself is 
based on the principle of atomised voting. Nonetheless, the political import of ‘unrestricted 
active and passive suffrage’ on the politicisation of civil society is undeniable since it brings the 
people into the arena of political power to the detriment of an exclusivist political state as the 
sole power holder. Furthermore, popular selection of commissioned deputies (for Marx opposes 
the idea of independent-minded representatives merely formally authorised, CHDS, 194) through 
elections is ‘the conscious product of the trust of the citizenry’ (CHDS, p. 174) and hence the 
legitimate expression of the society’s political will. The achievement of universal suffrage is 
taken to be the moment in which civil society ‘really’ raises itself to an ‘abstraction from itself’ 
leaving behind its anchorage in civil particularities and thus attaining the ‘political existence 
which constitutes its true, universal, essential existence’ (CHDS, p. 191). On the condition that 
such universalistic political existence becomes civil society’s ‘authentic existence’ then the rift 
between civil society and the abstract political state will tend to ‘dissolution’. It is significant for 
the early Marx’s understanding of political representation, the juxtaposition he implies to exist 
between the vote and representation itself. The vote he contends ‘is the immediate, direct, not 
merely representative but actually existing relation of civil society to the political state’ (CHDS, 
p. 191). The fact that Marx sees the vote as the ‘immediate’ and ‘direct’ expression, instead of a 
‘merely representative’ one, of civil society’s participation in the general affairs of the state 
suggests the idea that he would favour a kind of plebiscitary democracy where people would 
vote on all major state issues of concern than leave the choice to their representatives. 
    The Marxian notion of social representation is grounded on the connection each human being 
has to the species-being. This is not a relationship of subsumption of particular members under 
their natural kind, for the species-being in Marx is the communal association that human beings 
have with each other. So the connection of human beings with each other is not mediated by the 
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identical reference to an external abstract identity (human nature), they are neither connected as a 
multiplicity or a collectivity (as abstract humanity), but their real participation in communal life 
constitutes their direct bond ‘as a species-being, in community with other men’ (OJQ, p. 221). 
They are inextricably tied as individuals with the communal interconnection that permeates them 
all. Individuals as social beings have ‘social needs’. It is not the case that there is a kind of 
opposition between social needs and natural needs that the individual has as a ‘physical’ being 
for the latter are also social in form since they are object- and person-dependent for their 
satisfaction and this entails their social shaping by the communal existence of the individual. 
Social needs are necessarily addressed to other human beings and presuppose those other human 
beings as satisfiers of the ‘social needs’ and thus they presuppose the engagement of those others 
in definite forms of social activity which provide for the fulfilment of such needs. Hence, the 
definite form of social activity of the one constitutes him into the ‘representative’ of someone 
else’s ‘social need’. This representative nexus between the definite form of social activity of the 
one with the social need of the other is not a particularistic interchange but a universalistic bond 
for both the need and the form of activity are not addressed to any particular other but to the 
community at large as an organic whole.140 The community as a whole is not an abstraction 
hovering above its constituent member-parts but as we have seen in the previous section in the 
discussion of the ‘really rational state’ it is an integral oneness consisting of the totality of its 
members.    
Thus each communal member by being ‘what he is and does’ represents in his personal existence 
and in his specific communal activity their own communal association as a concrete universal, its 
species-life. Each is representative of the universal bond by virtue of which the overall state 
community exists. The social activity of each member ‘represents’ the ‘determination of the 
being’ of the other members as co-participants in the social organism. Each mediates the 
connection of the other to the whole. So, each stands for the whole in his concreteness not as a 
solitary individual but as social member of the whole which exists solely by virtue of such 
membership.         
                                                            
140 On the universalistic character of social need in early Marx, A. Chitty, ‘The Early Marx on Needs’, Radical 
Philosophy 64 (1993), mimeo, pp. 1-18.   
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      Social needs and forms of social activity are also universal, though experienced and 
exercised by concrete individuals, because they are the product of the historical development of 
the ‘social powers’ of humankind just as ‘the affairs of state are nothing but the modes of action 
and existence of the social qualities of men’ (CHDS, p. 78), ‘social qualities’ whose formation 
implicates not just their expression within a given social context but their historical constitution 
as well. This historical developmental dynamic is posited by Marx in his view that the 
constitution as ‘the incarnation of the people’ must be based on the principle of ‘progress’ so as 
to reflect the emergence of ‘new needs’ and social progress. (CHDS, p. 119).     
      In ‘true democracy’ where man has resumed ‘the abstract citizen into himself and as an 
individual man has become a species-being in his empirical life’ and ‘political force’ has become 
one of man’s ‘social forces’ and thus human emancipation has been completed (OJQ, p. 234) 
political activity as a definite form of ‘species activity’ will be shared by all members partaking 
in the general affairs of the society. This leaves open the question of the handling of the ‘specific 
affairs’ of societal democracy as singular political actions. Any ‘single political act’ says Marx: 
 
 ‘it is […] obvious that it cannot be performed by all people individually. If this were not 
so it would mean that the individual was himself the true society and thus would make 
society superfluous. The individual would have to do everything all at once, whereas in 
fact society has him act for the others, just as it has them act for him.’ (Underlining is 
mine, CHDS, p. 188). 
 
     
       ‘Society has him act for the others’. A relationship of social representation is posited by 
Marx as the ground on which the individual performance of political tasks takes place in the 
name of society and for the benefit of the other societal members. Three conditions circumscribe 
the substance of the relation of social representation. To act for the others rather than for oneself 
means that the essential feature of the individual’s social activity is purposefully oriented to the 
being of others, that his practice is attuned to the service of them consonant with the specific task 
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he is called upon to perform. The teleological aim of serving the others by performing the 
political function suggests that the essential defining characteristic of the social individual is his 
being-for-other. In acting for the others the individual is implicated in a social interrelationship 
whose other pole acts ‘just as it [society] has them act for him’. There is a condition of 
reciprocity (and equality in provisioning different services) constitutive of social representation. 
The individual acting for others is at the same time the purposeful telos of others who act for 
him. Thus his humanity is not being denied by turning the individual into a mere instrument of 
service but he is duly recognised as an end in itself by the others acting for him.141  
    Acting for others implies two exhaustive alternatives. Either the individuals on whose behalf 
the actor acts can perform the act themselves or they cannot. If they can, then the actor becomes 
a ‘substitute’ hand performing an action that could as well be performed by any of the persons 
acted for. It follows that this relation of substitution of one by another is made possible on the 
premise that a basic equivalence exists between the one or the other. The substitutability of one 
by any other in committing the act presupposes that they share an identical human capability or 
that the same social competence has been universalised at the given stage of development of 
society. He commits an act representing a ‘determination of [their] being just as every man is 
representative of other men’. Alternatively, the other option is that the individual who acts for 
the others does so because he can perform an act necessary for the persons on whose behalf it is 
acted-for and which the persons could not perform themselves for a variety of reasons (time 
limitations, lack of expertise, indifference to perform the necessary task, etc.). To that degree the 
performer of the act on behalf of the others is not an equivalent ‘substitute’ but a necessary 
complement of the others, who in his particular specificity in acting for the other represents the 
completion of the others, the redress of the others’ inability to perform the act on their own. In 
this sense, the actor-for-the-others represents not a duplication of any other but a kind of ideal 
self for the others. In performing the task as a necessary communal activity that realises the 
community’s universal self by fulfilling one of its communal needs, his act would represent for 
others an expression of their communal essence as species-being. 
                                                            
141 A similar restraint on the instrumentalisation of the human being as a ‘usable’ entity in Marx’s conception is 
argued by A. Chitty in ‘First Person Plural Ontology and Praxis’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New 
Series,  97 (1997), pp. 81-96 (p. 96). The normative basis for the rejection of the instrumentalisation of the human 
person is the Kantian supreme moral law never to treat a human being ‘merely as a means’. I. Kant, Groundwork of 
the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. by H.J. Paton (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1964), p. 101.             
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        In the hypothetical case of a society where individuals would produce as human beings for 
each other’s human need, Marx assumes that one of the consequences of such species activity 
would have been for each that ‘I would have acted for you as the mediator between you and the 
species, thus I would be acknowledged by you as the complement of your own being, as an 
essential part of yourself’ (EJM, p. 277). Each individual by his productive act procuring for the 
other’s need as a human being represents for the other the human species in person.    
      The first mode of equivalent representation is characterised by depersonalisation since 
anyone can occupy the locus of the actor for the others given the symmetrical distribution of 
competence and their common human identity. This mode of representation corresponds to the 
concept of the collectivity. The second mode of complementary representation where the activity 
of the one complements the being of the others expresses the multivalent interdependence of the 
communal members.142 This mode of representation corresponds to the concept of the 
community. Both modes of representation constitute in tandem the notion of social 
representation. 
     
       In the ‘really rational state’ ‘the legislature entirely ceases to be important as a representative 
body’. It exercises the legislative function and it ‘is representative only in the sense that every 
function is representative’. Every function in society is representative of the whole as an integral 
aspect of its self-reproduction and legislature as one among the societal functions represents in 
its specificity the achieved articulation of the social whole. The legislature represents the 
legislating process as a social need required by society whereas the legislators represent or 
embody the function of legislating. Legislature loses its exclusive political status and becomes a 
‘definite social activity’, hence a species activity and as such representative of the species itself. 
Legislative activity is representative of the species because it emerges as universalistic both in 
purpose and in substance. Its purpose is universalistic in that it deals with the general concerns of 
the society. Its substance itself is social, fused within the continuum of social activities that 
secure societal reproduction rather than being set apart as the instantiation of the political par 
                                                            
142 Human complementariness in bourgeois society has become ‘the reciprocal complementing and exchange of 
human activity itself [that] appears in the form of: the division of labour. This makes man […] an abstract being, 
[…] and transforms him into a spiritual and physical abortion. The very unity of human labour is regarded only in 
terms of division because man’s social nature is realized only as its antithesis, as estrangement.’ Marx, EJM, p. 269.    
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excellence. The members of the legislature are not a special class of political power-holders, 
specialists in their role of deliberating the common affairs but themselves human beings as social 
individuals ‘representative of other men’ to the same extent that the other men are representative 
of them. This connection of mutual representativeness implies a foundational egalitarianism 
where each species individual is identical to each other in that the (human) form of the one 
represents that of the other and vice-versa. This egalitarianism reflects the principle of 
equivalence characteristic of the collectivity. But the other principle characteristic of community, 
complementariness, is also present. For the legislative function is not performed by all at once, 
hence some do it while the rest do the rest of the definite social activities though all, to the 
degree they can and if they so desire could participate in the legislature. Given the equality of 
membership in the communal association it cannot be supposed that the legislative function 
becomes the exclusive prerogative of any particular social category. Nor that access to the ‘laws 
of reason’ which is legislature’s duty to ‘discover and formulate’ is the preserve of any kind of 
technocracy.      
     The three elements (purpose, function, agency) that constitute social representation are all 
universalised. The purpose encompasses the general affairs of the community, the function in its 
social specificity is geared to the societal totality as a universal and the agent is an instance of the 
universalistic species-being. Moreover in the legislative activity (as in any other form of social 
activity) there is a unity of identity and difference. This unity establishes the essence of 
legislative activity as social representation. The legislators as persons are representatives of the 
identicalness of being human and substitutable or standing in for any other human being while as 
persons in being legislators they are different in that they perform a distinctive activity 
representative of a basic social need whose realisation stands for the well-being of the societal 
species-life. 
    Social representation differs qualitatively from political representation in that it transcends the 
mediated character of political representation where one is a representative ‘by virtue of another 
thing which he represents’, hence subjecting his very existence to a condition (cause, will, 
demand) that is other than himself. The human being in order to represent socially he is not 
compelled to go out of himself and be something else but he is representative ‘by virtue of what 
he is and does’. In being a being-for-others necessarily he is already in his essence the condition 
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of existence of the others and through the others of himself. In being a human person he reflects 
in person the humanity of all others and the bond of identity with them while in what he does he 
expresses his differential contribution to the mutual complementariness of his species-being 
existence.   
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Chapter 6 
                  The Authorial Function of Money in the Society of Private Property  
 
    In this chapter I argue that Marx in his writings of 1844 develops a powerful theory of 
alienation that accounts for key structural features of modern social life. Alienation characterises 
the totality of exchange acts that constitute the social intercourse of individuals who enter the 
commodity exchange social relationship as private property owners. The organising principle of 
social commerce is money. Money becomes the ‘ultimate goal’ of exchange. Though it appears 
to be a mere means through which access to the other’s commodity is achieved (C-M-C), 
money’s function as a means of circulation is transformed into the purpose for which commodity 
exchange takes place (C-M) and by this transformation money assumes an overarching power 
over society. Its function as an agent mediating the transactions of the individuals is 
subordinated to its new role as the author of the actions of the individuals.  It becomes the 
motive power that impels individuals to transact with each other for otherwise the world of 
commodities turns to be inaccessible to them. Within the ‘system of private property’ all goods 
assume the commodity form and access to commodities becomes possible only with possession 
of money. This social necessity compels the individuals to perform socioeconomic roles 
ordained by the requirements of the commodity circulation process. To elucidate this power of 
money in the circulation process I draw some supporting evidence from Marx’s analysis in A 
Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy.    
    Marx’s analysis of commodity exchange reveals that commodity exchange constitutes two 
distinct forms of ‘substitute representation’ of the commodity owners. Commodity owners 
become ensnared in the forms of ‘substitute representation of the other’ and of the ‘substitute 
representation of one’s own self’. The aim of each commodity owner is to get the product of the 
other so their own product is of no importance to them. It is merely a means that provides access 
to the desired good. Thus the object produced or owned is not a vehicle of self-expression. On 
the contrary, the owned object is the medium through which the owner comes to take the place of 
the other, to enter into the other’s relation of possession of the good. Ownership of the good is 
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meant to be an expression of the individuality, of the particular personality of the owner. So in 
coming to take the place of the other which expresses the other’s individuality each exchanger 
becomes a virtual representative of the other’s self-identity. He becomes a substitute for the 
other. The surrogacy is representative because the one does not take up the place of the other 
literally but it is as if he had taken the actual place of the other or substituted for him, himself. He 
is virtually present in the other’s place but materially absent from it. This intersubstitutability of 
selves is mediated by the object of each one’s want. The only way to satisfy their own want is to 
possess the good of the other. It is the object possessed by each other that compels them to enter 
into a social (exchange) relationship with each other. The social interaction they get involved 
into is not formed for its own sake, it is not geared to the person himself but to the object he 
owns. They crave for the object not the person, the person merely stands in for the object he 
owns. Hence both are ‘in mutual servitude to the object’. (EJM, p. 277). The priority of object 
held as private property over the owning person is a form of alienation.  
    For Marx, based on the credo of political economy, the private property owned is the 
substantial part of a man’s individuality. This is a view espoused also by Hegel (PR § 51, p. 81). 
Private property expresses the material form by which one’s personality is realised. When this 
property is exchanged in the commodity transaction the new owner in obtaining the good he also 
appropriates the self-expression of the other. He puts himself in the ‘shoes’ of the other so to 
speak. He is vested with the self-expression of the other in a way that his self-fulfilment, the 
satisfaction of his need for which he entered the commodity transaction makes him be a 
substitute of the other, substituting his person for that of the other. This is the first form in nuce 
of substitute representation of the other. The second aspect or form of substitute representation is 
the surrogacy of one’s own self. This form is both a result and a precondition of the first form. 
The possession of goods, of products, of labour is the private property of their owner. Ownership 
as such conditions and expresses the particular social self, his social standing in society. The 
person is his property according to the proclamations of political economy which Marx adopts 
and builds his argument upon. The fact that participation in commodity exchange requires the 
subject’s disposition to alienate what is his and is expressive of his social being in order to get 
what he wants means that he has to substitute for his true self another self or adopt an attitude to 
his own self that degrades him into the means by which he can get what he seeks for. To enter 
into commodity exchange he must become ‘self-estranged’, to double himself as surrogate of his 
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own self, or to represent himself in his labour or product as something alien to himself. This 
aspect of substitute representation is a precondition of the other aspect since all commodity 
exchangers have to turn themselves into means of accession to the other’s possession of the 
desired good. It is also a result of the other form of substitute representation since the generality 
of commodity exchange necessitates each to continually surrogate himself in the place of the 
other and thus not be who one is supposed to be. In the chapter I develop the presuppositions that 
Marx sees as necessary for the two aspects of substitute representation to take hold and I trace 
some of the consequences that result thereof.   
    Marx sees the mediating function of money in commodity exchange to have a symmetrical 
correspondence to the mediating role of Christ in Christian religion. In the first section I discuss 
why money obtains such omnipotent role over social commerce and I trace out the structural 
features of the representative figure of Christ as the mediator of the religious community with 
God.     
    Furthermore, I employ an argument by analogy to show that there exists a structural 
isomorphism between the forms of substitute representation realised in commodity exchange and 
the forms that the relation of political representation takes in representative democracy. The 
cluster of resemblances, or set of correspondences, permeating the two societal relationships, the 
economic and the political, characteristic of civil society and the domain of politics respectively, 
is traced to their origin in the fundamental divisions that the society of private property both 
reflects and consolidates.  
 
6.a.  Money and Christ as Mediators of the Earthly and Heavenly Worlds 
     
    Marx in 1844 having started the study of political economy countenances the salience of 
money as the supreme organiser of social intercourse mediated by exchange. Marx in his 
commentary on James Mill’s Elements of Political Economy criticises him for the construction 
of ‘abstract laws’ which lead to the misconception of the role of money. James Mill exhibits a 
reified understanding (fixing a dynamic contradictory relation into a single invariable causal 
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proposition) toward law in his concept of money as ‘the medium of exchange’. This definition 
according to Marx assumes that the ‘nature of money’ is to embody solely ‘the property 
externalised within it’ (EJM, p. 260). Money appears to be just a material entity that translates as 
value a certain amount of property. This expressive function of money is only a momentary 
aspect of the actual relation of exchange and in its definitional exhaustion of the concept of 
money it conceals the real content of the relationship. The real basis on which the exchange of 
products takes place is not money itself but the human beings who exchange with each other. 
The mediator between products, the performer of ‘the mediating function or movement’ is the 
‘human, social activity, by means of which the products of man mutually complement each 
other’ (EJM, p. 260). It is not a ‘thing’ that ought to put in motion the exchange process but a 
‘social activity’ that should have established the exchangeability of complementary products. We 
must suppose that the complementariness of the products reflects the requirement by human 
beings of mutual need gratification. 
    The fact that money emerges as the controlling agent or ‘author’ who defines the exchange of 
products instead of the ‘social activity’ of the exchangers indicates that social activity ‘is 
estranged and becomes the property of a material thing external to man, viz. money.’ (EJM, p. 
260). The exchange of products, instead of being the outcome of the human, social activity that 
must express men’s reciprocal need, has become the controlled effect of a ‘material thing’ alien 
to man’s nature. An inversion structures the social exchange of products. A ‘material thing’, a 
non-human entity stands in for the role of the social activity of man. It appropriates the 
‘mediating function’ of social activity and becomes the determining force of exchange per se. 
The appropriation of the mediating function by money is not a mere deception on the part of the 
exchanging parties. It is a real condition of the way the exchange relationship is constituted for, 
as Marx stresses, the ‘mediating function’ has become the property of money itself. Money 
substitutes for social activity in the mediation organising the exchange between human beings. 
But money is a social, man-made institution. As a ‘medium of circulation’ money should have 
been acknowledged as a material representative of the social activity underpinning it. By 
substituting for social activity as the determinant moment, money misrepresents the actual 
character of the relationship. It becomes the cause rather than the effect that activates the social 
movement of exchange.  
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    Social exchange of objects not only grounds the sociation of individuals, their being involved 
in social relations but it also caters to their physical reproduction and since this takes place 
through a social process, exchange defines the contours of social reproduction of human life. 
From the moment the social activity of exchange is severed from its actual human bearers and 
becomes subordinated to the clout of money, whereupon money regulates social life in place of 
men regulating money as the instrument of their own exchange, money becomes an ‘alien 
mediator’ through which ‘man gazes at his will, his activity, his relation to others as at a power 
independent of them and of himself – instead of man himself being the mediator of man.’ (EJM, 
p. 260). If genuine social existence ought to be the expression of human beings’ relatedness with 
each other and the positing of their self-determining activities, the social condition of money as 
an alien mediator assuming ‘a power independent of them’ means that man as creator of money, 
as author of its social utility and its power of exchangeability has turned into a servile being, 
dependent on its own creation.143 An alien force henceforth mediates the relation of man to 
himself instead of the self-mediation of humanity by its own social self.  
   Money emerges as a transcendent power assuming divine features.144 As an all-seeing God 
superintends the totality of the extant things, money becomes the almighty force that confers 
value to all objects. Objects obtain value only insofar as they attach themselves to money 
otherwise they remain worthless and useless and they do not obtain any social currency. Money 
as mediator determines their social significance. An inversion has taken place. Instead of money 
functioning as a medium of representation of the objects’ worth, it determines by itself the 
representative worth, if any, of the objects. Marx formulates this inversion in the relation of 
representation as follows: 
 
Separated from this mediator [money], objects lose their worth. Thus they have value only 
in so far as they represent him [it], whereas it appeared at first that he [it] had value only to 
                                                            
143 ‘[I]n short, he, the lord of his creation, appears as the servant of that creation’ (EJM, p. 266).  In a later 
publication Marx shows that the ‘social process of exchange’ is the real determining moment of the commodity-
owners’ conduct. As individuals they are independent of each other but to partake in the exchange process they can 
do so only on condition that they are commodity-owners and therefore ‘they exist for one another only in so far as 
their commodities exist, they thus appear to be in fact the conscious representatives of the exchange process.’ 
(Emphasis mine, CCPE, p. 41).  
144 ‘[It] must become a veritable God since the mediator is the real power over that with which he mediates me.’ 
(EJM, p. 260). 
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the extent to which he [it] represented them. This reversal of the original relation is 
necessary. Hence this mediator is the lost, estranged essence of private property, private 
property alienated and external to itself; it is the alienated mediation of human production 
with human production, the alienated species-activity of man. (EJM, pp. 260-1).  
 
    Money does not represent anything if it does not represent the objects brought into exchange. 
Products on the other hand cannot have their social worth acknowledged if they are not mediated 
by money as the representative of their value. Beneath the appearance of equivalent contribution 
to the creation of the represented-representative nexus lurks the inversion in the source of 
determination of the product-money representative connection. Whereas money as the 
representative of the products’ worth should have facilitated their exchange in its role as the 
‘medium of exchange’ it is revealed to be the real source of determination of products having 
value and of their possibility to enter the social circuit of exchange in the first place. It is money 
as representer that holds the power to bestow the status of ‘represented’ on products. Products 
without the attribution of the status of ‘represented’ by and in the form of money remain socially 
inexistent as if actually non-produced. Nonetheless products are the expression of the working 
life-activity of individuals. The deprivation of their social utility to the extent money denies them 
‘participation’ in value representation amounts to devaluation, to the social disappearance of the 
human life that is objectified in them. 
    Instead of the product expressing its worth in the form of money as its representative, it is only 
money as the representative that has the power to establish the representative link. Money 
emerges as the condition of possibility for the product to exist as carrier of social worth. Money 
is the essential substratum whose prerogative to allocate social worth on products demonstrates 
its unequally held power to subordinate the products to its function of representation of value.  
    The supremacy money attains as the representative of social worth, as the motive power 
mobilising social circulation of products, substitutes for, as we have seen, social activity for-
itself as the mediator of exchange. This does not mean that social activity disappears from the 
scene for it would then be impossible to have any exchange at all. What it means is that social 
activity itself is corrupted in regard to its posited purpose. For the essential purpose of the social 
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activity pursuing exchange is the satisfaction of the needs of the community but since money has 
become installed as the definer of social utility, it is the pursuit of money elevated to the real 
purpose of social activity that can provide access to need satisfaction and even more 
fundamentally, which determines for the prospective exchangers which object it is worthy to 
strive after. In this way, productive life activities geared to human need satisfaction become 
useless to the degree money does not acknowledge any ‘value’ for their products. It thus comes 
to determine the scope and the utility of human production destined for social exchange instead 
of human producers determining the exchange of their productive activities.  
Money in having this power to define the social utility of the diverse forms of human productive 
activity becomes ‘the alienated mediation of human production with human production’, the 
foundation of the ‘alienated species-activity of man’ (EJM, p. 261).  
    Marx’s attribution of a divine status to money (as it operates in the historically born social 
form of bourgeois society) is not meant as a mere metaphorical use so as to illustrate its cult ‘as 
an end in itself’ in contemporary social life. (EJM, p. 260).145 He wants to establish the existence 
of a structural isomorphism, a parallelism, between Christ and money in respect to the relation of 
representativeness that Christ and money have to God and Man and private property and society 
respectively. The isomorphism that is expressed in the mutual mirroring of (monotheistic) 
religion and the institution of private property due to the prevalence of the given social form 
characteristic of bourgeois society extends mutatis mutandis to the domain of politics. By 
employing analogical argumentation I will try to elucidate significant similarities between the 
structuring of the world of commodities effected by the representative function of money with 
the role political representation plays in the constitution of the representative polity. The political 
community mediated by the sphere of politics in the representative nation-state emerges, I claim, 
as the morphological reflection of the primacy of private property conditioning the shape of 
bourgeois society.  
    The isomorphism posited between religion and private property is stated thus: 
                                                            
145 Walter Benjamin illuminates insightfully the character of capitalism as ‘a purely cultic religion [where] things 
have a meaning only in their relationship to the cult’. This resonates with Marx’s discovery that objects have social 
worth (are socially meaningful) only in relationship to money. See: ‘Capitalism as Religion’, Selected Writings Vol. 
1, 1913-1926, ed. by M. Bullock and M. W. Jennings (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 
1996), pp. 288-291 (p. 288).   
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Christ originally represents (1) man before God, (2) God for man and (3) man for man. In 
the same way money originally represents (1) private property for private property; (2) 
society for private property; (3) private property for society. But Christ is God alienated 
and man alienated. God continues to have value only in so far as he represents Christ, man 
continues to have value only in so far as he represents Christ. Likewise with money. (EJM, 
p. 261)    
 
      Money’s analogy to Christ then means that society and private property continue to have 
value ‘only in so far as they represent money’. If we abstract from the substances/subjects 
posited, the elementary formal relation that appears is that between two sides connected via an 
intermediary. The presence of the intermediary is essential for the constitution of the 
relationship. It is the placeholder of the relationship itself for without its mediation the two sides 
would be unrelated, the relationship would not exist at all and the two sides would lie external to 
each other hence potentially related only contingently. Because of its tripartite character the 
relationship as a whole can be said to consist of two distinctive relations conjugated by the 
substance of the intermediary into one. The mediator as the middle term brings the two extremes 
in contact whereas by themselves would not be in contact or even be the extremes. The bringing 
into conjugation of the two respective sides by the mediator takes place because the mediator 
embodies a representative connection with each of the relative sides and by unifying in its 
substantive existence the respective representative connections interconnects the two sides with 
each other. What must be stressed as the structural core of the relationship is the condition of the 
primacy of the mediating instance over the respective sides. This obtains because the two sides 
taken in their independence would exist indifferently to each other. They become relata and thus 
something different from themselves only due to the power of the intermediary to establish a tie 
of representation with each and thus to relativise them through itself.  
    In the cases Marx presents, the primacy of the intermediary as representative over the 
represented beings is surmised by the condition that the ‘value’ of each entity is conditional on 
the representative nexus and not vice-versa. The representation of God in Christ is not derived 
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from God having a ‘value’ as an independent substance but has ‘value only in so far as he 
represents Christ’ (EJM, p.261). Christ reveals or confers divine status to God, likewise for Man. 
This reversal in valuation is premised on alienation, on Christ being the figure of the alienated 
God and Man concurrently. This means that they have transferred their essence as self-subsisting 
entities onto Christ and it is by reflection into Christ that henceforth they can be recognised for 
what they are meant to be. The ‘original’ relation of representation has been corrupted into its 
opposite. ‘Originally’ Christ represents both God and Man.146 This suggests that God and Man 
pre-exist the figure of Christ and at a certain (historical) moment they ‘authorised’ or conferred 
upon Christ the symbolic role of intermediation. The initial constitution of the relation of 
representation presupposes a consenting act of recognition for its genesis. But its consolidation 
or perpetuation requires either a continual renewal of the constitutive act or the inherent dynamic 
of the relationship itself (that the representative itself becomes the sole ground on which the 
relation as such can be) manifests itself in self-perpetuation.147 This becoming autonomous of the 
representative relation from its constituent ‘authors’ accounts for the alienated character or the 
inversion in value attribution from the representer to the represented rather than the reverse. The 
symbolic figuration of the representative persona becomes an established social convention 
which with the passage of time is met with as an already there reified constellation for the 
succeeding generations. To state it formulaically. I am a Christian believer not because I posit 
Christ as a representative of God but because to be Christian I have to accept that Christ is taken 
to be the representative of God. To deny this I do not question the representative tie of Christ to 
God but I deny my identity as Christian. Hence the religious relation has undergone a process of 
inversion. The initial power of the religious community to freely institute the representative 
connection of Christ to the Godhead has been transformed by the historical ossification of the 
                                                            
146 ‘The true God may be Personated […] by the Son of man, his own Son […] and induce all Nations into the 
Kingdome of his Father; not as of himselfe, but as sent from his Father;’. Hobbes, Lev. XVI, p. 114. 
147 Hegel grasps the constitutive distinctiveness of the two communities, ‘the emerging [entstehende] [and] the 
subsisting [bestehende] community, which maintains itself’ but he cannot cognise the resultant reversal in the power 
of representativeness  brought about by the historical transition from the constituent to the constituted, Church-led 
community, even though he acknowledges the primacy of the ‘God-man’ as the sole ground for the existence of the 
‘new religion’, because he assumes dogmatically that God’s othering as Christ is merely ‘a transitory, disappearing 
moment, not a true, essentially enduring, absolute moment.’ (My emphasis). See: Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy 
of Religion, One-Volume Edition, The Lectures of 1827, ed. by P. C. Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1988), pp. 475, 474.      
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symbol of representation into a relation of dependency where inclusion in the Christian 
community is grounded on the acceptance of the representative figure.148    
    The description of the formal character of the mediated relation as presented above is 
incomplete at least as far as Marx’s account is concerned. For Marx seems to posit three 
distinctive relations or representative connections established by the representative persona. This 
triplicity becomes possible because the representative encompasses a double nature 
simultaneously. It bears within itself two antithetical aspects each of which is identical to each of 
the two sides accordingly. And as the contradictory unity itself the mediator appears as the third 
element. Christ is divine and human and both at the same time (that is he is human and non-
human simultaneously), money is private property and social wealth and private social wealth.149 
The contradictory unity of the representative as ‘Christ’ assumes an independent existence since 
as such it is irreducible to its two component identities of being human and divine. If the unity 
was dissolved, ‘Christ’ would have lost his representative function. Likewise with money.150 In 
the formation of the contradictory unity of the representative figure as an independent category 
per se we see a germ of the ‘dialectical movement’ that Marx, writing in a later period, will 
define as the necessary ‘coexistence of two contradictory sides and their fusion into a new 
category’.151 The dialectical constitution of the representative persona suggests the confluence of 
both a ‘negative’ and a ‘positive’ aspect in its spiritual substantiality. The negative aspect is the 
                                                            
148 The domination of the believers by the representative figure, exemplified for instance by the 17th century 
Anglican liturgical practice of ‘bowing at the sacred name of Jesus’, entailed most often a politics of representation 
by contesting religious groups implicating the House of Commons itself. See: Horton Davies, Worship and 
Theology in England: From Crammer to Baxter and Fox, 1534-1690 , Vol. II (Cambridge, U.K.: William B. 
Eerdermans Pub., 1996), pp. 392, 343-4.            
149 In Marx there are two senses of the category of the ‘social’. The first sense (which is operative in the present 
context) is the opposition of the individual/private versus the social as the supra-individual. For example, barter as 
the individual exchange of products under the regime of private property is ‘the very antithesis of a social 
relationship.’ (EJM, p. 267). Also, ‘[b]y social is meant the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under 
what conditions, in what manner or to what end.’ Marx, German Ideology in Karl Marx: Selected Wrings in 
Sociology & Social Philosophy, ed. by T. Bottomore and M. Rubel (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964), p. 62. The 
second sense of the ‘social’ acknowledges that the individual as private interest is social in its very essence since 
society itself is the sine qua non condition of possibility for the private individual to exist. See: Gr. p. 156. The 
private/ individual interest appears as an anti-social inclination within the social. It resembles Kant’s notion of 
‘unsocial sociability’ in ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose’ in Kant: Political Writings, ed. 
by H. S. Reiss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 41-53 (p. 44).         
150 ‘In the first place, a commodity in which the functions of standard of value and medium of circulation are united 
accordingly becomes money, or the unity of standard of value and medium of circulation is money. But as such a 
unity gold [as money] in its turn possesses an independent existence which is distinct from these two functions.’ 
(CCPE, p. 124).    
151 Marx, Oeuvres: Economie, I, p. 81 cited in Paresh Chattopadhyay, ‘Passage to Socialism: The Dialectic of 
Progress in Marx’, Historical Materialism, 14.3 (2006), pp. 45-84 (p. 64).  
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revelation of an underlying split between man and god (whatever the latter may signify for the 
community) that necessitates the structural interposition of a mediator to recuperate or bridge the 
chasm dividing the two.152 The positive aspect concerns the element of universalism that the 
figure of Christ introduces as the sole representative of God.153 God in being One is juxtaposed 
to the totality of humans. Christ by representing Man as such opens the possibility of 
encompassing the totality of human beings as religious believers under his symbolic rubric. The 
Christological community permits, formally at least, a universalistic participation in disregard of 
particularistic social, economic and cultural identities. Since the other (divine) side of Christ 
represents God’s oneness for humans, the universalistic multitude aggregated under the name of 
Christ is rendered unitary or it can conceive itself as one universal (collectivity) community.154 
Such ‘catholic’ (and imaginary) construction of the Christian community goes hand in hand with 
the abstract political universality (the citizen as the pure political actor devoid of socioeconomic 
and cultural determinants) presaged by the modern political society.                
    The third relationship that Marx posits is the mediating function of Christ between men 
themselves. The implication of this is that the representative connection not only connects human 
beings with the transcendent realm but it also interconnects human beings into a social 
relationship in the form of a religious community. The perpetuation of the religious community 
via the representative persona becomes the real basis that conditions the double connection 
within the religious community that provides accession to God on the part of Man (making God 
present for men, re-presenting ‘him’ in the shape of Christ) and the divine elevation of man 
through identification with the suffering humanity of Christ as the obverse side of his divine 
nature. 
    In actuality the three distinctive relations posited by the mediating representative are the two 
antithetical extremes of a single relationship. Christ representing ‘God for Man’ and ‘Man for 
God’ are two opposed moments of one and the same relationship. They are opposed since Man is 
                                                            
152 ‘Religion is precisely this: the devious acknowledgment of man, through an intermediary’. Marx, OJQ, p. 218. 
153 The early modern theological debate clashed over the legitimate representative agency of God (Christ versus 
angels) till Christ was pontificated as the unique legitimate agent. The Christian God can only have a unique 
representative just as the contemporary political community could have had only a single legitimate sovereign and 
later only a sole legitimate representative government of the political republic could exist.    
154 Hegel rightly discerns that the need to conceive ‘God as spiritual, in universal form and stripped of finitude […] 
was engendered by the progress of history and the progressive formation of the world-spirit.’ Socio-historical 
development conditions the spiritual socialisation of the notion of universality. Hegel Lectures on the Philosophy of 
Religion, note 199 (excerpt from the 1831 lectures), p. 465.     
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not God and God is not Man, the nature of each excludes the other in essence. The semblance of 
a dual relation between Man and God is generated because the presence of the intermediary 
presupposes that the direct relation has been broken up (alienated) and it is the function of the 
representative to stitch it together. Consequently the two distinctive relations are actually the two 
opposite standpoints (the movement from man to god and vice versa) that the intermediation of 
the representative permits to take. Of crucial importance is the other branch within the overall 
relation of representation, that is, the condition of Christ representing ‘man for man’. Whereas 
Man and God partake of two essentially opposite natures which are conjugated by the 
contradictory unity of the representative figure, Men as such partake of an identical nature. 
Hence the possibility of having a representative as a go-between who stands for an ideal 
personification that can reflect man’s nature for another man presupposes that man stands 
divided from his own self, that he is separated within his species-being and in need of a 
representative confronting him as a third party having ‘independent power’ so as to come in 
terms with his own nature. In analogous fashion to the domination of capital over labour that is 
seen as ‘a necessary stage of transition [Durchgangspunkt]’ on the road to ‘a free human society’ 
Marx considers the broken up unity of the spiritual (religious) life of human existence sutured by 
the religious representative as a necessary stage in the process of human emancipation. As he 
puts it: ‘This antagonistic form [capital over labour] has to be traversed just as the human must 
give his spiritual forces a religious form and erect them as an independent power confronting 
him’. 155                   
    
6. b.  Money and Alienation in the Regime of Private Property 
 
         The function of representation becomes clearer in Marx’s analysis in the case of money. 
Money as the general representative of private property becomes not only the expression but also 
the determinant instance of the alienated human relationship of the form of society it rules. Marx 
posits a social ontological teleology mediated by the historical emergence of private property as 
                                                            
155 My emphasis. K. Marx, Őkonomische Manuskripte (1863-7), p. 65 cited in P. Chattopadhyay, ‘Passage to 
Socialism: The Dialectic of Progress in Marx’, p. 68.  
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the precondition of the rule of money. The ontological premise is that man is ‘a social animal’. 
Sociality as the inherent dynamic of development of human nature entails the positing of a total 
interconnectedness of human beings among themselves and this is only possible in the form of 
social exchange that brings human individuals into multiform interrelationships and unites them 
into a grand whole expressive of their species-life. Hence, according to Marx ‘man must finish 
up in exchange and exchange – given the premise of private property – must finish up in 
value.’(EJM, p. 261). Value is an ‘abstract relation’ and for an abstract relation to be, to obtain a 
‘real existence’ it must assume a form, a socio-material presence and the form of value as 
abstract relation is ‘money’. The form-giving power of ‘money’ to the abstract relation of private 
property for itself is money’s representativity. The abstract relation of one private property with 
another private property established by commodity exchange is as such something invisible, 
absent from the realm of phenomenal existence. Money as a material substance makes present 
the phenomenally absent or implicitly present but unperceivable generality of private property as 
the essential condition organising social intercourse.  
      The central premise that accounts for the character of modern society organised along the 
axis of private property is that the mediation of money reveals that the human relationship, the 
relation of man to man, is ‘no human relationship’ any more since through exchange ‘things lose 
the meaning of personal, human property.’ (EJM, p. 261). Things as products of men possess a 
dual character. By being direct products of the human beings’ own creative force they exist as 
their ‘personal property’ geared to personal enjoyment and need satisfaction. At the same time 
they appear as the self-expression of the person who makes them. The specificity of who a 
person is as a human being is objectified, inscribed in the very form of thinghood of the thing 
produced. As such the man-made things incorporate the constitutive property of being human, 
the power of transformation of nature in a conscious manner. Commodity exchange rests on the 
condition that the purpose of the man-made product is neither personal enjoyment nor self-
realisation but its substitution for something else. In this regard, the commodity sets up a double 
separation between the producer and his product. The self is separated from his creation both 
from its function as a means of use and enjoyment (from personal property as private property) 
and from the possibility of objective self-manifestation as a human (from the human property of 
self-expression). Since the exchangeability of commodities has become a general condition in 
society the alienation/separation of the individual producer attains a generality and becomes the 
155 
 
condition par excellence of the human condition. Producing humanity, the species itself, is 
subjected to this state of alienation. What is of relevance here is the distinction Marx suggests 
between ‘personal property’ and ‘private property’. Private property is alienated personal 
property. Not merely in the legal sense of transfer of property to someone else, but as a form of 
property which in being meant to be exchanged on purpose bears within it a primary separation 
of the individual producer from his own human self.156 This situation accounts for the 
paradoxical, at first view, description of ‘[t]he social relationship of private property to private 
property [as] already one in which private property is estranged from itself.’ (EJM, p. 261, my 
emphasis). The generality of the sale of one’s own private property as the normal practice in 
bourgeois society would suggest that private property comes to be itself what it is (the realisation 
of the essence of the society of private property) not a condition of ‘estrangement from itself’. 
Methodologically, the dual sense of alienation as dehumanisation and transfer of property is not 
a matter of added on significations neither a case of conflated meanings whose disambiguation 
could give us two clear and distinct ideas out of its mixed mode or compound sense. The legal 
sense of alienation is coextensive with its social sense for they are established simultaneously by 
the act of commodity exchange. It took centuries till the consolidation of generalised commodity 
production and thus the normalisation of commodity exchange as an everyday practice allowed 
for the legal sense to emerge as a neutral descriptor (with no evaluative content) of what 
transpires as a matter of course and as the given social intercourse. In the process the normative 
sense of alienation has been neutralised by the neutral legal sense in a similar fashion to the 
dissimulation of social commodity exchange, which is ‘no human relationship’ but has turned 
into the characteristic social form of human interaction. The ideological veil the legal sense casts 
over the normative sense of ‘dehumanisation’ is due to the fact that in the legal sense the 
‘transfer of private property’ has been severed from the purposive character of the act. The social 
condition that the commodity transferred has been produced for the sake of being sold which 
presupposes the human alienation of the producer from his product is extinguished by the formal 
                                                            
156 The distinction of personal from private property provides a solution to the dilemma made much by critics of 
communist society where the abolition of private property is interpreted to mean that no individual possession can 
possibly exist and consequently such society effaces completely the basis of individuality. In Grundrisse, the 
antithesis between personal and private property is made explicit and involves two different modes of social 
organisation of production both of which necessitate the mediation of community. (Gr, p. 492).    
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contractual arrangement which is indifferent to the motives or intentionality motivating the 
transaction.157 
    The social situation of indebtedness reveals the third condition of human alienation, next to 
loss of self-expression and indifference to one’s life-work product, ‘under the rule of private 
property’ (EPM, p. 314). The ‘social necessity’ which compels the debtor to sell (CCPE, p. 141), 
that is, to access money as ‘means of payment’ in order to pay off his debt shows the coercive 
character of participation in the circulation process of commodity exchange. Under the threat of 
legal sanctions (thus by the state’s mediation) or even under moral compulsion if a loan has been 
granted on the basis of ‘trust’ guaranteed by the personal existence of the debtor and thus of 
morality having become subservient to the (il)logic of private property, human individuality 
forfeits its constitutive freedom of self-determination. Moreover, this systemic compulsion 
indicates the authorial function of money which instead of acting as a facilitator of circulation of 
products in accordance with use-value needs, it has turned man himself into an ‘incarnation’, an 
embodiment of money’s ideality.158  
    In accordance with Marx’s analogy that Christ and money in alienated society overturn their 
mere representative status and become the definers of the value of the beings represented by 
them (EJM, p. 261) we see in money as credit that ‘man’ has value only to the degree he 
‘incarnates’ money or represents money in person by being the material vehicle of the ‘spirit of 
money’. The power of constituting a representative held by the represented beings has shifted 
into the power of the constituted representative to exclusively confer ‘value’ on them even 
                                                            
157 Also, the intrinsic development of the circulation process that culminates in money’s function as credit and its 
attendant form being ‘means of payment, as the absolute form of exchange-value’ shows that ‘[t]he conversion of 
commodities into money as a final act, or the first metamorphosis of commodities as the ultimate goal [C-M], […] 
has now become an economic function.’ (CCPE, pp. 141-2). Marx’s point is that the ‘evolution’ of the circulation 
process that leads to credit money and the disjunction between sale and purchase, necessarily posits ‘money as the 
ultimate goal’ even if the initial purpose of entering commodity exchange was need for another’s commodity and 
not money as such. Being indebted ‘turns selling into a social necessity for him, irrespective of his individual needs.’ 
(CCPE, p. 141).      
158 ‘In the credit system man replaces metal or paper as the mediator of exchange. However, he does this not as a 
man but as the incarnation of capital and interest. […] [M]an has been exiled from himself and transformed into 
material form. Money has not been transformed in man within the credit system, but man is himself transformed into 
money, or, in other words, money is incarnate in him. Human individuality, human morality, have become both 
articles of commerce and the material which money inhabits. The substance, the body clothing the spirit of money is 
not money, paper, but instead it is my personal existence, my flesh and blood, my social worth and status.’ (EJM, p. 
264). The subordination of human morality to the imperative of private property as money and the resultant 
linguistic perversion in morality’s meaning is starkly revealed in the technocratic lingo of international financial 
institutions which appellate the financial risks associated with money-lending to corporations and sovereign states, 
moral hazards.      
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though on the surface level ‘credit, estranged from men, functions with all the appearance of the 
greatest possible recognition of man’s worth by economics.’ (EJM, p. 264).               
    The consequence of the universalised separation of private property from the human self who 
creates it and since this process necessarily passes through the representative function of money 
makes Marx conclude that ‘[h]ence, money, the existence-for-itself of this relationship [of 
private property to private property], represents the alienation of private property, an abstraction 
from its specific personal nature.’ (EJM, p. 261). ‘Abstraction’ here is alienation, the denuding of 
a social entity or relationship from its specific determinations that condition its essential nature. 
Money is elevated to the epitome of human alienation for in its material body as the 
representation of ‘abstract social wealth’ even private property suffers the extinction of its 
particular material character as thingness. Money becomes the impersonal force (of society) 
powered by the depersonalisation of commodity owners effected by their subjection under the 
heteronomous operation of the mechanism of commodity circulation. This depersonalisation 
process (it does not matter who they are as long as they are representatives of their commodities) 
is the obverse side of the ‘economic’ personalisation imposed upon commodity-owners by the 
‘metamorphosis of commodities’ in the process of commodity circulation. As Marx puts it:  
   
[T]he metamorphosis of commodities […] transforms the commodity-owners as well, and 
alters the social role they play in relation to one another. […] The different forms which 
money assumes in the process of circulation are in fact only crystallisations of the 
transformation of commodities, a transformation which is in its turn only the objective 
expression of the changing social relations in which commodity-owners conduct their 
exchange. New relations of intercourse arise in the process of circulation, and commodity-
owners, who represent these changed relations, acquire new economic characteristics.’ 
(My emphasis, CCPE, pp. 138-9).   
                                                                 
The ‘changed relations’ and the ‘social roles’ assumed (commodity-owner, seller, buyer, buyer 
and seller, hoarder, creditor-debtor) are not freely adopted roles expressive of the individuality of 
the persons engaging in a self-posited social intercourse but by-products of the structural 
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constraints imposed by the developmental dynamic of commodity circuits. The social 
relationship of commodity exchange obliges commodity-owners to ‘represent these changed 
relations’ only by acquiring new functional characteristics.159  
    The totality of the innumerable commodity exchanges taking place daily constitutes the 
commodity circulation process. Since in this process participates the great majority of human 
beings in society (even a child buying chewing gum is a money-commodity owner), this is a 
structured social relationship that implicates the human species-being as a whole. It is a 
particular, historical social form of the social ontological relation of the human species-being 
defined by Marx as ‘[t]he process of exchange both of human activities in the course of 
production and of human products is equal to the species-activity and the species-spirit whose 
real, conscious and authentic existence consists in social activity and social enjoyment. Since the 
essence of man is the true community of man, men, by activating their own essence, produce, 
create this human community, this social being which is no abstract, universal power standing 
over against the solitary individual, but is the essence of every individual, his own activity, his 
own life, his own spirit, his own wealth.’ (EJM, p. 265).  
    The circulatory process emerges as a social mechanism which compels human agents to 
behave in certain pre-defined ways consonant with the social roles imposed by the requirements 
of commodity-money-commodity-money ad infinitum flow. Within the process the human 
agents do not express themselves as they essentially are but as representative agents of the 
economic functions performed. Therefore their social particularity, the specific determinations of 
their life existence are subdued to the detriment of their humanity and they exist as abstract 
beings, as general types embodying individually and alternately the various social positions 
commanded by the perennial metamorphoses of the commodity. This social subordination of the 
human species-being in its generality under the imperative of commodity circulation amounts to 
generalised alienation of humanity in the society of private property. The relationship of 
representation they flesh out in their commodified transactions is a condition of alienation not a 
freely posited understanding of the other as executor of their own will. The social 
                                                            
159 Marx portrays incisively the contradictory formation of the personality of the hoarder (‘accumulation of money 
for the sake of money’) as the reflected duplication of the social function he performs ‘in the barbaric form of 
production for the sake of production’. Also, the hoarder is ‘the commodity-owner as the guardian of a hoard’, he 
acts for it as its trustee. (CCPE, pp. 134, 140).   
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interrelatedness instead of consisting of a process of acting for one another by complementing 
each other’s social need through exchanging their ‘social activities’ and thus realising their 
essential communal being-for-other, they are trapped in an inter-individual dependence where 
physical and social self-reproduction takes place on condition that they partake in social 
exchange under a congeries of commodity selves necessarily defined in an external way. Money 
is thus the ruling force of coherence of the individuals’ multiplicity of social interactions in the 
cornucopia of the commodity world. Since the principal telos of the commodity world, ‘its 
ultimate goal’ is money, money changes its function and from a mere mediator or representative 
of commodity value becomes the principal distributing human agents in functions in accordance 
with its teleological imperative. The whole commodity world beneath the façade of freely driven 
human engagement in accidental commodity transactions is constituted as a teleological machine 
which has become a real hypostasis vested with subjectivity in having the self-determining 
power to propel the actions of its innumerable human supports.160 
 
6. c. The Substitute Form of Representation as the Essence of Private Property 
 
    The science of economics starts with the premise, reflecting ‘the process of reality itself’ that 
‘the relations between men [are] relations between private property owners’.(EJM, p. 266). In 
this perspective, as in reality, ‘exclusive ownership’ entails three basic aspects that define the 
social existence of the individual. Firstly, it provides for the ‘preserv[ation] of his personality’, 
secondly it ‘distinguishes him from other men’ and thirdly it permits him to ‘relate’ to other men. 
(EJM, p. 266). Marx draws the correct conclusion that given the assumption of private property 
as the ‘personal, distinguishing and hence essential existence’ of man then any loss of it 
‘signifies the alienation of the man as much as of the property itself.’ (EJM, p. 266). Alienation 
here is not mere separation or ‘externalisation’ of the property from its owner. It is social 
annihilation of the individual since his personality as the essential distinguishing mark of his 
humanity is grounded on possession of private property. Furthermore loss of private property 
                                                            
160 The limitless ‘circulation of money as capital is an end in itself’ that has ‘the possessor of money’ as its 
‘conscious bearer [Träger]’ and the ‘capitalist’ functions as such only ‘as capital personified and endowed with 
consciousness and a will.’ (Cap.I, pp. 253-4).   
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amounts to dissolution of his social standing in the order of social distinctions within which and 
through which he ‘distinguishes’ himself from others. He loses the capacity to entertain a social 
persona eliciting the recognition by others of his uniqueness. These consequences for the 
individual reveal a deeper layer of estrangement undergirding the society of private property. 
That the personality and the sociality of the individual are dependent on private property in a 
way that its loss results in the ruin of its owner161 bespeaks of a general condition where human 
existence and its social worth is conditional upon private property and thus men are overpowered 
by their world of objects (EJM, p. 266).  
    Alienation of property as something that has become external to the person obtains when the 
individual releases the owned thing from his dominion, severing his ‘personal connection to 
it.’(EJM, p. 267). Alienation ‘becomes estranged private property only when it ceases to be my 
private property, without at the same time ceasing to be private property […] when it becomes 
someone else’s private property.’ (EJM, p. 267). So estrangement is the outcome of an act of 
commodity exchange. Private property changes hands but it maintains its substance as private 
property. The owner becomes ownerless but private property remains identical to itself.162 In the 
relation to ‘my property’ someone else substitutes himself for me. Owners change but private 
property remains what it is. Hence, seen from the standpoint of the relationship as a whole, what 
appears to be the transfer of private property from person to person is actually the 
intersubstitutability of persons powered by private property. Since ‘my personality’ is 
conditional on ‘my property’ as its ‘distinguishing mark’ in the act of estrangement ‘my 
personality’ evaporates together with the transfer only to become someone else’s power of 
personal recognition conditional on his acquired private property.163 A similar substitution takes 
place in the representative relation. The principal authorises the agent to come and take the place 
of his own will; to become the substitute for one’s decision-making power. But this introduces a 
                                                            
161 Loss of decent housing due to pauperism broke down the ‘last power of resistance’ of the agricultural labourers 
and made them ‘mere slaves’accepting the minimum of wages as ‘a law of nature for them’. (Cap, I, pp. 848-9).   
162 More than two decades later Marx will employ almost identical terms to designate the movement of ‘private 
property’ as value. In the money-commodity circuit, value in its two ‘modes of existence’ as money and commodity 
‘is constantly changing from one form into another, without becoming lost in this movement; it thus becomes 
transformed into an automatic subject. […] As the dominant subject [übergreifendes Subjekt] of this process, […] 
value requires above all an independent form by means of which its identity with itself may be asserted. Only in the 
shape of money does it possess this form.’ (My emphasis,  Cap. I, p. 255).   
163 A central motive in luxury consumption of the haute bourgeoisie is the purchase of exorbitantly priced goods 
(mansions, yachts, art objects etc.) if only to possess goods that were formerly owned by the ‘rich and famous’ and 
thus symbolically to take their place and enjoy the prestige inscribed in the ‘good’.   
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division in the will of the principal. The will loses its integral character. The gap opened in the 
unity of the will brings with it a series of contentions over the alignment of the will of the 
represented with that of the representative. This divided will, at the basis of political 
representation has given rise to two contesting traditions, the conservative tradition arguing for 
the ‘independent will’ of the representative164 and the democratic tradition arguing for 
‘imperative mandate’ or the strict abiding of the delegate to the instructions received.165 The 
‘independence of judgment’ of the representative in the elitist accounts of political representation 
rests on the idea that the ‘represented’ is a kind of populist rabble who lacks its own moral and 
political competence to judge and thus it is better for the representative to maintain a certain 
‘distance’ so as to be the least affected by the multitude’s predilections.166 
     The relation of private property to private property takes place, as acknowledged by 
‘economics’ itself, as the consequence of a state of need. The human being is a being of lack. 
The object owned by the other is the necessary complement to his physical and social 
sustenance. In spite of the predominance of the self-relation of the owner with his ownership, his 
identification with private property as his ‘distinguishing mark’, commodity exchange reveals to 
the exchangers that beneath the ‘mutual alienation’ of their products there lies ‘another essential 
relation to the objects than that of private property.’ (EJM, p. 267). Not to see or not being 
conscious of this species relation to objects implies the one-sided perverted social 
particularisation of human beings as bearers of private property. Human need is a condition of 
necessity that breaks through the imaginary self-sufficiency of the owner’s entanglement with his 
property. It makes him aware that his integral self lies beyond the egotistical identification with 
the commodity self. The human being is ‘a total being and as a total being his needs stand in an 
inner relation to the products of the labour of others – for the felt need for a thing is […] proof 
that the thing is part of my essence, that its being is for me and that its property is the property, 
                                                            
164 See Edmund Burke’s view of the representative’s independent ‘mature judgment’ which in no way must be 
constrained by ‘authoritative instructions’ and ‘mandates issued’. ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol at the 
Conclusion of the Polls’ in On Empire, Liberty, and Reform: Speeches and Letters, ed. by D. Bromwich (New 
Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), pp. 50-61.   
165 The Leveller Richard Overton can be taken as an example and his view that the delegate must pursue his 
constituents’ will and not his own. H. Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, pp. 146, 276 n.3.  
166 In the Federalist view of political representation, the ‘merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes 
of the community’ (Alexander Hamilton) are the appropriate ‘social superiors’ to render the political voice of the 
labouring multitude. Ellen Meiksins Wood, Democracy Against Capitalism: Renewing Historical Materialism 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 215, 216.      
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the particular quality peculiar to my essence.’ (EJM, p. 267). Total being refers to the totality of 
the diverse needs a human being consists of, the outcome of a long historical process of social 
development. Thus to fulfil oneself the productive activity of the others is not only necessary but 
constitutive of the essence of oneself. The material nature of the things that correspond to the 
‘felt needs’ is not mere naturalness but the social materiality of the man made world of things 
whose properties are attuned to the realisation of the essence of humanity. The dependency of 
human need on the products of the others indicates that the human being is ontologically a 
relative being and essentially a being-for-the-other since the nexus of one’s need with the other’s 
product is reciprocal and universally shared. Hence impulsion to social exchange is consonant 
with the inner constitution of the human species-being. But that it takes the socially specific form 
of barter as an exoteric act of alienation, indifferent to its substantive content is the outcome of 
‘the system of private property’. (EPM, p. 342). Barter or commodity exchange is ‘the social 
species-activity, the community, social commerce and integration of man within private 
property, and for that reason it is the external, alienated species-activity […] [and] [b]y the same 
token it is the very antithesis of a social relationship.’ (EJM, p. 267). 
    The ‘system of private property’ imposes on the totality of the members of society an external 
societal integration because it compels them to enter the circulatory process of commodity 
exchange exclusively as commodity owners (labour appears necessarily either as independent 
direct producers or as ‘wage-labour’ that is as sellers of the commodity ‘labour-power’) in order 
to be possible to sustain themselves as creatures of need. They enter the commodity circuit 
primarily as isolated individual commodity owners which is not a natural state of things but as 
we have seen the consequence of universal alienation, the divorce of their human existence from 
their own production as self-realisation. This condition is the conditio sine qua non of the regime 
of private property. ‘Indeed, division is the universal basis of private property.’ (EPM, pp. 320-
1). The necessity to enter commodity exchange under the penalty of physical and social 
extinction coupled with the coerced adoption of social roles167 that reiterate the commodity 
                                                            
167 In an otherwise thoughtful reconstruction of the ‘self-ordering movement’ of commodity circulation D. Levine 
makes the error to claim that in regard to the entrance to the circuit ‘it is equally arbitrary whether the starting point 
is said to be the commodity (C) or the money (M). David P. Levine, Economic Theory, Volume 1. The elementary 
relations of economic life (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978), p. 117. The absolute starting point is the 
commodity for money both logically, socially and materially necessarily presupposes a prior sale (money does not 
fall from the sky like mana), an act of commodity metamorphosis into money. Consequently the social role of 
‘buyer’ always presupposes conceptually that of the ‘seller’.   
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exchange flux and propel its self-perpetuating movement means that the totality of individuals 
are trapped in a social trans-individual interdependence, the ‘social commerce’ of the 
‘community’ life of bourgeois society, not of their own (self-conscious) making.168 This social 
interdependence of the independent commodity owners because of its necessary universalisable 
character and its socio-historical universalisation has become the ‘social species-activity’ of 
humanity or ‘generalised commodity production’ as capitalism. Money is the universal 
representative of the commodity world and ruler of each and all participating individuals in the 
social commercium since it is the social bond integrating the civil community of private property 
as a whole. The social interconnection of the individuals takes place only through the 
interposition of money as mediator hence the person relates to money and through money to 
another. 
   The universal alienation underpinning the society of private property affects also the relation of 
the individual human being to his needs. Since need is a lack dependent on the potential object 
that can replenish it, it is not only the mode of appropriation that is mediated by money but also 
the mode of satisfaction is mediated by the ruling function of money as the conferrer of ‘social 
worth’ on objects. Hence not any object but only those objects deemed worthy to be produced as 
‘use-values’ (in having an exchange value) are disposable for need satisfaction. The human 
individual in having needs (other than being in need), a bundle of needs/wants which constitute 
the primary basis of his/her inmost particular self and the motive force of personal deployment 
(the consumer self) is necessarily trapped in an other-determined mode of shaping of needs 
consonant with the available commodity objects. (EJM, p. 269). He enjoys potential ‘freedom of 
choice’ among available commodities but he is unfree to exit the commodity world at large as he 
was compelled to enter it in the first place. Hence need satisfaction rather than being a mode of 
self-realisation is actually the replication of an heteronomous commodity self.169            
                                                            
168 Formulated concisely and correlated to the determinacy of the modern state by civil society, Marx says that ‘the 
modern state has as its natural basis civil society and the man of civil society, i.e., the independent man linked with 
other men only by the ties of private interest and unconscious natural necessity’. Marx and Engels, The Holy Family 
(Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 140.       
169 This fundamental aspect of alienated need interiorised by the human agent as a consequence of the social rule of 
money in the society of private property is ignored by the two Marxist efforts to theorise a theory of needs in Marx. 
See: Agnes Heller, The Theory of Need in Marx (London: Allison & Busby, 1976) and Michael A. Lebowitz, 
Beyond Capital: Marx’s Political Economy of the Working Class, second edition (Basingstoke: Palgrave/Macmillan, 
2003).  
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    The externalised bond of the community of the species-being is not yet a ‘social relationship’. 
The members of the species community do not share an inner relationship expressive of their 
reciprocal dependency as beings-for-one-another in their existence as beings-for-self. As beings-
for-self they stand in opposition to each other170 and the necessary presence of the other for the 
realisation of the being-for-self is treated as a means thus dehumanised. The inversion of the 
humanity of the human individual into the inhuman private property mode of comportment 
means that the elevation of man to his species-essence necessitates the abolition of the mediation 
of private property as the determining principle of the organisational structure of the social 
interdependence of humanity, ‘the positive supersession of private property as human self-
estrangement’ (EPM, p. 348). This abolition is something more than a mere change of form as in 
the case of the community substituting itself as exclusive private property owner of the 
communal wealth (nationalisation of the means of production) in place of the individual private 
property owners. In this changed form private property subsists having only changed the agency 
of possession while the division between the state-community and its members persists and the 
totality of individuals are rendered into ‘wage-labourers’ and thus they continue their 
participation in society as individual commodity owners. For this reason Marx conceives the true 
aim of the communist movement seeking the emancipation of the working class to be ‘the 
ultimate abolition of the wages system.’171  
    The community of universalised wage-labour metamorphosed into ‘society as abstract 
capitalist’ (EPM, p. 333) cannot escape the fate that befalls any society subsumed under the 
category of ‘alienated private property’. The state of ‘alienated private property’ is the general 
condition that obtains when each and everyone alienates his private property in exchange for 
another. We have seen that alienation of one’s private property signifies the severance of the 
nexus between one’s personality and property, loss of self-realisation and indifference to one’s 
work activity. The new aspect that alienated private property as general condition of society 
introduces is that one cannot not only be his own self but he must also be someone else.  
                                                            
170 ‘Free industry and free trade […] produce the universal struggle of man against man, individual against 
individual.’ Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 144. 
171 Marx, ‘Value, Price, and Profit’ cited in Heller, Theory of Need, p. 66. This Marxian criterion of the abolition of 
the ‘wage-form’ as the precondition for the coming of the communist society can be taken as the evaluative norm to 
judge how much ‘socialist’ the societies of ‘actually existing socialism’ were in their systematic effort to 
universalise ‘wage-labour’. 
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    In commodity exchange the alienation of one’s private property is replaced by ‘private 
property of a different nature’. Since this is reciprocally effected, ‘private property appears as the 
representative of a different kind of private property, as the equivalent of a different kind of 
product.’ (EJM, p. 268). Two consequences result thereof. The exchange relationship permits 
private property to establish a representative nexus of itself with itself in its difference from 
itself. Two qualitatively ‘different natures’ (the different kinds of products) become identical as 
representatives of private property. Their material quality is extinguished and their difference in 
kind is absorbed in private property’s identity. Furthermore, a relation of equivalence is 
established that reduces the ‘difference in kind’ into a quantitative equation. The incomparable 
quality ends up being comparable quantity. Marx continues his analysis deriving the 
consequences which follow for the private property owners themselves.                                                                 
                                                           
Thus from both sides the relationship is such that each embodies the existence of the other, 
each exists as his own surrogate and as the surrogate of the other. Thus private property as 
such is a surrogate, an equivalent. Its immediate identity with itself has given way to a 
relation to another. As an equivalent its existence is no longer peculiar to it. It thus 
becomes a value, in fact an immediate exchange value. Its existence as value is a 
determination of itself diverging from its immediate nature, external to it, alienated from it, 
a merely relative existence. (EJM, p. 268). 
 
    The structure of a double surrogate representation is posited here. Each party in the exchange 
is conditioned to be doubly surrogated. Each becomes ‘the surrogate of the other’ and ‘his own 
surrogate’. The fundamental premise that underlies the transposition and the doubling of the self 
is the identity of private property with the personality of the owner. So when the owner comes 
into possession of a private property of ‘a different nature’ expressive of the selfhood of the other 
owner, the new possessor puts himself in the place of the other, ‘embodies the other’, that is, he 
enters into a personal relation with a product inscribed with the life-expression of its producer. 
By doing that, the other via the representation of himself in the product comes to be inscribed 
within the new owner and thus the latter turns into a surrogate of the other. In his own existence 
166 
 
as possessor he represents the other’s self-relation to his objectified life. From the moment the 
new possessor through exchange turns into a surrogate of the other, his own selfhood is 
relativised vis-à-vis the particular other. His self-identity is negated for it becomes itself only by 
the other who defines his new existence by the property given. He is not only other-determined 
but in being himself he can be so only by representing its self as surrogate. 
    The first aspect of surrogate representation activated by commodity exchange is therefore the 
substitution of oneself by another such that the self partakes in a ‘different nature’ than its own. 
The other’s difference takes the place of one’s relation to self. This relation of surrogate 
representation resembles the form that political representation obtains in the case of the 
representative who is ‘a social superior’ to the multitude of represented whom he represents. 
Already in being a political representative, in holding a place in the domain of political power, it 
presupposes that a political exchange has taken place. The represented as a collectivity instead of 
being themselves at the helm of power as they ought in a democracy based on ‘popular 
sovereignty’, they have by consent given away to the representative the prerogative to be in 
power. The latter as a ‘social superior’ or as possessor of superior political judgment is obviously 
‘different’ both socially and in terms of political competence. So the represented find in the 
representative a substitute of themselves who is different. They do not express in him their own 
essential nature as who they are, what the form of their life-existence is but they are represented 
by the other’s difference from them, his unequal stature vis-à-vis them. Consequently in their 
political presence as represented by their representative, they countenance with a substitute of 
themselves who is other than themselves by being ‘superior’ to them. Their essential political life 
ceases to be their own self-expression and becomes that of another. The representative’s 
different, independent and unaccountable political will has taken the place of their own collective 
will. Their political subjectivity has been inscribed with a contrary will (not of their own making) 
and as a passive constituency they speak in the mode of being spoken by a voice other than their 
own. 
    The second form of substitute representation that takes place in commodity exchange is the 
condition of each party existing as ‘a surrogate of oneself’. In being ‘a surrogate of the other’ the 
other’s different private property is the presupposition for the one to be ‘a surrogate of the other’. 
In being ‘a surrogate of oneself’ the presupposition entails the being of one’s own self. 
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Commodity owners enter the exchange as already estranged human beings. Commodity 
exchange realises their alienation but it does not create it in the first place. As commodity 
owners they are already predisposed to act as such. They have in other words, already severed 
the connection between themselves as human producers and their product as an expression of 
self-realisation, of personal significance, of the enjoyment of a work activity.172 Hence within 
commodity exchange, the exchangers realise or express their innermost split between self and 
private property and their personal subjection to it as human subjects. A split based on the 
production of the commodity not as an end for oneself but as the means for an impersonal 
exchange (and not geared to a concrete other’s end). To this extent in the commodity exchange 
they make present the condition of their social life as alienated beings whose productive activity 
is orientated to an abstract other than themselves and the form this must take is that of private 
property for sale. Prior to the exchange, self-alienation is only potential, it is merely implicitly 
present and the act of commodity exchange turns it into a reality. So they become ‘surrogates of 
themselves’ as representative agents of their own private property. But there is more in this 
aspect of surrogate representation where one substitutes for himself. Both parties in the exchange 
relationship are indifferent to their own private property which they alienate. By being both of 
them indifferent they turn out to be identical to each other. Exchanging under the rule of private 
property has resulted in their identicalness which means that their human singularity, their social 
idiosyncratic individuality has been reduced to a single abstract element, commodity ownership. 
Their social specificity as concrete individuals has shrunk to the performance of a single abstract 
type of a social role.173 This reduction of the distinctive individuals into an abstract identity 
under the spell of private property means that their individual uniqueness has been equalised. 
They have become equivalent to each other just as much as the ‘different natures’ of their 
products. They have been transformed by the act of commodity exchange into intersubstitutable 
beings. So the form of surrogate representation of oneself involves not only the alienation of 
                                                            
172 This is the reason of Marx’s insistence that it is not private property that produces alienated labour but ‘alienated 
labour’ which results in the constitution of private property. (EPM, p. 332). Alienated labour itself presumably 
originates with the conquest of land and soil together with the human beings attached to it and thus arises slavery 
and serfdom ‘which soon corrupts and modifies the original forms of all communities, and then itself becomes their 
basis.’ Marx, Gr, p. 491.     
173 Money as ‘the external, universal means and power’ has the capacity to turn ‘real human and natural powers into 
purely abstract representations’ by blocking their realisation while it can effectuate the opposite by turning ‘real 
imperfections and phantoms […] into real essential powers and abilities’ and consequently, ‘money is the universal 
inversion of individualities’. Marx. EPM, p. 378.      
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oneself by his becoming a representative of his ‘own’ private property but also that the self has 
become a substitute of any and every other self serving the identical function or partaking of the 
same abstract identity. A generalised self comes in the place of the particular self and the latter in 
the singularity of his individuality is a substitute representative as an embodied instance of his 
general self.                                        
    In political representation the form that corresponds to the ‘surrogate representation of 
oneself’ is that of the delegate. The practice of delegation, inside or outside the electoral process, 
rests on ‘descriptive’ representation where an essential attribute of similarity is chosen to become 
the criterion of selection of the representative.174 The representative tie between the 
representative and the represented rests on a basic similarity shared by both. Empirically, the 
attributes that the similarity nexus takes are primarily those of gender, race, social class, age, 
sexual identity, geographical location and professional occupation. Marx explicitly adopts the 
criterion of similarity as the ground of the relation of representation. The two social determinants 
upon which he grounds his criterion of similarity are ‘material interest’ and ‘social situation’ or 
‘different forms of property’ and their attendant social relations.175 The social basis that 
conditions the correspondence between the representative and the represented is social class 
homology. This category is nevertheless inflected in Marx by an interesting nuance. It is not 
similarity in class origins or class position that secures the representative tie, i.e., a direct, 
positive connection but the sharing of a common (negative) limitation of the mental horizon that 
reflects the Weltanschauung emanating from the socio-material conditions of existence of the 
social class in question. He generalises his view of the representative class alignment drawing 
from the case of the petty-bourgeoisie’s representatives who ‘may well be poles apart from them 
[the ordinary class subject] in their education and their individual situation’ but ‘[w]hat makes 
them representatives of the petty bourgeoisie is the fact that their minds are restricted by the 
same barriers which the petty bourgeoisie fails to overcome in real life, and that they are 
therefore driven in theory to the same problems and solutions to which material interest and 
social situation drive the latter in practice. This is the general relationship between the political 
and literary representatives of a class and the class which they represent.’(EB, pp. 176-7).        
                                                            
174 A. Phillips Griffiths and Richard Wollheim, ‘How Can One Person Represent Another?’ Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, 34 (1960), pp. 187-224 (p. 188). 
 
175 Marx, EB,  p. 173. 
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    Since the bond of representation rests on similarity and not in difference the formal character 
of the representative emerges as equivalent to that of the represented group. The representative is 
a mirror reflection of the essential identity of the represented. He is posited as an embodied 
instance of the identical (social) nature of the represented. Since the criterion of selection is a 
certain shared similarity each and every one of the members of the represented group could in 
theory have taken the place of the representative. Thus the members of the represented group 
appear to be equivalent to each other and hence intersubstitutable with each other. Each as an 
individual is potentially a ‘surrogate of oneself’ since every other is an instance of an identical 
self. 
      Each particular individual is relative to the identical similarity he shares with the others like 
him. They are relative to each other not per se but as a consequence of being constituted as the 
represented via the mediation of the like representative who reflects back to them their political 
essence. So the positing of the particular political identity of each constituent member of the 
represented group is not a direct political self-expression but a derivative identification with a 
political self, a ‘surrogate of themselves’, that comes, so to speak, from outside themselves. This 
is the first aspect of the surrogate representation of oneself. The second aspect is the following. 
Since the represented are such only on condition that they share an identical attribute with their 
representative it follows that their political representation is achieved only by their being reduced 
to a single abstract feature, that embodied by their representative. This means that their particular 
social existence as ‘total beings’ with a manifold of needs, a gamut of dispositions and the 
bearing of a diversity of social determinations, shrinks in its political representative expression to 
the one unique trait they share with their representative. Thus their political representative status 
is made possible only by turning and adopting themselves a one-sided abstract identity that 
singularises politically its opposite, the particular social wealth of human powers and capacities 
each one is. In this regard, the represented are a ‘surrogate of themselves’ by substituting for 
their particular self, the general abstract self constituted by the representative tie of similarity 
manifested by the representative as an other-in-sameness.176 Both forms of political surrogate 
                                                            
176 The same dialectic characteristic of the double form of surrogate representation grounds the constitution of social 
labour in capitalism. Very synoptically, each particular, concrete kind of labour-power is transformed –via 
money/value- into a surrogate of itself by representing general simple labour or ‘universal labour-time’ and only 
under their subsumption as representatives of ‘universal labour-time’ ‘is the social aspect of the labour of the two 
individuals represented for each of them by the labour of the other’. Marx, CCPE, p. 33.     
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representation, of oneself and of the other, are expressions of political estrangement and in 
particular of the contradictory effects produced by the division of the political state from ‘civil 
society’ and of the latter’s general estrangement under the ‘system of private property’.177 Marx 
condenses this double negativity of the political and of the civil in an apt formulation from the 
Holy Family. ‘The contradiction between the democratic representative state and civil society is 
the completion of the classic contradiction between public commonweal and slavery. In the 
modern world each person is at the same time a member of slave society [under the rule of 
money] and of the public commonweal’.178  
    We have seen that the two forms of surrogate representation in the case of the commodity 
exchange relationship and in that of the political relation of representation when examined 
alternately the one form appears as the presupposition of the other form. To complete the 
exposition we need to take the relationship as a whole in order to see that both sides taken in 
their unity are mutual presuppositions of each other. As far as commodity exchange is concerned 
this is quite apparent from the fact that any commodity sale presupposes simultaneously a money 
purchase of the commodity and vice-versa. We have seen that money’s presence in the act of 
exchange presupposes a prior conversion of a commodity into money. So the commodity 
presupposes the money into which it must express its exchange value in order to be a commodity 
and money itself presupposes another commodity converted into it. ‘We are thus caught up in a 
vicious circle of presuppositions. This vicious circle is indeed circulation itself.’ (CCPE, p. 90). 
Commodity exchange or exchange of ‘private property’ with itself presupposes the general 
alienation of commodities or the category of alienated private property as such. What appears 
from the standpoint of the individual as an isolated act of exchange is revealed from the 
standpoint of the total relationship to be an endemic structural condition organised as a dynamic 
process where any commodity presupposes the totality of the commodity world mediated by 
money. 
    In the relation of political representation as a whole each extreme constitutes a presupposition 
of the other. The represented group in the absence of the representative is unrepresented, it does 
                                                            
177 Marx does not restrict his analysis to the category of general estrangement but he indicates that general 
estrangement assumes also specific ‘forms of estrangement’ conditioned by particular historical national 
circumstances. The estrangement of ‘man’ takes the form of ‘political equality’ in France, of ‘self-consciousness’ in 
Germany, of self-measuring ‘practical need’ in England. (EPM, p. 364).   
178 Marx and Engels, The Holy Family, p. 144. 
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not exist as such. On the other hand, the representative cannot exist by itself without any 
reference to a group or collective body of which he or it is a representative of. The constitution of 
the represented as a constituency is the condition of possibility of the representative’s existence. 
We have seen that commodity exchange presupposes alienation or division as the basis of its 
constitution. Does the same condition apply to the constitution of the represented-representative 
tie? In its totality political representation does suppose a primordial partition or division of its 
constituent parts. The foundation of democratic politics is popular sovereignty. Political 
representation in its very existence establishes a division of the people into two distinctive forms 
of political existence. The setting up of a representative government is an entity apart from the 
people which exercises political power in its name. The representative government acts for the 
people but in acting for it, it does not act in regard to a third party but it rules over the people 
themselves. By the same move that the representative government is set up, the people at the 
same time dislodges itself from its sovereign status as the supreme ruler and becomes an object 
of rule by its own self-created by-product. In externalising itself in the form of a representative 
government, the people turn automatically from a ruler into the ruled. Thus political 
representation in its essential core presupposes the division of the ruler from the ruled. This 
structural condition of the relationship is not affected at all by the quality of political 
representation, whether it is despotic or enlightened, detrimental or beneficial. Even in Carl 
Schmitt’s apt definition of democracy as ‘the identity of governed and governing’ of ‘the subject 
and object of state authority’ or the ruler with the ruled179, the call for identity is made possible 
because the division pre-exists it and the distinction is not eliminated even if the identity is 
achieved but only internalised as a self-doubling where the ruled is simultaneously the ruler of 
himself. The political community’s self-subordination suggests again a dual state of political 
existence even if it is not an I-Thou relation but a self-relation of the ruled ruling themselves. 
The very relationship of political rule expressed by political representation both in its 
conservative, elitist version and in its democratic populist version presupposes a state of 
unruliness in the social existence of the individuals. The elitist version sets up a constitutive 
naturalised social discrepancy between privileged reason possessed by the representative and 
spurious popular opinion possessed by the represented. The asymmetry originates in the Platonic 
notion of the guardianship of the ideal republic, the estate of guardians possessing the 
                                                            
179 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1988), p. 26. 
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knowledge of the good of the political whole but it is exemplified in modern political thought by 
the reasons adduced by Edmund Burke in his defence of the superiority of the representative. 
This superiority rests on the condition that the representative is infused with reason (by 
Providence) while the constituents are suffused by biased opinions and inordinate ‘inclinations’ 
quite incapable of grasping ‘the general good, resulting from the general reason of the whole’. 
And since ‘government and legislation are matters of reason and judgment, and not of 
inclination’ it follows that it is the representative’s business to exercise his unbound reasonable 
judgment in deliberations over the interest of the whole.180  
    The republican populist theorisation of political representation, offspring of Enlightenment 
thought, itself acknowledges that there is a conflict between intellect and passions, between 
egoism and moral conscience and consequently the unruly passions of the people must be tamed 
and be properly cultivated and brought under reason’s provenance.181 Marx has suggested that 
such an argument functions rather as an ideological rationalisation of the desired appropriation of 
political rule by its promulgators. He castigates the French theory of the doctrinaires who 
proclaim ‘the sovereignty of reason in opposition to the sovereignty of the people, in order to 
exclude the masses and to rule by themselves.’182  Hence, political self-rule can await the coming 
of the enlightened masses while popular self-rule is exercised virtually in substitute 
representative form by the people in otherness to themselves.          
    The paradox of political self-rule exists because it reflects a deeper division in society between 
the social realm and the sphere of politics. The community has to step outside its social self, to 
disregard the very social organisation of its conditions of life existence in order to enter a 
distinctive sphere where political self-rule is made possible exclusively. Only if the integral 
character of the human species is ‘restored’ by abolition of alienation and the political activity 
(ruling and being ruled) loses its abstractness and its alien power over human individuals by 
becoming a specific activity built in a multitask gamut of communal activity for the society as a 
whole is it possible to arrive at a self-determining humanity beyond the need of rule that 
                                                            
180 E. Burke, ‘Speech to the Electors of Bristol’, p. 55. 
181 The conception of ‘the self in terms of a ruling principle (reason) and a set of otherwise unruly parts’ originates 
by and in Plato’s Gorgias. Anthony A. Long, ‘Ancient Philosophy’s Hardest Question: What to Make of Oneself?’, 
Representations 74 (Spring 2001), 19-36 (p. 29).   
182 Marx, Holy Family in Selected Writings, p. 57. 
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necessitates the presence of the power of the state as the ‘concentrated and organized force of 
society’.183  
  
                                                            
183 Marx, Cap. I, p. 907, n. 3. 
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Chapter 7 
 
                      The Dialectic of Political Form and Social Class Representation  
 
    The growth of civil society has evinced its crystallisation into distinctive social classes. Social 
class identity is not a static attribute but an ongoing formative process and a polarising relative 
social relationship. Class formation is the product of the social division of labour. Individuals are 
socially distributed into different material conditions of existence through which they strive to 
reproduce themselves. The modern bourgeois division of labour introduces ‘a cleavage in the life 
of each individual, insofar as it is personal and insofar as it is determined by some branch of 
labour and the conditions pertaining to it. [...][They are] persons, but their personality is 
conditioned and determined by quite definite class relations, and the cleavage appears only in 
their opposition to another class’.184 This cleavage between the individual as person and his class 
existence is due to the fact that ‘within the division of labour social relations inevitably take on 
an independent existence’.185 As persons, the individuals see their location in particular 
conditions of life as ‘accidental’ and this impression creates the belief that they are relatively 
unfettered to shape their conditions at will. Their class existence, their common subjection under 
definite relations of production and their enmeshment in different types of private property, 
disappears from view. Their personal lives are governed by impersonal ‘material forces’ that 
reduce them to class beings, constricting dramatically the freedom to deploy their own life-
designs. They are driven to act and think in class determined ways which in the ‘isolated’ mode 
of existence of the individual appear as forms of self-choosing. Political representation and the 
politics of representation introduce socio-political conditions that permit the cognisance of one’s 
own class existence, the passage of consciousness from a belief in being in a state of 
‘thrownness’ into the  contingency of circumstances to an understanding of sharing common 
travails and interests with similarly conditioned fellow human beings.  
                                                            
184 Marx and Engels, The German Ideology, p. 87. 
185 ‘Ibid.’ 
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    I will address two problems that can supply an elucidation of the connection of representative 
politics and class representation in Marx’s conception. Firstly, how is social class constituted by 
and through political representation and secondly, which form of the republic is most conducive 
to the cultivation of conditions supportive of the prospect of emancipation of the labouring 
humanity? 
    The exemplary text of Marxian class analysis is his discussion of the 1848 French revolution 
and the intertwinement of social classes in a series of political struggles in their effort to shape 
the regime so that it will represent their class interest. Two theoretical ideas can be derived from 
Marx’s analysis. The first idea concerns the power of political representation to transform the 
implicit class existence of a social ‘multitude’ into a genuine class with a minimal, at least, 
collective self-awareness of its class being. The second idea involves a dual claim. Political 
representation in general manifests the class interests on the ‘public stage’ of society and this 
creates a condition of transparency about the stakes in the class struggle which calls for a 
requisite form of the republic that best upholds the democratic features sustaining such 
transparency. On the other hand, since interest representation takes place through the mediation 
of the literary and political representatives of a class there is always the possibility of a 
discrepancy, and in extreme cases of an opposition, between the real class interest and its 
political formulation. This discrepancy often takes the following form. The class representatives 
voice the general, common class interest but the class, especially if divided in distinct class 
fractions having particularistic interests, does not recognise itself in the representative penumbra 
and thus it experiences misrepresentation and withdraws its support.  
 
7.a.  Marx’s Theory of Class Constitution and Passive versus Active Social Class Political 
Representation 
 
    The prototypical case of a non-class turned into a class by representation is that of the ‘small 
peasant proprietors’ who found their class embodiment in the figure of Louis Bonaparte at the 
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helm of state power.186 What are the conditions the lack of which deprived the French small 
peasant proprietors from being a properly constituted class? To elucidate this Marx provides a set 
of criteria grounding the process of formation of a class. The fact that the presentation of the 
criteria of class formation and their connection to representation is the most explicit and lucid 
found in Marx’s oeuvre, justifies a relative lengthy quote.      
 
    The small peasant proprietors form an immense mass, the members of which live in the 
same situation but do not enter into manifold relationships with each other. Their mode 
of operation isolates them instead of bringing them into mutual intercourse. [...] Each 
individual peasant family is almost self-sufficient; it directly produces the greater part of 
its own consumption and therefore obtains its means of life more through exchange with 
nature than through intercourse with society. [...] Thus the great mass of the French 
nation is formed by the simple addition of isomorphous magnitudes [...] In so far as 
millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that separate their mode 
of life, their interests and their cultural formation from those of the other classes and 
bring them into conflict with those classes, they form a class. In so far as these small 
peasant proprietors are merely connected on a local basis, and the identity of their 
interests fails to produce a feeling of community, national links, or a political 
organization, they do not form a class. They are therefore incapable of asserting their 
class interest in their own name, whether through a parliament or through a convention. 
They cannot represent themselves; they must be represented. Their representative must 
appear simultaneously as their master, as an authority over them, an unrestricted 
governmental power that protects them from the other classes [...] The political influence 
of the small peasant proprietors is therefore ultimately expressed in the executive 
subordinating society to itself. (My emphasis, EB, pp. 238-9).  
 
                                                            
186 ‘[T]he state power does not hover in mid-air. Bonaparte represents a class, indeed he represents the most 
numerous class of French society, the small peasant proprietors.’ (EB, p. 238).  
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    The necessary condition for class constitution is identicalness of social situation. But this is 
not sufficient by itself. It also requires a ‘manifold of relations’ existing between the class 
members. If there is no ‘manifold interrelationship among them’, if separation is the mode of 
(dis)connection that keeps the individuals or families apart then their common attribute of being 
engulfed in similar living situations merely confers on them the status of a mass. Their social 
existence is that of an aggregate as a ‘simple addition of isomorphous magnitudes’. The external 
relationship that permeates the formation of the mass obeys the logic of number and subsists as 
‘a diversity that would not be a diversity of itself’.187 It is only observing Reason that can cognise 
the identicalness of the isomorphous, self-sufficient monads constituting the mass. This negative 
unity of the non-class as a mass (an external unity neither posited by the mass itself nor 
internalised by it) corresponds to my concept of ‘multiplicity’ in the typology of social forms of 
multiplicity, collectivity and community that I developed in chapter five.  
   Which are the predicates that constitute class being? Marx mentions three social predicates 
which at the same time must satisfy two fundamental relations. Class existence is circumscribed 
by similarity in ‘mode of life’, commonality of ‘interests’ and sharing in ‘cultural formation’. 
These aspects are the components necessary for the construction of any societal unity. True 
species life itself must fulfil these conditions if it is to be actually realisable. Everyone must 
participate in the communal organisation of productive life and self-consciously complement 
each other’s social needs, care and cater for the reproduction of the societal whole (the ‘interest’ 
of the species-being) and partake in the formative power of ‘world civilisation’. But class being 
is a partial being, the opposite of species being since the latter’s coming into being presupposes a 
classless society, the transcendence of class divided and alienated species life.188 The 
particularity of class being involves the sharing of the three aspects that provide for the unity of a 
class, in separation from the triplex of the same determinant processes characteristic of other 
classes. In other words, the same formal constituents constitute a mass of people into a social 
class but the specific content, their distinctive character provides the demarcation line between 
each and any class. Hence it is not only the positive unity furnished by the sharing of common 
characteristics that renders a class its class character but simultaneously a negative relation to the 
other similarly constituted classes is required to ground the self-sameness of the class. It follows 
                                                            
187 G.W.F. Hegel, The Jena System, p. 15. 
188 It requires a non-antagonistic, classless societal association with no ‘political power properly so-called’. Marx, 
The Poverty of Philosophy, introduction by F. Engels (New York: International Publishers, 1963), p. 174. 
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that each particular class being is inherently relative to the being of other classes. Still, positive 
unity and class relativity do not exhaust the concept of social class. Marx’s definition entails a 
further prerequisite. The relativity of one class vis-a-vis the others is not a matter of simple 
difference, of one social stratum standing next to the other, below or above it (as gradations in 
the social rank of the social order or different occupational categories) but entails an oppositional 
relation, the ‘bringing them in conflict’ or an inherent antagonism must permeate their (class) 
relation pitting one against the other. Thus the substantive condition of class self-existence 
implicates a polarising relativisation of social classes that necessitates the manifestation of class 
struggles over the conditions that define their class identity, that is, ‘their mode of life’ (social 
struggles), ‘their interests’(economic struggles), ‘their cultural formation’ (cultural struggles). 
The effective exercise of such struggles requires their politicisation, the capacity of social classes 
to introduce their demands and interests into the public arena and this in turn requires the 
mediating forms of political representation.  
    A mass of people living under a similar situation without any social ‘intercourse’ between 
them are an homogeneous multiplicity of ‘self-sufficient’ units thus pervasively atomised. They 
seem to live within society as if they were outside society, in a kind of a state-of-nature mode of 
existence, a form of existence hinted at by Marx in his designation of the mass of peasants as 
being primarily dependent on ‘exchange with nature’ rather than with society at large. They have 
not been drawn into the social division of labour which is the determinant force of class 
formation. The ‘small peasant proprietors’, though they are characterised by ‘identity of 
interests’ and some local connectivity, are a non-class. To become a class and thus capable of 
asserting their class interest they should have developed a sense of national community or of a 
community connected nationally by political organisation or other forms of supra-local 
organisation. Then they would have been competent to represent themselves politically and fight 
for their interests ‘in their own name’. In that case they would be class conscious having a sense 
of class unity and acting to promote their interests, be in other words, a class for itself. I claim 
that in this passage from the state of being a dispersed atomised mass directly into a class-for-
itself, Marx omits a most crucial phase of class constitution, that of becoming a class in-itself. 
That it is the lack of an objective social connection among the scattered peasants which explains 
their incapacity to develop the class consciousness appropriate for asserting their own interest. 
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And that it is the power figure of Bonaparte who supplies the missing link through which an 
external tie of class unity is made possible.  
    There is a certain paradox in Marx’s understanding of the class representation of the peasant 
proprietors. Not in regard to the form of political representation attained but in regard to the class 
being which becomes represented. According to the class definition he introduces, the ‘small 
peasant proprietors’ were not a class and they did not become such during the whole political 
period he examines for they never organised their own political expression at the time. They did 
not achieve a class-for-itself consciousness such that they could form a ‘common will’ and thus 
push for class self-representation. 
     Any social formation is an evolving societal organism. The changing relations of production 
in French society of the first half of the nineteenth century exerted a series of effective 
determinations on the class make-up of the mass of peasants. The developing socio-economic 
processes did not alter drastically their isolated mode of production in such a way that they 
would have been entangled in an organic way within the overall social division of labour. 
Nonetheless they were gradually caught into the web of the cash nexus. To maintain their small 
land holdings they had to countenance money capital and sooner or later they ended up heavily 
indebted. This condition brought the mass of peasants in potential conflict with the (moneyed) 
bourgeoisie, an economic conflictual situation conducive to the generation of a sense of negative 
class union vis-a-vis rival classes. Hence, the peasant stratum was trapped in suspended 
animation so to speak. They were moving out of their disconnected mass form of existence into 
the first stirrings of class being but lacking both a united class will and the mediating political 
forms that could provide them with an independent class self-consciousness.  
      It is this contradictory formation of a mass turning into a speechless class seeking a political 
voice and finding it in a ventriloquist Bonaparte that explains Marx’s presentation of the mass of 
peasant proprietors as having been transformed, all of a sudden, into a class enjoying passive 
representation. It is the agency of Bonaparte as an imaginary political complex, a representative 
template which accounts for the peculiar transformation of the peasants into a  social class, albeit 
a form of class distinct from the one that bears a class consciousness and the accompanying 
nation-wide political organisation or movement. I discuss below the reasons that motivated the 
peasant class to endow Bonaparte with the status of a virtual representative of itself. The relation 
of political representation as we have seen necessitates the mutual conditioning of its poles 
180 
 
however asymmetrical the relative strength of each pole may be. This dialectical condition 
suggests that the passively represented group dependent on the representative is simultaneously 
the condition of existence of the representative and thus of his social dependency on it. This 
condition applies to any form of state power. State power whether under class rule or in seeming 
independence from any bloc of classes cannot not have a social basis sustaining its rule. ‘State 
power does not hover in mid-air.’(EB, p. 238). Hence, ‘autonomous’ state power personified by 
the ‘second Bonaparte’ called for its grounding on a social stratum whose mode of (unsocial) 
social existence could provide for the remoteness of centralised state power from its immediate 
anchorage onto the political representation of the active, but mutually neutralised, contending  
social class forces. Consequently, ‘Bonaparte represents a class, indeed he represents the most 
numerous class of French society, the small peasant proprietors’. (EB, p. 238). In being 
represented by Bonaparte as the embodiment of the state’s executive power, the peasantry is 
constituted as an inert object, it turns into a class in-itself obtaining an external class unity via 
virtual representation. The distinctive element of this type of political representation that 
differentiates it from the class representation of the other social classes, the bourgeoisie, the 
petty-bourgeoisie and the proletariat, is the lack of class will, of a common, collective will 
elaborated and voiced by the ‘political and literary representatives’ as it occurs for the other 
classes.189 The peasantry is historically determined as a will-less class with Bonaparte posed as a 
substitute representative of its absent political will. Bonaparte wills for them and they recognise 
his will as their own in this master-servant transposition of will.    
    Drawing from J. L. Austin’s theory of ‘the performative nature of social representation’, 
tacitly anticipated by Marx’s analysis, an argument has been raised that Bonaparte functioned as 
a powerful ‘referent’ establishing ‘a bogus political representation constituting the social being it 
represents’.190 This argument exploits the dialectic of presence-absence inherent in the idea of 
representation. The embodied political referent emerges as an instance of semiotic production of 
                                                            
189 Paul Thomas grasps the element of lack of a common will of the peasantry but he overlooks its differentiating 
specificity that grounds the ‘particularity’ of Bonaparte’s representation vis-avis that of the other classes. P. Thomas, 
Alien Politics: Marxist State theory Retrieved (New York: Routledge, 1994), p. 98.     
190 Sandy Petrey, ‘The Reality of Representation: Between Marx and Balzac’, Critical Inquiry, 14.3, The Sociology 
of Liteature (1988), pp. 448-468, (p. 466). This argument on the constitutive power of representational signs draws 
partly from Eagleton’s elaboration of Marx’s political insight that ‘Bonaparte is indeed a signifier of class interests, 
but a complex, contradictory one that politically constitutes the very interests it signifies.’ Terry Eagleton, Walter 
Benjamin, or, Towards a Revolutionary Criticism (London: Verso Editions, 1981), p. 168. 
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the political reality ‘lived by those for whom the sign means.’191 The political signification of an 
ideational reality becomes a matrix that invites individuals to identify with and thus to recognise 
themselves as subjects represented by it.192 So far so good. What we may contest is the inference 
drawn and attributed to Marx that the performative character of representation suggests that 
‘while nothing objective authorizes a successful performance, something objective can follow 
it.’193  That ‘something objective’ can follow the ‘performative representation’ is an 
unobjectionable statement that captures the gist of Marx’s claim that the peasantry became a 
represented class only when the dictator presented himself as the supreme governmental power 
posturing as a divine ‘protector’ of the peasants ‘from the other classes’, ‘send[ing] rain and 
sunshine from above’ (EB, p. 239). What is objectionable is the idea that the ‘performative 
representation’ lacks an objective basis that makes possible its performativity. The implication of 
such ‘absence’ of a basis would mean that any ‘representation’ by its mere power of existence 
could perform such role. As if any person at the helm of the then state power could have sutured 
the peasants into a represented class. 
    There are three basic social determinations that furnish the (socio-historical) objective basis 
for Bonaparte’s representative performative ‘success’. These determinations share the common 
denominator of being manifestations of a broad social homology between the state of the 
peasants and the Bonapartist state. We can designate them as the proper name, numerical 
oneness and the changed class articulation. Louis Bonaparte carries the name of his uncle and 
pretends to be a re-incarnation of him, especially by invigorating the imperial attitude of the 
genuine Napoleon, appearing as an Emperor. Being an absolute or ‘unrestricted’ ruler after his 
second election, his imperial ‘obsession was realized, because it coincided with the obsession of 
the most numerous class of the French people.’ (EB, p. 239). Bonaparte represented the nostalgic 
desire of the peasant class to restore itself to its former ‘glory’ that the authentic Napoleon had 
brought to the peasants by consolidating and securing the peasants’ post-feudal status as ‘free 
landed proprietors’ and ‘their new-found passion for property’. (EB, p. 241). There existed a 
cultural tradition of idolatry of Napoleon and ‘as the second Bonaparte is himself only a 
                                                            
191 Petrey, ‘The Reality of Representation’, p. 463. 
192 This process of identification with a symbolic content that does not express a subject but the subject ‘finds’ itself 
to be expressed by it after the encounter with it, is an elementary effect of opinion poll surveys where citizens 
lacking a prior opinion on a certain issue respond by declaring an opinion after the question and its choices has been 
addressed to them.       
193 Petrey, ‘The Reality of Representation’, p. 466. 
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substitute for Napoleon’ (EB, p. 244) he inscribed himself as the genuine continuator of this 
tradition turning his person into a surrogate representative of the proper name of Napoleon. He 
had effaced his ‘own’ personality in exchange for the symbolic power of the proper name 
appropriated as ‘his’ personal ownership, and that transfiguration had won for him a landslide 
victory (in the 10 December 1848 election) to the Presidential office. In being no one but a name 
he could express the discontent felt by all classes toward the bourgeois republic, ‘[p]recisely 
because he was nothing he was able to signify everything, except what he in fact was’. (CS, p. 
73).  Just as in surrogate representation enacted by commodity exchange we have the substitution 
of personality by private property so in the sphere of political power the politician trades his 
personality for the manufactured public image, as the vehicle to accession to power. The 
constructed political personality managed by the media of mass communication or the trappings 
of the historical tradition as in the case we examine, indicates that the ‘personalisation of 
politics’ that ‘it is most perceptible at the national level in the relationship between the executive 
and the electorate’ lies at the core of representative government and it is not merely a feature 
characterising the recently emergent third phase of ‘representative government’ designated as the 
‘tribunal of the public’.194  
     We have seen that Marx describes the material condition of the mass of peasants as a state of 
quasi-natural existence in which they are isolated from society and isolated from each other 
(excepting the maintenance of some weak ‘local’ ties), in their ‘self-sufficiency’ as productive 
units. In dialectical philosophy this condition defines the state of being ‘the numerical one’.195 
The negative unity of each ‘numerical one’ in excluding all the similar ‘numerical ones’ 
maintains a ‘negating connection’ to the rest that constitutes it into an ‘aggregate of numerical 
ones’, a mass having its own ‘negative unity’. In Hegel this ‘negative unity’ is ipso facto turned 
into a ‘positive unity’ by logical fiat. Not so for Marx. A socio-material determination must exist 
that necessitates the conversion of the negative into a positive unity or of the massive 
                                                            
194 Bernard Manin, ‘The metamorphoses of representative government’,  Economy and Society, 23.2 (1994), pp. 
133-171, (pp. 157, 162ff). 
195 ‘This simple unity, connecting purely with itself, which excludes every many from itself [or] negates them with 
respect to itself, is the numerical one; [...] that it excludes the many, [i]t is negative unity.’ This ‘[n]egative unity is 
exclusive [...] [and] in this excluding it is immediately connected with the other; if what is excluded is conceived as 
multiplicity, then negative unity itself is immediately a many as well; for however many the many is, so many times 
is it negated by the unity; such a manifold negating or such a manifold, is the unity itself; and negative unity is rather 
its contrary, positive unity, and as such, multiplicity, which, being internally differentiated, is posited as an 
aggregate of numerical ones.’ Hegel, The Jena System, pp. 9, 11-12.   
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multiplicity into a class in-itself. This determination was the social relationship that the post-
revolutionary ‘centralised state power’ held with the numerous mass of peasants.196 The concrete 
form of the state-peasant proprietorship nexus was taxation and bureaucratic clientilism. In the 
absence of ‘aristocratic intermediate levels’ destroyed by the Revolution (of 1789), a direct, 
reciprocal entanglement was established that made the state apparatus dependent on the peasants 
and the latter dependent on state power. The state unified the peasants into a taxable class and 
these in turn found in the state machinery an outlet for class mobility and a paternalistic 
‘protector’ of their newly emergent class being. In Marx’s words, the (socially) objective 
interpenetration of the state-peasant nexus is grounded on the fact that: 
 
 [...] the small-holding is burdened by taxation. Taxation is the source of life for the 
bureaucracy [...], for the whole executive apparatus. [...] By its very nature, small peasant 
property is suitable to serve as the foundation of an all-powerful and innumerable 
bureaucracy. It creates a uniform level of relationships and persons over the whole 
surface of the land. Hence it also allows a uniformity of intervention from a supreme 
centre into all points of this uniform mass. [...] [I]t calls forth the direct interference of 
this state power and the interposition of its organs without mediation. Finally, it produces 
an unemployed surplus population which [...] grasps at state office [...] provoking the 
creation of state posts. (My emphasis, EB, p. 243). 
 
       This binding of the class of atomised property-holding peasants by the ‘uniform 
intervention’ of a ‘supreme centre’ on the one hand, and the individualistic but en masse 
recruitment into the state machinery on the other hand, constituted the objective basis for the 
passive representation of the peasant class by the ‘supreme centre’ and Bonaparte’s 
representation of the ‘most numerous class’. 
      The peasant mass ‘serves as the foundation’ of the executive apparatus without being a social 
class, in the developed sense of having attained an independent political or civil self-
representation. At the same time this class in-tself subsists in isolation from civil society, as ‘the 
                                                            
196 That an external third element is required for the transition into a ‘positive unity’ is nicely illustrated by Marx’s 
‘notorious’ simile of the peasants as ‘a sack of potatoes’. (EB, p. 239). Logically, potatoes are ‘self-subsistent’ inert 
units that it is impossible to form a mixture by themselves or enter into a ‘chemical’ connection constituting a 
‘compound’.  To form a ‘unity’ they must be contained into a ‘sack’. It is the sack as container, distinct as material 
element from the potatoes that unifies them into a ‘sack of potatoes’.    
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class which represents barbarism within civilization’.197 This double condition explains the 
paradoxical situation of a form of state power that ‘seem[s] to have attained a completely 
autonomous position [...] vis-à-vis civil society’ (EB, p. 238), thus giving rise to interpretative 
frames that deny the class representative character of the state or assign to it a ‘relative 
autonomous’ standing in relation to class society.198  
    The third determination that reinforced the representative alignment of the peasantry behind 
autocratic state power was the very form of property ownership held by the peasants. Small 
holding land property is inherently driven to extinction because the mode of simple reproduction 
it furnishes is exposed to periodic ‘natural catastrophes’, to market crises, to state taxation. The 
historical effect of these adverse conditions led the French peasants into inevitable 
‘indebtedness’ (EB, p. 241) and ‘enslavement by capital’ (EB, p. 242). Even though usurer’s 
capital does not ‘alter the mode of production of isolated petty production’ (Cap. III, p. 730) it 
drastically affected ‘the relation of the peasants to the other classes of society’ (EB, p. 242). 
Firstly, in regard to its internal composition it led to a radicalisation of a minor segment of the 
peasantry that was quashed by the bourgeois forces of the republic. The majority of peasants 
remained ‘conservative’, ‘enclosed within the old order’ and sought redemption ‘by the ghost of 
the Empire’ (EB, p. 240). Secondly, the economic dependency on money capital turned the 
peasantry against the bourgeoisie and its political rule expressed by the ‘parliamentary republic’ 
and into the embrace of the figural representative of the executive power that opposed and finally 
usurped the parliamentary possession of political power. It is significant that the smallholding 
land proprietor in his dependency on money capital turned into a nominal owner of his property 
in a way that suggests an instance of substitute representation. In working for himself he was 
actually working for the benefit of his (exploiting) partner in (property) exchange. The utilisation 
of private property as his personal means of self-sustenance had turned into ‘the pretext that 
allows the capitalist to draw profits, interest and rent from the soil, while leaving the tiller 
himself to work out how to extract the wage for his labour’ (EB, p. 242). The entrance of the 
peasant proprietor into the money-commodity circuit results in a change of his relation of 
reproduction even if his relation to production remains the same. His productive substance loses 
its ‘self-sufficient’ character and with it its quasi-natural state and becomes socialised or 
                                                            
197 Marx, CS, p. 72. ‘Barbarism’ here does not need be construed anachronistically in a pejorative sense but it may 
signify the lack of communication with and incomprehension of an ‘alien’ nation.  
198 P. Thomas, Alien Politics, p. 94, Nicos Poulantzas, Political Power and Social Classes (London: Verso, 1973). 
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entangled in the social interdependency characteristic of bourgeois society. The unity of his 
productive self as owner of his conditions of production is bifurcated into the economic functions 
of sharing his produce with capital on the one hand and with the state as a taxable citoyen on the 
other while he himself is reduced to the status of a self-employed ‘wage labourer’.199 This 
trichotomy accounts for the emergent peasant class conscious ambivalence of opposing the 
bourgeoisie even though holders of private property themselves and affiliating with the 
authoritarian regime even though taxed heavily by it. 
 
 
7.b.  The Dialectic of Political Form between Monarchy and the Republic and Abstract 
Class  Rule 
 
       A new political form, the republic, was instituted by the revolution toppling the monarchical 
regime. The abdication of the King inaugurated not a change of government but a change of the 
form of government. As in most political revolutions there is fluidity in social situations and 
volatility of political events, so the political form of organisation of the new system of rule is 
quite indeterminate till the moment of consolidation of the new regime, usually by the 
ratification of its constitutional charter. In the interim period till stability ensues a social space is 
opened where social classes can field their own vision and struggle over the prospective features 
of the novel political form. In the opened social space class action tends to assume primarily 
forms of political representation of class interests, demands and aspirations that seek to 
advantage the represented classes while at the same time provide political platforms behind 
which class segments and fractions align themselves and build a sense of class unity.  Marx 
identifies three candidate forms of the republic, the social republic, the democratic republic, and 
the parliamentary republic as the representative political forms corresponding to the three most 
active social classes that vied for political rule, the proletariat, the petty-bourgeoisie and the 
bourgeoisie respectively. Of the three forms the ‘parliamentary republic’ prevailed as most 
conducive, according to Marx, to express the rule of the bourgeoisie. I will not examine the 
                                                            
199 ‘The independent peasant or handicraftsman is cut up into two persons. As owner of the means of production he 
is capitalist: as labourer he is his own wage-labourer.’ Marx, Theories of Surplus Value, Part I (Moscow: Progress 
Publishers, 1969), p. 408.  
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historical turns of events or Marx’s descriptive account of them.200 In view of the fact that the 
instituted republican form initiated the practice of universal (male) suffrage and invoked the 
principle of popular sovereignty as its normative basis, it appears as an exemplary case of 
political democracy. My theoretical concern is to distil the general features of Marx’s analysis of 
the republican form so as to assess which features, if any, are deemed by Marx necessary as 
political conditions of possibility for the furtherance of the project of emancipating humanity. 
    These political conditions organise the public stage that allows the expression of class 
representation, the public presence of the ‘literary and political’ class representatives to act and 
formulate the will of the class. The class representatives are the political actors who act for the 
interests of a class, not the classes themselves. The same condition is true for street politics too. 
Participants in popular mobilisations of any type constitute representative segments of their own 
classes however numerous they may be. Classes by themselves are not metaphysical subjects 
who can present themselves directly as ‘the primary political actors’ as an hypostasising 
interpretative view of Marx has it.201 As we have seen classes are constituted by social relations 
and definite socio-material conditions which condition individuals subsumable under these 
relations and conditions to act in certain constrained ways and they cannot be directly 
identifiable with empirical groupings.  
    The express aim of the revolution (of Feb. 1848) was to effectuate an ‘electoral reform’ so as 
to ‘widen the circle of the politically privileged within the possessing class itself’ (EB, p. 152). It 
ended up in the generalisation of the political right to vote which resulted in the convocation of 
the National Assembly which ‘represented the whole nation’ (EB, p. 153). The idea of a ‘social 
republic’ (the social transformation of the bourgeois conditions of existence) proclaimed by the 
proletariat was revealed to be untimely. Its ‘content’ was mere utopia for it could not be put in 
practice since it contradicted ‘the given circumstances and conditions’, it lacked the material 
resources required and disregarded the low ‘level of education attained by the mass of the 
                                                            
200 There is an argument claiming that Marx’s account contains quite a few historical inaccuracies and ‘theoretical 
inconsistencies’. This argument rests exclusively on the series of journalistic articles Marx (and Engels) wrote, The 
Class Struggles in France ignoring Marx’s denser theoretically account in The Eighteenth Brumaire. And the critic 
often confuses factuality with interpretation while he completely misapprehends Marx’s understanding of class 
constitution. See: Richard F. Hamilton, The Bourgeois Epoch: Marx and Engels on Britain, France, and Germany 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1991), pp. 49-121. 
201 Martin E. Spencer commits this hypostasisation fallacy of reading Marx’s idea of class as a ‘primary political 
actor’ in ‘Marx On The State: The Events in France between 1848-1850’, Theory and Society, 7 (1979), pp. 167-198 
(p. 172).  
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people’ (EB, p. 153). The conditions that rendered the implementation of the ‘social republic’ 
impossible are inversely homologous to the conditions that constitute a class for itself. We have 
the lack of the socially objective conditions which generate the common productive powers of 
social labour, the lack of a national network of organisational and political association and the 
lack of the appropriate ‘cultural formation’ or sociopolitical consciousness of the great majority 
of people. It is apparent that the proletariat was not yet a class competent to perform its 
revolutionary project and that the possibility of social revolution calls for the prior development 
of certain socioeconomic and political conditions. The historical impossibility of the ‘social 
republic’ leaves us with the option of the bourgeois republic incorporating the ‘democratic’ and 
the ‘parliamentary’ republican forms.  
    Marx suggests that there is a dialectical linkage between the newly emergent republic and the 
superseded regime. The revolutionary break by changing the form of government maintains at 
the same time a continuity with the former system of rule. 
 
 The bourgeois monarchy of Louis Philippe could only be followed by a bourgeois 
republic. In other words, if a limited section of the bourgeoisie previously ruled in the 
name of the king, the whole of the bourgeoisie would now rule in the name of the people. 
(EB, p. 154).  
 
There is a double transposition taking place in the necessary political metamorphosis from the 
one political form to the other. The first transposition involves a change in the character of the 
legitimating source of political representation. Rule ‘in the name of the king’ was substituted by 
rule ‘in the name of the people’. The represented entity passes from a singular subject (the king) 
to a universal subject (the people). The second transposition involves a shift in the substance of 
the representer (the actual possessor of rule) from a particular ‘section’ to the ‘whole’ of the 
bourgeoisie. In both shifts we evidence a process of generalisation, from the singular to the 
universal on the one hand and from a part to the whole on the other hand. This process of 
generalisation of the respective poles of represented-representer transforms the political 
representative tie also by making it general in character. The political revolution by uncoupling 
the representative nexus from its particularistic embodiments renders the relationship of political 
representation an abstract one. The relationship has now become one holding between two 
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abstract categories, ‘people’ being represented by a ‘class’. Political rule becomes depersonalised 
and political leaders or political institutions (representative assemblies and state apparatuses) 
become the bearers of rulership. Political rule has become abstract and (political) abstraction 
rules.202 As the authorial power of money confines human agents to certain determinate 
economic functions so political rule in abstracto defines the distribution of political functions 
and subordinates their incumbents to the jurisdictional specifications of these functions (i.e. 
formal selection criteria in civil service recruitment, the ‘rule of law’, etc.). 203   
     Historically, it is plausible to claim that there is truth in the proposition that the bourgeoisie 
‘represented’ the ‘people’ since the bourgeoisie, the petty-bourgeoisie and the ‘most numerous’ 
mass of peasant proprietors all shared the common social denominator of being ‘propertied 
classes’ or modes of existence of private property. In this sense bourgeois rule of the political 
republic does not concern primarily which class fraction, political faction, class coalition, bloc of 
classes may rule politically in one or another historical conjuncture but that whoever exercises 
political rule acts above all for the preservation of the society of private property. My 
interpretation of the republican form of political rule as class rule construed in the broad sense of 
representing an entire specific class society rather than one or another particular class is 
consistent with Marx’s assignation to the urban proletariat of the task to ‘overthrow the 
bourgeois order’ (EB, p. 242). Not the overthrow of one or another class (or intra-class fractions) 
which may hegemonise political rule at any particular time204 but of the whole (class) order that 
perpetuates a class-divided society and its corresponding political form. My claim is further 
substantiated by the ambiguous response Marx introduces in order to explicate the political 
outcome of the exercise of universal suffrage. His diagnosis was that ‘the collective will of the 
nation [is] seeking its appropriate expression through the superannuated enemies of the interests 
of the masses’ (EB, p. 171). Clearly, the diagnosis supposes a misrecognition of the self- 
                                                            
202 The abstract political rule of the bourgeois republic manifests itself as the political instance of the general 
condition endemic to capitalist society, of individuals being ruled by abstractions , the idea-form of ‘objective social 
relations’ having become ‘independent’ and opposed to ‘the seemingly independent individuals’. Marx, Gr., 164.   
203 Due to the abstractive character of the representative system of political rule political power has become ‘elusive’ 
and this has given rise to conceptions of political democracy (of C. Lefort) where the ‘locus of power is empty’ 
since the ‘people’ is not a ‘unitary subject’ and the ‘corporeality of the social’ (formerly expressed by ‘the body of 
the king’) has been dissolved. Sofia Näsström, ‘Representative Democracy as Tautology: Ankersmit and Lefort on 
Representation’, European Journal of Political Theory, 5.3 (2006), pp. 321-342 (p. 328). 
204 The marginalisation of the political representation of the non-bourgeois classes (in the narrow sense) meant that 
the ‘mass of the bourgeoisie’ had found in the ‘bourgeois republic’ the ‘form of state in which they could rule 
jointly’.  (EB, p. 165). 
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interests of the ‘collective national will’ since the interests of the ‘masses’ found their expression 
in political representation by their enemies. How can we explain this disparity of interests and 
the self-deluded character of the collective will? Marx does not provide an answer. He proceeds 
to discuss why the ‘party of Order’ (the political representation of the ‘joint-rule’ of the 
bourgeoisie) expresses the common rule of the bourgeoisie despite their distinctive class interests 
(landed property vs. capital) and their opposed pro-royalist sympathies. Thereby he furnishes an 
indirect answer that depends on the divergence of the layers of appearance from (social) essence. 
Individuals enmeshed in the particularity of their social conditions and the ‘different forms of 
property’ that shape such conditions develop ‘modes of thought and views of life’ circumscribed 
by these ‘social conditions of existence’ but their consciousness does not cognise the shaping 
role of these socio-material relations and conditions on their mode of thinking and feeling but the 
‘single individual’ rather ‘imagines’ that his feelings and way of thinking ‘form the real 
determinants and the starting-point of his activity’ (EB, pp. 173-4). As a consequence the 
possibility of a discrepancy is opened up between ‘what a man thinks and says of himself and 
what he really is and does’. This field of imaginary self-deception encompasses also collective 
actors like parties. (EB, p. 174). This discrepancy grounds the potential divorce between the 
apperception of one’s apparent interest and the apprehension of his real interest. The apparent 
interest of each class fraction was opposed to the other. But their real interest was common 
because ‘big landed property in fact has been completely bourgeoisified by the development of 
modern society’ (EB, p. 174).205 So, in spite of their political differences representing their 
apparent interests, their combined parliamentary representation as a party meant that ‘they did 
their real business [...] under a social and not a political title, as representatives of the bourgeois 
world order’ (EB, pp. 174-5). Class rule therefore is not the particular political representation of 
a spectrum of apparent interests even if these are traceable to narrow class specific interests but 
the overall political mediation (that may pass through the executive power than via the 
parliament as in the case of Bonaparte’s rule) of the dominant social form of class existence in 
society. Marx himself concludes definitively that class rule pertains to the political reproduction 
via representation of the general conditions that secure the maintenance of class society instead 
of the representation of direct and apparent class interests in his evaluation of the electoral 
                                                            
205 The political expression of the transformed class character of big landed property became ‘the parliamentary 
republic’ as the ‘fusion’ of the two former monarchies and in which ‘the various species of bourgeois disappeared 
into the bourgeois as such, the bourgeois genus.’ (EB, p. 216).  
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programme of the party of Order which proclaimed ‘the rule of the bourgeois class, the 
preservation, that is, of the vital conditions of its rule: property, family, religion, order!’ (CS, p. 
89). The legislative body controlled by the parliamentary majority was the political 
representation of the social existence of the whole ‘bourgeois world order’, of the society of 
private property.206 If the ‘party of order’ represented this whole order of generalised private 
property irrespective of the particularistic class interests promoted (which appear as variations on 
a common theme) as Marx claims, it is quite plausible that the ‘masses’ voted for it since their 
apparent interest was the preservation of the regime of private property that grounded the mode 
of their particular social existence.207                                    
       It follows that the division in Marxist theory over the question of state power as an 
instrument of the ruling class versus its ‘relative autonomous’ standing to the dominant class is a 
pseudo-dilemma. Both positions are compatible within this broader framework of a 
representative polity whose political form accommodates any class rule if only it takes place on 
behalf of maintaining class society in general. This essential political structure of representation 
of the common interest of class society as the general interest of ‘society’ instead of the particular 
representation of any class interests can account for the possibility of representative governments 
not serving any one particular class but only the perpetuation of the overall class order.          
     The transition from the monarchical to the republican form appears to be a sudden 
transformation from one form of government into an opposite one. But in a deeper layer it is a 
developmental step along a continuum of political rule since the ruling class agency remains the 
same in essence. According to Marx there is a social entity which grounds the continuity 
between the two political forms and this is the ‘centralised state power’. A huge bureaucratic 
machinery ‘arose in the time of the absolute monarchy’ (EB, p. 237) that ‘accelerated’ the decay 
of feudalism and helped to unfetter the maturation of the nascent middle classes, was perfected 
by Napoleon and under the two contrastive political forms of monarchy and the ‘parliamentary 
                                                            
206 ‘The parliamentary republic was […] the only form of state in which both the claims of these particular fractions 
and the claims of all other classes of society were subjected to the general interest of the bourgeois class.’ (EB, p. 
215). This general interest in the preservation of the bourgeois order was not necessarily perceived as an ‘apparent’ 
class interest, for the ‘ordinary bourgeois citizen’ was inclined due to egoism ‘to sacrifice the general interest of his 
class to this or that private motive’ (EB, p. 210).   
207 The class affiliation between the different classes on the shared basis of private property as a reason for the 
resultant pro-bourgeois parliamentary representation is stated by Marx thus: ‘The Party of Order […] possessed an 
army of unpaid vassals in the mass of the petty bourgeoisie and peasants who […] found in the high dignitaries of 
property the natural representatives of their petty property’ (CS, p. 90).  
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republic’ became ‘the instrument of the ruling class’ (EB, p. 238).208 The centralised state that 
undergirds the continuity of political rule has itself changed in accordance with the 
socioeconomic changes that took place in bourgeois civil society. Two structural features 
characterise the modern organisation of state power. Firstly, it incorporated as ‘state attributes’ 
the various decayed feudal political functions organising itself in a planned way ‘characterized 
by a centralization and division of labour reminiscent of a factory’ (my emphasis, EB, p. 237). It 
became functionally differentiated with a technical division of labour reflecting the novel 
organisational pattern instituted by the bourgeois mode of production. According to Marx then, 
the intrinsic organisational pattern of the state machinery is an homologous reflection of the 
social form imposed by the capitalist production process. The second feature concerns the 
administrative appropriation by the state of the newly emergent activities brought forth ‘by the 
division of labour within bourgeois society’ (EB, p. 237). As a result, ‘[e]very common interest 
was immediately detached from society, opposed to it as a higher, general interest, torn away 
from the self-activity of the individual members of society and made a subject for governmental 
activity’ (EB, p. 237). The developing social division of labour was generating new types of 
productive activities which meant the constitution of ‘new interest groups’ having distinct 
‘common’ interests built around these activities. By appropriating the execution of these 
activities in the name of the general interest of society the state expropriated these interest groups 
from their ‘self-activity’. In a more philosophical vein, these two essential features of the modern 
state express the double relationship that the political state maintains to civil society as argued by 
Marx in his Critique of Hegel’s Doctrine of the State. These are the relation of externality where 
the state imposes itself upon civil society (the division and opposition between ‘common’ and 
‘general’ interest) and the relation of determinacy of the state as a reflected form conditioned by 
the property structure of civil society (its ‘factory-like’ organisational format).  
      Two aspects of the democratic political form or political democracy based on the political 
representation of popular sovereignty intimate its progressive character over the monarchical 
form of government in Marx’s view. The first concerns the introduction of transparency in the 
political struggles taking place among the political representatives of the different classes. The 
class representatives can contend directly with each other in the political arena without such 
                                                            
208 The same theoretical account of the ‘centralised state power’ serving the ‘nascent middle-class society’ across the 
divide of the political regimes as ‘an engine of class despotism’ is reiterated by Marx in ‘The Civil War in France’,  
Marx: Later Political Writings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 181-2. 
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political contestation being mediated by the presence of the Crown that obfuscates political class 
conflict with ‘the possibility of diverting the national attention by their secondary conflicts 
amongst themselves and with the monarchy.’ (EB, p. 175). Direct universal suffrage permits the 
election of political representatives from the whole array of classes in society.209 By voicing and 
juxtaposing the various class interests one against another the classes represented undergo an 
educative political experience in learning to discern what their real interests might be and who 
the class opponents are. Parliamentary debates in England provided a consistent source of 
information on the mindsets and the ideological proclivities of the class representatives. They 
revealed and hid the real motives behind legal enactments but the struggle of words between the 
rival class factions was ‘the midwife of truth on the question’ debated. (Cap. I, pp. 830-1). 
Parliamentary representation functions as a vehicle of upgrading the political culture of the 
subordinate classes, a public school of raising class consciousness, a force of national 
enlightenment.210  
     The second aspect and the most significant is that the form of representative democracy 
affords to all classes a share in political power. The Constitution which established the ‘new 
form of government’ based on the representation of popular sovereignty, if it meant to secure the 
political rule of the bourgeoisie it rather initiated a process of political contestation of the 
exclusive prerogative of the dominant class to rule, for:   
                                                       
[I]t gives political power to the classes whose social slavery it is intended to perpetuate; 
proletariat, peasants and petty bourgeoisie. And it deprives the bourgeoisie, the class 
whose old social power it sanctions, of the political guarantees of this power. It imposes 
on the political rule of the bourgeoisie democratic conditions which constantly help its 
enemies towards victory and endanger the very basis of bourgeois society. (CS, p. 71).  
 
      Three novel conditions are introduced with the constitution of the democratic political form 
based on universal suffrage, which mitigate the exclusive rule of the bourgeoisie. First, it allows 
all classes to be politically represented and thus to share political power and/or contest its mode 
                                                            
209 Thus it was revealed the error of the republican school of thought which thought the ‘people’ as citoyens to share 
the same interests and views as an undifferentiated body. ‘Instead of their imaginary people the electors revealed the 
real people, that is, the representatives of the different classes which comprised the people’. (CS, p. 56).   
210 As we have seen in chapter three, a similar function of public enlightenment is assigned by Hegel to the 
deliberations conducted in parliament by corporate representatives.  
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of exercise.211 The resultant national assembly is ‘the freely elected representation of the people’ 
with representation being ‘the muscles which connect the parliamentary head with the body of 
the nation’ (EB, p. 230).  Second, even though the bourgeoisie maintains its ‘social power’ it is 
deprived of ‘the political guarantees’ of its social power. This deprivation refers to the loss of 
command of the repressive apparatus of the executive power being wielded in the interest of the 
bourgeoisie to put down any popular contestations of its rule. A levelled down playing field is 
created where executive power ought not to be monopolised by one class against the others. This 
condition is vitiated by the republican principle ‘of separation of powers’.212 Marx is adamant 
that the three powers of the political democratic republic (the parliamentary, the executive and 
the military) must form a unitary centre of power for otherwise sovereignty is divisible and 
subject to internal confrontation over the control of the state apparatus. Moreover, the 
concentration of both legislative and governmental (executive) power must rest in the hands of 
the people’s elected representatives and the executive power ought to be selected out of the ranks 
of the Assembly itself.213  In general, if the executive is made independent from the legislature 
then ‘[t]he opposition between executive and legislature expresses the opposition between a 
nation’s heteronomy and its autonomy.’ (EB,p. 236) 214. A major contradiction in the constitution 
establishing the parliamentary republic was exactly this. That it provided for two independent 
though politically representative institutions (the National Assembly and the Presidency), both of 
which traced their legitimacy to the popular will and whose clash over the ultimate control of the 
executive power resulted in a prolonged interregnum and the subsequent demise of the 
parliamentary power. (CS, pp. 71, 77) Third, ‘the democratic conditions’ that accompany the 
democratic republic and constrain the exclusivity of class rule concern the vibrant functioning of 
a public sphere where classes can launch their own independent organs of communication and 
publicity, form their own political and cultural associations and freely campaign to influence 
                                                            
211 Likewise for England, Marx rather optimistically, deems universal suffrage as ‘the equivalent of political power 
for the working class. […] Its inevitable result is [its] political supremacy’. Cited in David MacGregor, The 
Communist Ideal in Hegel and Marx (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), p. 169. 
212 It originates from the ‘assembly of barons’ in pre-modern England that solidified in the ‘public mind’ the idea of 
‘division of powers’ and of ‘limited power under law’ as foundational tenets of ‘representative government’. 
Francois  Guizot [1851], The History of the Origins of Representative Government in Europe (Indianapolis: Liberty 
Fund, 2002), Part II, Lecture 1, pp. 227-9. 
213 H. Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, v. 1, p. 296. 
214 The heteronomy of the nation rests on the uncontrollable power that the executive can apply to it. The autonomy 
of the nation rests in raising ‘its general will to the level of law’. In the bourgeois controlled Assembly the law of the 
ruling class was made the nation’s general will. (EB, p. 236).    
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public opinion (the anonymous press functioning as ‘the third power in the state’).215 Marx 
opposes any form of censorship, governmental practices of gerrymandering, restrictions on voter 
eligibility, exclusion of the uneducated from jury lists and upholds the independence of judicial 
courts from executive power while he favours unicameralism seeing the bicameral system as a 
designed bulwark against the direct expressivity of popular sovereignty.216     
       In the absence of a social class whose self-consciousness demands the abolition of the 
system of private property and the negation of class society, the ‘constitutional republic’ 
continues to be the political form that is geared to the maintenance of the class rule of the 
‘bourgeois world order’. The politically representative assemblies institutionalised in 
constitutional democracy will tend to reflect in a rather distorted way, due to the electoral 
sparseness of proportional representation, the only electoral system that truly respects the 
universalistic principle of isopsephia or equality of vote, the various segments into which the 
political category of the ‘people’ is fractured and the socio-cultural cleavages around which 
collectivities form their political identities and seek to express them by representative politics. 
The formation into a revolutionary class of the collectivity of waged producers (becoming 
capable in self-transforming themselves in tandem with the changing of circumstances) is the 
product of an-going class struggle. For such struggle to flourish nonetheless the ‘democratic 
republic’, according to late Marx, is a sociopolitical necessity for it constitutes ‘the last form of 
the state for bourgeois society’ in which the stakes of class struggle can be resolved 
‘definitively’,217 suggesting the possibility of accession to state power via majority rule. 
Otherwise the ‘democratic republic’ would have been irrelevant to the cause of the revolutionary 
transformation of bourgeois society. 
  
                                                            
215 The ‘democratic conditions’ are highlighted by the political agenda of the petty-bourgeois democratic republicans 
(right of association, of free press, universal public education etc.) condemned by the regime of bourgeois despotism 
as ‘socialistic’. (CS, p. 121; p. 134 on the press). On Marx’s view of the free press as ‘the only effective control’ of 
governmental arbitrariness, H. Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, v. 1, p. 292.  
216 H. Draper, Karl Marx’s Theory of Revolution, v. 1, pp. 301-3. 
217 Marx, ‘Critique of the Gotha Programme’ in Marx: Later Writings, p. 223.  
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                                                                 Conclusions 
 
       The general point arrived by the analytic excursion in these major thinkers of political 
modernity is that political representation constitutes a unitary political society as the basis of 
legitimate power or government. Representative government is set up as a separate part of the 
political community exercising its sovereign power ‘in the name of’ or ‘on behalf’ of the 
political society. Modern political thought (Hobbes, Locke, Hegel) conceives political 
representation as a structure which ensures that individual freedom and the public good are 
secured for the members of the political society. This account is vitiated by the split between 
political society or the state and civil society. Marx censures liberal and republican theory for 
ignoring the effect of the rift between civil/bourgeois society and political society on popular 
sovereignty. The representative polity is either an ideal reflection of abstract atomised 
individuality or a semblance of popular participation in the sovereign power of the state. In either 
case the concrete universality of freedom and the democratic self-determination of the political 
community is being denied. Instead, money as the organiser of social exchange and human 
relations under the regime of private property shapes the representative polity after its own image 
and renders democracy as popular sovereignty a lie.  
     I present briefly some concluding remarks as general points for each political thinker 
analysed. Hobbes’ author-actor model is the ground of political representation. It provides for 
contractual transfer of will from person to person. It establishes the relationship of the 
representative acting in the name of the represented (political community). It is deficient in two 
major respects that deny the legitimacy of the representative government. The establishment of 
the sovereign representative is permanent. The initial authorisation cannot be retracted no matter 
what. It follows that no political freedom exists and alienated representation is consolidated. The 
sovereign representative is arbitrary. He is above the law and defines the laws and the public 
good at will. Thus he is unaccountable to the represented and breaches the representative 
connection. He ought to act for them and acts for himself.  
 In Locke the political community sets up the representative form of government through 
majority rule. It assigns supreme power to the legislative. The structure of political 
representation is triadic. The mandate given to the representative government is not to represent 
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the wishes of the represented but to act for the public good, for ‘the preservation of society’ on 
behalf of the represented. No one is above the law and positive law is itself judged by the 
standards of natural law, hence Locke’s notion of ‘unjust laws’. Justice is irreducible to positive 
right. In case the public good is not served by the representative power the latter loses its 
representativeness and it is legitimately exposed to overthrow. The political society enjoys the 
freedom to change either the government or the form of government or even to dissolve itself.  
     The societal differentiation of the political and civil spheres is explicitly addressed by the 
young Hegel. Political representation is recognised as the principle of the modern world. For 
Hegel, in the modern world the representative connection between ruler and ruled is reversed. 
The territorially-based political community grounds the institution of rulership and it is not, as in 
feudal society, the ruler who conditions the political existence of the community of the ruled 
subjects. To reconcile subjective and objective freedom and to maintain the ethical unity of the 
rational state, Hegel assigns a structural role to representation. Representation functions as a 
social glue of civil society to the political state and undergirds the state’s differentiated unity. 
Three forms of representation provide for the confluence of civil society with the political state 
as the rational state. These are: ethical or equitable representation (concrete justice requires that 
judicious judgment of the defendant must be dispensed by representatives of the same social 
estate he belongs to), corporate representation (corporate representatives are socialised into the 
higher ends of the state) and participation by representation into the institutional complex of the 
political state proper. Hegel privileges the elitist conception of the representative who is not 
mandated and looks after the state’s ends not the particular interests of his constituency. Political 
representation in the representative assembly is primarily a matter of deliberations for the 
edification of public opinion and a political show that the formal freedom of civil society is being 
respected.  
      For the Marx of 1843, Hegel’s attempt at the political articulation of the rational state is 
misguided. Hegel acknowledges the universality of the principle of subjective freedom. His 
model of restricted political representation condones the superiority of some social groups over 
the rest. By institutionalising political inequality in political representation of subjective freedom 
the political state does not ensure universal freedom and thus its rational character is marred. In 
reality, the state’s administrative bureaucracy seeks its own maintenance, not the representation 
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of the public interest.  The bourgeois split of the private self from the abstract citizen impedes the 
convergence of particular interests with the universal end of the state. For it cannot be supposed 
that the individual can transcend his (property-based) egoism and accede to the universal end.  
Marxian democracy requires the supersession of the separation of the political sphere from the 
civil domain so that the universal, the common bond integrating the social whole, is concretised 
in the particular social existence of each individual. Universal political enfranchisement provides 
for political democracy but it cannot overcome the separation of civil society from the political 
realm by itself because it conceives the citizen as abstract individuality. It cannot express the 
social interdependence characteristic of the societal community. Only societal or ‘true’ 
democracy can do that. Societal democracy entails the self-conscious positing of the political 
constitution of society’s communal being. The possibility of societal democracy rests on the 
organic unity of the human species-being. Each species member exists as a creature of needs and 
producer of social need-satisfactions. Hence each societal member is involved in an 
interconnection of mutual complementariness. Their common essence is being-for-the-other or 
being-for-self by being-for-the-other. In Marx, social representation by which each represents by 
being what he is and does, is a mutual relation. The producing self acts for another’s need 
sustaining the other’s concrete life while representing it as human. For Marx, social 
representation germinates under the regime of private property in alienated form.  
    Money as the universal representative of the commodity world subjects social exchange to the 
form of a double substitute representation. Each commodity owner acts for the other as a 
surrogate of the other in seeking to obtain the other’s private property and as a substitute of his 
own self in reducing the self from an end to a means and thus becoming self-estranged. 
Commodity selves act out economic functions authorised by money in the circuit of social 
exchange. The system of political representation exhibits isomorphic elements and relations 
analogous to the features prescribed by the authorial function of money. As a consequence, it 
cannot vouchsafe the self-determination of the political community and political democracy as 
popular sovereignty appears impossible to be realised. The modern (French post-revolutionary) 
‘governmental form of the parliamentary republic’ becomes the realm of the social classes’ 
political representation. Social classes are represented politically in the legislature either directly 
or virtually by symbolic representation (the peasant class by the elected president of the 
republic). The parliamentary republic is an advance over constitutional monarchy for bourgeois 
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society in that it allows the political unity of the bourgeoisie by placing on the political agenda 
class rule as a whole instead of the political confrontation of the subdivisions of the bourgeoisie 
mediated by the presence of the Crown. Parliamentary government ensures political rule for the 
bourgeois class system as a whole rather than catering to particular segments of it. The 
parliamentary republic affords also the political representation of the subordinate classes 
provided that some democratic conditions are in force. Political representation in parliament and 
the public sphere can invigorate social class self-consciousness. Popular sovereignty beckons to 
societal democracy for its realisation. True democracy as the expression of human emancipation 
requires the supersession of the rift between civil society and state power which in turn requires 
the abolition of the generalised regime of private property. Till then social representation as the 
inner bond of the human species being will subsist under its alienated form conditioned by 
money’s social power. 
     Though I address the role representation plays in the thought of each thinker separately, not 
comparatively, their examination under a single focus has suggested certain basic similarities 
which all of them share, three of which are the most significant. 1) They share the idea that 
political power, whatever its form, rests on the political community over which it rules. 2) All 
accept the notion of the indivisibility of sovereign power in the sense that they deem it 
destructive of the state if any kind of dual power existed within it. Hence none espouses a 
doctrine of the separation of powers. Even Hegel who develops a doctrine of the ‘division of 
powers’ sees the differentiated powers dialectically interlinked in an organic whole with the 
power of the sovereign at the apex and all other powers subordinate to it. As a consequence none 
of the four considers viable a model of ‘checks and balances’ between relatively independent but 
equal in authority powers. 3) For all of them, political representation constitutes the mode of 
unity of the community with the sovereign power even though the mode of unity is different for 
each one in particular.                                                    
     My theoretical analysis has engaged with four of the most significant political philosophers of 
modernity. The need to focus on the concrete mode of articulation of their conceptual 
constructions and the place of political representation in them which is an endeavour to map out 
a virgin territory has not permitted me to enter into a comparative analysis of them. Nonetheless 
I think that this is a very promising research venue. Though the Hobbes-Locke and the Hegel-
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Marx couples are often discussed comparatively in the literature, the comparative analysis of 
Hobbes with Hegel and Marx with Locke could bring out interesting research results.   
      Another interesting line of research investigation would be the resemblance in the thinking of 
Hegel and Marx on the connection between social class and its political representatives. There is 
a common ground in their conceptions, namely the idea that the class representative shares 
objectively the same substance with the class he represents. For Hegel the political representative 
embodies objectively the ‘social sphere’ that has chosen him to express its interest by his 
presence in legislature. For Marx also the literary and political representatives embody in their 
mentality the class horizons of the class they speak for. Common social and mental substance 
between social class/corporate community and representatives in the public-political domain is 
the ground of political representation. Their difference is that Marx introduces a meta-level in the 
representative connection. For him political representation assumes a reflexive character in that it 
is an essential condition for the class to attain consciousness of itself as a class. The 
representative is not a mere mirror-image of the class’s interest. Political representation functions 
to transform class substance into a class subject. For Hegel too the representative has an 
educative role for his social estate, only this educational function through publicity is not 
oriented to the purpose of making the particular corporate class conscious of itself but to teach it 
the character of the state’s universal end and to make it appreciate how to put the general affairs 
of the state above its particular interest-based pursuits. On the other hand, as I have pinpointed in 
the seventh chapter Marx also acknowledges this enlightenment dimension of the public/political 
activity of the class representative so the similarity in their accounts may be more than 
superficial. 
   Lastly, an intriguing connection disclosed by my research which I think deserves further 
extensive examination is the connection between representation and the doubling of the self. This 
connection holds both at the individual and the communal level. It seems to be a constitutive 
condition of modernity itself. Its elucidation will help bring about a better understanding of the 
socio-political divisions pervading our communal existence and perhaps indicate possible routes 
of overcoming them.  
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